Baker v. Bowen
Decision Date | 29 February 1988 |
Docket Number | No. S 87-207.,S 87-207. |
Citation | 680 F. Supp. 304 |
Parties | Brice A. BAKER, Plaintiff, v. Otis BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Lawrence J. Clifford, Susan A. Horn, South Bend, Ind., for plaintiff.
Clifford Johnson, Asst. U.S. Atty., South Bend, Ind., for defendant.
The matter before the court is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the Secretary's final decision denying the plaintiff's claim for Social Security disability benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, and for Supplemental Security Income benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1383 et seq.. The plaintiff, Brice Baker, filed applications for disability benefits and for supplemental income on or about November 18, 1985, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 1985, apparently as having resulted from removal of parts of the liver, bowel, stomach and spleen some ten years earlier. His applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. A hearing was held June 12, 1986, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Frederick Graf, at which the claimant was represented by counsel. On August 20, 1986, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits on the basis of the following findings:
The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision on February 4, 1987, whereby it became the final decision of the Secretary. The plaintiff then complained to this court on April 9, 1987, requesting review. Both sides have filed motions for summary judgment with supportive memoranda, and therefore, the matter is ripe for a decision.
The plaintiff was, at the time of his hearing, thirty-nine years of age. He completed school through the sixth grade and his past employment included doing repairs, truck driving, and operating machinery. In 1975 the plaintiff was seriously injured, having fallen from an irrigation tower. As a result of medical repairs made at that time, surgical clips remain scattered throughout his abdomen. For about nine years after his fall, however, up until November of 1985, Mr. Baker was employed in some of the above-mentioned capacities. The central issue in this case is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that the plaintiff's impairments do not prevent him from performing his past relevant work. Resolution of this issue will involve an examination of the ALJ's treatment of pain, medical evidence, and residual functional capacity to engage in basic work activities. See, e.g., Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917 (7th Cir.1986).
The Social Security Act provides that "the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1983); Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 639 (7th Cir.1987); Burnett v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir.1987). Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Sears v. Bowen, 840 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir.1988); Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917, 923 (7th Cir.1986). A search for substantial evidence must take into account "whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Sears v. Bowen, 840 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir.1988), quoting Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917, 923 (7th Cir.1986). In reviewing the decision of an ALJ which has become the final decision of the Secretary, this court is obliged to review the entire record and all evidence therein, but must accept the ALJ's findings if supported by substantial evidence. Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir.1987); Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir.1987) (per curiam). Although substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, Richardson, at 401, 91 S.Ct. at 1427, it is "something less than the weight of the evidence." Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.1986), quoting Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).
Thus, the question presented for review is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather whether the ALJ's finding of non-disability is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.1987). This court does not decide the facts anew, reweigh evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir.1987); Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir.1984). Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, it is for the Secretary or the Secretary's designate to resolve the conflict. Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.1987); Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82-83 (7th Cir.1986); Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287-88 (7th Cir.1985).
In determining whether or not a claimant is disabled, the Secretary has adopted a five-step sequential evaluation process, which has been summarized as the following inquiry:
An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or on steps (3) and (5) to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point other than at step (3) will lead to a finding that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See, e.g., Veal v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 693, 695 n. 2 (7th Cir.1987). This case was decided at step (4) of the process. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Having determined that the plaintiff could perform his past work, benefits were denied. At this step of the evaluation, the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff. Sears v. Bowen, 840 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.1988). Where a claimant's disability is severe, substantial evidence will still be found to support a finding of not disabled, where the impairment has not prevented the claimant from working in the past, unless other combinations of impairments tend to disable him from work. Sears v. Bowen, 840 F.2d 394, 398-99 (7th Cir.1988).
The plaintiff here contends, first that the ALJ used an incorrect legal standard for evaluating the plaintiff's pain. Pursuant to the Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), the standard for evaluation of pain is as follows:
Id.; Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.1987).
Although objective evidence of pain must be considered by an ALJ in determining whether an individual is disabled, such evidence does not mandate a finding of disability, and in this respect, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ if substantial evidence supports his or her conclusion that the plaintiff's pain is not disabling. Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 1987), citing Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir.1984).
In reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ acknowledged that the plaintiff is impaired by "abdominal pain of uncertain etiology, recurring jaundice, and possible recurring bile duct obstruction, which significantly limit his ability to perform the basic work-related functions of lifting and carrying heavy weights." From this he concluded that the claimant had a severe impairment with respect to step (2) of the sequential evaluation. He also found that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kelsey v. Bowen
...U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.1987); Sparks v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.1986); Baker v. Bowen, 680 F.Supp. 304 (N.D.Ind.1988). On the facts of this case and the record now before the court, the ALJ erred in applying the Grid without considering the......
-
Cozad v. Sullivan, Civ. No. H 81-126.
...(7th Cir.1987); Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650 (7th Cir.1987); Sparks v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1986). See also, Baker v. Bowen, 680 F.Supp. 304 (N.D.Ind.1988). A claimant may prove disability by subjective complaints if he shows: (1) evidence of an objectively adduced abnormality a......