Baker v. Beam
| Decision Date | 01 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:16-cv-01737-AWI-BAM (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | MIKE BAKER, Plaintiff, v. E. BEAM, et al., Defendants. |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff Mike Baker ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
On November 16, 2016, this action was opened pursuant to the undersigned's order severing the unrelated claims in Plaintiff's complaint filed in a related action, Baker v. S. Cacoa, et al., 1:15-cv-00693-AWI-BAM (PC). Plaintiff's May 6, 2015 complaint in that action was ordered to be filed in this newly created case. Plaintiff was also ordered to pay the filing fee for this new action, or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2, p 4.)
On December 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 4), and on December 27, 2016, Plaintiff's certified trust account statement was filed in support, (ECF No. 7.) On January 3, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 8.)
On January 20, 2017, this Court screened Plaintiff's complaint and determined that Plaintiff's complaint stated certain cognizable claims. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff was instructed to either file a first amended complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies in his other claims, or to notify the Court of his intent to proceed only on the cognizable claims in the complaint. (Id. at pp. 35-36.) On April 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 12.) The Court screened the first amended complaint and determined that the amended complaint stated cognizable claims. Plaintiff was instructed to either file a second amended complaint or notify the Court of his intent to proceed only on the cognizable claims. (ECF No. 13.) Following multiple extensions of time requested by Plaintiff, the second amended complaint is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 25.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendantacted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Courts are required to liberally construe pro se prisoner complaints. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976).
Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison at Coalinga, California. The events at issue in the complaint are alleged to have occurred when Plaintiff was housed at Corcoran State Prison ("CSP"), in Corcoran, California.
Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Registered Nurse ("RN") L. Vasquez; (2) RN Y. Ponce De Leon; (3) (former) Correctional Sergeant (and later, Officer) E. Beam; (4) Correctional Sergeant R. Vogel; (5) Correctional Sergeant Cuevas; (6) Correctional Officer T. Caldwell; (7) Correctional Officer N. Huerta; (8) Correctional Officer R. Cervantes; (9) Correctional Officer Benevidas; (10) Correctional Counselor II D. Goree; (11) Correctional Counselor II J. Diaz; (12) Correctional Counselor II K. Cribbs; (13) Correctional Counselor II A. Pacillas; (14) Correctional Counselor II E.G. Jarvis; (15) Chief Deputy Warden M. Sexton; and (16) D. Davey, the Warden.
Plaintiff's allegations in the second amended complaint do not vary from the original complaint filed on November 16, 2017 and screened on January 20, 2017. Since Plaintiff's allegations in the second amended complaint are largely the same, with some additional factual allegations, the Court finds it most expedient to summarize and discuss the second amended complaint allegations as necessary in the sections below.
III. Analysis of the Complaint
Plaintiff asserts that Sergeant Vogel, Officers Caldwell and Cervantes, and Warden Davis violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to serious risks to his health and safety.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045.
To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
"[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate must show "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.'" Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)). Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, delay or intentional interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) "a 'serious medical need' by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'" and (2) "the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent." Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012).
Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and fails to adequately respond. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1018. "Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard." Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). The prison official must be aware of facts from which he could make an inference that "a substantial risk of serious harm exists" and he must make the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1998).
"Mere 'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Vogel and Officers Caldwell and Cervantes violated the Eighth Amendment by interfering with his medical care and his use of prescribed medical devices. Plaintiff alleges that he informed Sergeant Vogel of his chronos and medical need for such devices, based on his continuing recovery from knee surgery and a cracked spine. Plaintiff further alleges that Sergeant Vogel obstructed his possession of the devices, causing him...
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