Baker v. Beto

• Decision Date: 13 March 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-H-345.
• Parties: James E. BAKER et al. v. Dr. George J. BETO et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

349 F. Supp. 1263

James E. BAKER et al. v. Dr. George J. BETO et al.

Civ. A. No. 71-H-345.

United States District Court, S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

March 13, 1972.

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James De Anda, Corpus Christi, Tex., Ed Idar, Jr., San Antonio, Tex., Frances T. Freeman Cruz, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Robert Flowers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

OWEN D. COX, District Judge.

This is an action originally filed by Plaintiffs, James E. Baker, Coy Ray Campbell, Sam Bernard, and Fred Arispe Cruz, convicted felons and prisoners of Texas Department of Corrections (TDC), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Sam Bernard asked to be, and he was, dismissed as a Plaintiff.

The remaining three prisoners, whose present status results from their total disregard of the rights of others, are asking, for themselves and as alleged representatives of their class, by way of rather ambiguous pleadings, for declarations by this Court that (1) the procedures followed by TDC in imposing prison discipline for infractions of its policies and rules of conduct violate Plaintiffs' fundamental rights of procedural due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America; (2) the rules and procedures relating to the handling of the mail, that is, reading, censoring, copying, withholding or delaying written communications, particularly between the prisoners (clients) and their attorneys, violate their fundamental First Amendment right of expression and deprive them of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) the monitoring, observing or interfering with the attorney-prisoner (client) visits also violates such First Amendment right of expression and denies said prisoners equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Plaintiffs herein, and others which they purport to represent as members of their class, have suffered the loss of "good time" and have been committed to solitary confinement while inmates of the Texas prison systems by virtue of disciplinary procedures followed in the prison system; and, they seek injunctive relief in connection with any favorable declarations of this Court, including orders to require the Defendants to recompute their respective good-time status; and to prohibit Defendants from continuing the present procedures for imposing prison discipline, the censorship of correspondence, and interference with attorney-prisoner (client) conferences.

This Court will first concern itself with the question of what rights does a prisoner accused of violating the rules of the prison system have? The Courts do generally recognize that the prisoner does not carry with him into prison all of the rights which the law-abiding citizens of this country enjoy. "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948). But, the earlier, extreme attitude that the prisoner was "for the time being a slave of the State"¹ has been relaxed in recent years. Although the relaxation of the sterner views of years past has been considerable, there is yet no real uniformity as to how extensive a prisoner's rights may now be. Some Courts appear to be excessively sympathetic to the convict and thus over-react to his plight, or so it seems to this Court. Others give more consideration to the extremely difficult task of maintaining order among prisoners, many of whom are incorrigible and violent.

In this case, we are only concerned with the constitutional rights of the convicts to some degree of due process, equal protection of the laws, and freedom of expression. Direct access to the Courts to air grievances the prisoner has, regardless of how vicious or incorrigible he may be. This right is well recognized. But, as to the other constitutional protections named, this Court feels that only minimal safeguards are necessary. The degree of constitutional protection to be afforded the convicted criminal must necessarily be measured against the demanding requirements placed upon the prison system to control and discipline a large number of prisoners prone to unruliness, under very trying circumstances, and weighted in favor of the latter. Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5 Cir., 1969).

With regard to the procedures for disciplinary action which result in either a loss of "good time" or commitment in solitary confinement, the only issue relates to due process. There doesn't seem to the Court to be any issue with regard to lack of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The procedures that are followed affect all prisoners alike. That law-abiding citizens have more protection by way of due process than do prisoners of the state is not such a distinction as creates unequal protection. Both law-abiding citizens and convicted criminals are entitled to due process, but the process due the law-abiding citizen is considerably greater than the process which is due to any convicted criminal serving time in the penitentiary. The Court finds no facts which indicate any violations of the rights of the three named Defendants to claim a failure of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to disciplinary action.

When a prisoner runs the risk of revocation of his "good time" already accrued, or of a sentence to solitary confinement, for an infraction of any of the rules and regulations of the Texas prison system, he is entitled to be heard as soon as practicable after the infraction is reported. The procedures set up by such prison system, and which the evidence shows are followed, require this. There is no evidence in this case which indicates any accused prisoner is given a formal, written notice of the charges against him at any particular period of time in advance of the hearing. However, the procedures provide, and the Court finds, that the accusations against the prisoner are fully explained to him before the hearing commences, and formally read to him when the hearing starts. The hearing is before a committee of three prison officials. At the time of this hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the prisoner and, if any, the punishment, the accused prisoner is given a full opportunity to tell his side of the story. The officer who has accused the prisoner of an infraction of a rule or regulation may sit on the committee. This may not be the better practice, but, standing alone, does not violate any constitutional right of the prisoner. The Court finds no constitutional abuse resulted to the named prisoners by the actions of the committees before whom they appeared.

The forfeiture of good time is permissible, and the Courts should not interfere with the decision of the disciplinary committee in forfeiting the good time of any prisoner. Sexton v. United States, 429 F.2d 1300 (5 Cir., 1970); Theriault v. Blackwell, Warden, 437 F.2d 76 (5 Cir., 1971).

The case of Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 395, 34 S.Ct. 779, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914), makes it clear that the fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. Once that is granted and minimal procedures followed to insure that the prisoner may, if he desires, speak his piece without interference, there can be no clear showing of arbitrary or capricious action which makes the forfeiture of good time invalid.

No Court should camouflage its decision as to what it thinks would be a fair and humane procedure in a particular case, with a constitutional mantle. The Fifth Circuit has been very chary, and rightly so, about interfering in the internal operations and administration of prison systems and this policy has been followed except in exceptional cases. Diehl v. Wainwright, 5 Cir., 419 F. 2d 1309. A prisoner's complaint about the lack of medical attention did not, in the case of Thompson v. Blackwell, 374 F.2d 945 (5 Cir., 1967), "rise to the level of stating facts which would make out a case of an abuse of discretion on the part of the prison authorities." The Federal Court should refuse to interfere with the internal administration of any state prison system except in the most extreme cases involving a shocking deprivation of fundamental rights. Baldwin v. Smith, 446 F.2d 1043 (2 Cir., 1971). This rule is also followed in Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2 Cir., 1971).

The TDC does not permit a prisoner to have legal counsel or counsel substitute at such disciplinary hearing, nor necessarily allow the prisoner to be confronted by all the witnesses against him. He is not permitted to cross-examine any of the witnesses. The denial of these rights which the law-abiding citizen customarily has does not constitute lack of due process for the convicted felon. These hearings are carried forward in good faith and are not merely a formality to be gotten over with as quickly as possible. The evidence reflects that many prisoners have been absolved at such hearings and this fact attests to the fairness of the hearings as conducted by the prison officials.

There is provided adequate protection for an accused prisoner against errors and mistakes which might occur at the disciplinary hearing. The prisoner is not entitled to be present at any review of his case, but his absence does not offend due process, since no evidence is taken during review proceedings. Decisions of the disciplinary committee are customarily reviewed by the warden, except as to minor infractions, and he may approve, modify or disapprove the action taken by the committee. The Court does not consider this review to be perfunctory.

In those cases where the prison disciplinary committee recommends forfeiture of an inmate's statutory "good time," a review by the state disciplinary committee...