Baker v. Brown

Decision Date06 December 1939
Docket NumberNo. 25133.,25133.
Citation23 N.E.2d 710,372 Ill. 336
PartiesBAKER v. BROWN.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by John R. Baker, as trustee, against Adelbert Brown, on a foreign judgment. From a judgment, 298 Ill.App. 173, 18 N.E.2d 578, reversing a judgment for plaintiff, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and judgment of the Circuit Court for plaintiff affirmed.Appeal from Second Division Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from the Circuit Court, Cook County; Daniel P. Trude, Judge.

John M. Lee, of Chicago (Daniel D. Tuohy, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Woods, Woods, Brown & Salter, of Chicago (Leslie E. Salter and Adelbert Brown, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

GUNN, Justice.

John R. Baker, as trustee, recovered a judgment of $6,419.07 in the circuit court of Cook county, against the defendant, Adelbert Brown. The action was based upon a judgment of the district court of Oklahoma county, Oklahoma (hereinafter referred to as the Oklahoma court), for $4,744.39, entered on September 14, 1932. An appeal was taken to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgment of the circuit court was reversed and judgment entered in favor of the defendant. A petition to appeal to this court was allowed. The question involved is whether the judgment of the Oklahoma court against the appellee, Adelbert Brown, is void and subject to collateral attack in the courts of this State.

The plaintiff, John R. Baker, trustee, sued in the Oklahoma court as assignee of the rights of certain taxpayers. The petition alleged, in substance, that one M. E. Durham had contracted with various taxpayers to recover taxes paid under protest, upon a twenty-five per cent commission basis. It was alleged that Durham employed the law firm of Brown & Stater (of which appellee was a member) upon a fee basis of eleven per cent of the amount recovered, to bring suit to obtain a refund of the taxes in question. Refunds were obtained and paid but the judgment for the refund was afterward set aside and the taxpayers required to repay the amount refunded. The petition further alleges that Durham, Brown and Stater had knowledge of the terms of the contract under which a commission was payable and were not entitled to retain any money until there had been actual reduction in taxes. The petition prays for recovery against Durham, Brown and Stater for the full twenty-five per cent and alleges: ‘There is due and owing to the plaintiff from the defendant, M. E. Durham, as an individual and as one doing business under the name of the Taxpayers Association, and from Adelbert Brown and Gordon Stater, both as individuals and as partners doing business under the name of Brown & Stater,’ the sum of $4,744.39, with interest at the rate of 6% from January 20, 1930, until paid. The amount sought to be recovered was made up of several claims. The first cause of action was based upon retention of $1,006.07 from a tax claim of $4,024.32 made by the New State Ice Company. Eleven other causes of action were alleged, of the same character except as to the name of the taxpayer and as to the amount claimed.

The defendants in the Oklahoma suit were personally served with process which notified each defendant ‘unless said defendant answers, judgment will be taken for the sum of $4,744.39 with interest at 6% from the 20th day of January, 1930. Durham and Stater filed their answer and each of them filed a cross-petition, asserting, in substance, that the defendant Adelbert Brown was primarily liable, and claimed judgment against him for any sum or sums for which they might be adjudged responsible. Adelbert Brown defaulted. Upon trial, judgment was entered for the plaintiff and certain findings made, including the following: ‘That among other things it finds that Adelbert Brown and Gordon Stater as partners doing business under the firm name of Brown & Stater are liable to the plaintiff for 11% of the gross or total amount of money obtained from the county treasurer of Oklahoma county for the twelve taxpayers herein involved under the original journal entries in the case of Abernathy v. Boneparte, 55507–A–B, which were subsequently set aside, which said 11% amounts to $2,061.64 with interest at 6% from January 20, 1930, until paid, and costs, and that M. E. Durham and Adelbert Brown, jointly and severally are liable to the plaintiff for the sum of $2,061.64 with interest as aforesaid, and that said M. E. Durham and Adelbert Brown, jointly and severally are liable to the plaintiff for the additional sum of $2,682.75 with interest at 6% from January 20, 1930, until paid.’ The Oklahoma court thereupon entered the following judgment: ‘That plaintiff John R. Baker, as Trustee, do have and recover of and from the defendants Brown & Stater, a co-partnership composed of Adelbert Brown and Gordon Stater, both of whom were personally served with summons herein, the sum of $2,061.64 with interest at 6% from January 20, 1930, and costs of this action. * * * And be it further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff John R. Baker, as Trustee, do have and recover said sum of $2,061.64, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from January 20, 1930, until paid, and the costs of this action of and from M. E. Durham and Adelbert Brown and each of them, and that in addition to said sum of $2,061.64 with interest and costs as aforesaid, plaintiff do have and recover of and from M. E. Durham and Adelbert Brown and each of them the additional sum of $2,682.75 with interest at 6% from January 20, 1930, making the total amount to be recovered by plaintiff from M. E. Durham and Adelbert Brown and each of them, the sum of $4,744.39 with interest at 6% from January 20, 1930, until paid, and costs, for all of which let execution issue.’ The Oklahoma court also entered a judgment in favor of the defendant Stater against his co-defendant Brown, based upon the allegations of his answer that he had returned to Brown, for repayment to the plaintiffs, the sums received by him as fees. Stater is not a party to this proceeding.

In the circuit court of Cook county appellee filed an answer denying he was indebted in the sum of $4,744.39 or any other sum, and alleging that the purported judgment was void upon its face for the reason that the issues raised by the pleadings in the Oklahoma case would only support judgment against him in the sum of $2,061.64 and that it improperly entered a judgment in favor of Stater, against him, as pointed out above. The plaintiff offered in evidence a record of the proceedings and judgment in the Oklahoma court, properly authenticated and certified.

Under the constitution of the United States the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of each State must be given full faith and credit in the courts of every other State. It is admitted that the district court of Oklahoma had general jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit and that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant Adelbert Brown by personal service.

The general rule is, a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, unless reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not open to contradiction or impeachment in any collateral action or proceeding, except for fraud in its procurement, and even if the judgment is voidable and is so illegal or defective that it would be set aside or annulled on a proper direct application, it is not subject to collateral impeachment so long as it stands unreversed and in force. People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354, 192 N.E. 229;East St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Schnipper, 310 Ill. 150, 141 N.E. 542;Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N.E. 62;Donner v. Highway Com'rs, 278 Ill. 189, 115 N.E. 831;Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill. 344, 345,96 N.E. 385;Figge v. Rowlen, 185 Ill. 234, 57 N.E. 195. This rule is so well settled it is not open to question.

It is contended by appellee, however, that the general rule above stated does not apply to the present case because it is claimed the Oklahoma court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter for the reason that the pleadings were insufficient to support a judgment against the defendant Brown in a sum in excess of $2,061.64. Is this position sound when it is admitted the suit was one that could properly be brought in the Oklahoma court and personal service of summons was had upon appellee, in a case where the...

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    ...attack upon the judgment or decree, but if made after the expiration of thirty days it is a collateral attack.' In Baker v. Brown, 372 Ill. 336, 23 N.E.2d 710, 712, the court 'The general rule is, a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the paties and the subject matter, unles......
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    ...out two supreme court decisions, Buford v. Chief, Park District Police, 18 Ill.2d 265, 164 N.E.2d 57 (1960), and Baker v. Brown, 372 Ill. 336, 23 N.E.2d 710 (1939). Mortimer, 278 Ill.App.3d at 602, 215 Ill.Dec. 363, 663 N.E.2d 113. The plaintiff in Buford was defaulted on a traffic ticket i......
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