Baker v. Benton Area Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 29 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:16-CV-02311,4:16-CV-02311 |
| Citation | 418 F.Supp.3d 17 |
| Parties | Stephanie BAKER, Plaintiff, v. BENTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Columbia Montour Snyder Union Counties of Central Pennsylvania Service System, Coleen Genovese, Kelly Kocher, and Lindsay Rado, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Barry H. Dyller, Law Office of Barry H. Dyller, Wilkes-Barre, PA, Patrick T. O'Connell, Law Office of Patrick T. O'Connell, Bloomsburg, PA, for Plaintiff.
Ellis H. Katz, Justin D. Barbetta, Sweet. Stevens, Katz & Williams LLP, New Britain, PA, Elizabeth Kramer, Frank J. Lavery, Jr., Lavery Law, Harrisburg, PA, Josh Autry, Morgan & Morgan, Lexington, KY, for Defendants.
"A poet or other who can make nothing clear, can stir up enough sediment to render the bottom of a basin as invisible as the deepest gulf in the Atlantic."1
This Court, sitting about 170 miles from the Atlantic, finds the bottom of this basin—a summary judgment ruling in full favor of Defendants—only partially visible. Plaintiff has stirred up enough factual sediment to cloud the Court's view and impair a conclusive victory for Defendants.
Defendants Benton Area School District ("BASD"), Coleen Genovese, Kelly Kocher, and Lindsay Rado (collectively with BASD, the "BASD Defendants") moved for summary judgment against Plaintiff Stephanie Baker. Defendant Columbia Montour Snyder Union Counties of Central Pennsylvania Service System ("CMSU") also moved for summary judgment against Baker.
A. Procedural History
Baker sued Defendants on November 17, 2016.2 Her Complaint had four claims. Count I alleges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants retaliated against Baker for exercising her free speech rights, and "conspired with each other and with others to" do so.3 Count II alleges under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law4 that Defendants retaliated against Baker for being a whistleblower.5 Count III alleges that CMSU violated Baker's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by terminating her without notice or an opportunity to be heard.6 Count IV alleges that Defendants Genovese, Kocher and Rado published defamatory and false communications about Baker.7
On August 28, 2017, I decided Defendants' motions to dismiss.8 I dismissed Baker's First Amendment retaliation claim (Count I) against CMSU and BASD. I also dismissed Baker's due process claim (Count III) and defamation claim (Count IV) in their entirety. But I granted Baker leave to amend her Complaint.
Baker filed an Amended Complaint on October 4, 2017.9 The BASD Defendants and CMSU each moved for summary judgment on July 8, 2019.10 Each of these motions are now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, each of these motions is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I begin my analysis with the standard of review which undergirds summary judgment. "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose."11 Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."12 "Facts that could alter the outcome are ‘material facts,’ and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct."13 "A defendant meets this standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff's case."14 "A plaintiff, on the other hand, must point to admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie case under applicable substantive law."15 When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.16
"The inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits."17 Thus, "if the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented."18 "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."19 "The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks...‘whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ "20 The evidentiary record at trial, by rule, will typically never surpass that which was compiled during the course of discovery.
"A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."21 "Regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."22
Where the movant properly supports his motion, the nonmoving party, to avoid summary judgment, must answer by setting forth "genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."23 For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" must be supported by: (i) "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" that go beyond "mere allegations"; (ii) "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute"; or (iii) "showing...that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact."24
"When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.’ "25 Moreover, "if a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may...consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion."26 On a motion for summary judgment, "the court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record."27
Finally, "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."28 "There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."29 "If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."30
With that standard outlining the Court's framework for review, I now turn to the undisputed facts of this matter.
In March 2013, Synergy Systems Group, Inc. ("Synergy") hired Baker to work as a "Blended Counselor" with BASD.32 Baker has a degree in criminology from Indiana University of Pennsylvania. She does not have a certification from the Pennsylvania Department of Education.33 When Baker was working with BASD's middle/high school (seventh to twelfth grade), Genovese was the principal, Kocher was the guidance counselor, and Rado was the special education director.34
When Baker was working at BASD under Synergy, she sometimes needed to attend off-site meetings with Synergy's CEO, Glenn Simington.35 Baker did not tell Genovese about these meetings beforehand.36 Genovese would then get upset because she didn't know where Baker was.37 Genovese memorialized these concerns in an email titled "Absences" of March 12, 2015, where she told Baker:
As the building principal, please make me aware of when you will and will not be in the district (sick, personal, vacation days etc). I realize that I am not the one who approves your days, but I need to be aware of when you will be out. Me knowing your whereabouts is always important, but especially at this time of year moving to graduation when we need all hands on deck.
Baker replied that she was "sorry for not telling you personally that I was leaving today" and would "be sure to do so in the future."38
In November or December 2015, Kocher brought more issues with Baker's attendance to Genovese's attention, relating that Baker was "coming late... almost every single day" and "leaving early."39 Genovese discussed this with Baker, instructing Baker again to let her know when Baker would be out.40
After this discussion, Genovese heard that Baker had been saying negative things about Genovese in the community. Some of Kocher's family told Genovese that Baker was at a wine fest in October 2015. Per Kocher's family, Baker was intoxicated and told them how much she hated Genovese and that Genovese was a "bitch" and a "cunt."41 Genovese also heard that Baker had been talking to teachers about how much she hated the school district.42
Baker would tell Rado about discipline issues that Baker saw in BASD, like students showing bullying behaviors. Rado would tell Baker that she needed to bring these issues up with Genovese, because they were out of Rado's department ...
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