Baker v. Carr

Decision Date15 November 1965
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 2724.
Citation247 F. Supp. 629
PartiesCharles W. BAKER et al., Plaintiffs, v. Joe C. CARR et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

Walter Chandler, Memphis, Tenn., and Hobart F. Atkins, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Harris Gilbert, Nashville, Tenn., for intervening plaintiff Ben West.

E.K. Meacham and Eugene N. Collins, Chattanooga, Tenn., for intervening plaintiff City of Chattanooga.

C.R. McClain, Director of Law, Knoxville, Tenn., for intervening plaintiff City of Knoxville.

Cecil Branstetter, Nashville, Tenn., for intervening plaintiff Tennessee State Labor Council, AFL-CIO.

Neill S. Brown, Director of Law, and Gilbert S. Merritt, Jr., Asst. Director of Law, Nashville, Tenn., for Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.

George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., and Milton P. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Tennessee, Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.

Edwin F. Hunt, Nashville, Tenn., for intervening defendant Tennessee Farm Bureau Federation.

Before PAUL C. WEICK, Circuit Judge, and MARION S. BOYD and WILLIAM E. MILLER, District Judges.

WILLIAM E. MILLER, District Judge:

Over six years ago Charles Baker and others filed the initial complaint in this action challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee's Legislative Apportionment Acts. Nearly two years ago this court stated, "malapportionment in Tennessee is an evil of long standing." D.C., 222 F.Supp. 684, 693 (1963). Plaintiffs allege that the evil still exists, and thus bring the issues once again before the court. Before rendering what, it is hoped will be a final disposition of this action, it may be well to summarize its protracted history.

Shortly after the original complaint was filed, the defendants moved to dismiss the action without convening a three-judge court, for the reason that it did not present a substantial, or justiciable federal question. Those were the days of the "political thicket," and the defendants' position was supported by substantial authority. Nevertheless, the court felt that the issues merited consideration by a three-judge court, and the motion was denied. 175 F.Supp. 649, (M.D.Tenn., 1959).

On December 21, 1959, the three-judge court rendered a per curiam opinion dismissing the action (179 F.Supp. 824). The court could find "no way in the present case to escape the compelling authority" of numerous Supreme Court decisions to the effect that "whether from a lack of jurisdiction or from the inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration," the federal courts would not intervene in cases of this type.

Since the court felt powerless to grant a remedy, it could have said no more. But it went on to state that Tennessee's apportionment was a "clear violation" of both the state and federal constitutions. Furthermore, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that "the evil is a serious one which should be corrected without further delay." (emphasis supplied). Perhaps in this language the plaintiffs found a kernel of hope. At any rate, they appealed to the Supreme Court, and the stage was set for constitutional history.

Not every citizen has heard of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed.2d 663 (Mar. 26, 1962), but it is perhaps not fanciful to suggest that the impact of the Supreme Court's decision will be felt for many years to come. It has certainly been felt by the courts. Since that decision, there have been literally hundreds of published opinions dealing with apportionment. And published opinions do not tell the whole story. In this case alone, the single-spaced docket entries require more than 13 pages, and the file is measured not in pages but in feet.

But we digress from our history. The Supreme Court held that these "political" questions were justiciable, and reversed and remanded. On May 7, 1962, following the remand, this court conducted a pre-trial hearing at which the Attorney General of Tennessee informed the court that the Governor was calling a special session of the General Assembly to consider legislative reapportionment. The Attorney General therefore moved the court to stay further proceedings until the General Assembly had acted. The court reserved a ruling on this motion and set June 11, 1962 as the date for a further hearing.

Subsequent to the pre-trial conference, and prior to the scheduled hearing, the General Assembly in extraordinary session reapportioned both the House and the Senate through separate acts passed on June 6, 1962, and approved by the Governor the next day. The interested parties agreed to an amendment of the pleadings so as to bring into issue the constitutionality of the new apportionment statutes. This issue was presented to the court at the June 11 hearing, on plaintiffs' amended motion for summary judgment.

In a per curiam opinion filed June 22, 1962 (206 F.Supp. 341) the three-judge court reserved final judgment on all issues until the 1963 General Assembly, constituted and elected under the 1962 statutes, had an opportunity at its regular 1963 session to act on the matter of legislative apportionment. Although it did not enter a judgment, the court expressed its "views" with respect to both the House and the Senate. The 1962 statute reapportioning the House was based on the controversial two-thirds ratio provision of the Tennessee Constitution, and there were "certain discrepancies and inequities." Nevertheless, the court indicated that the House plan was not per se irrational or unconstitutional. The Senate plan was a different matter. The court stated that the only pattern of apportionment in the state Senate was "one of invidious discrimination." The court further indicated that any plan enacted by the 1963 session would have to base apportionment in at least one of the houses "on numbers of qualified voters without regard to any other factor."

At its regular 1963 session, the General Assembly again reapportioned both the House and the Senate. The plaintiffs duly amended their complaints in order to challenge the constitutionality of the new acts, and to request the court to approve reapportionment plans submitted to the court by the plaintiffs.

In an opinion filed October 10, 1963 (222 F.Supp. 684), the three-judge court ruled that the reapportionment of the House, having eliminated the "discrepancies and inequities" pointed out by the court in its June 22, 1962 Opinion, complied with the minimum requirements of the equal protection clause. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the Fourteenth Amendment required population-based apportionment for both houses of the General Assembly. The reapportionment of the Senate, however, was found to discriminate against the urban counties by allocating senators to them only for every full ratio, although senators were allocated to many rural districts which had less than a full ratio.

With a slight modification, the court approved the plaintiffs' apportionment plan for the Senate, which allocated three more senators to the urban areas than did the 1963 Act. The court did not enter a final order adopting this plan, but allowed the defendants almost four months to file objections to the plaintiffs' plan, as modified, or to submit a plan of their own.

In an Order filed April 17, 1964, the three-judge court noted (1) that the intervenor defendant had filed an alternative senate plan; (2) that the plaintiffs had filed a supplemental brief renewing their contention that both houses must be apportioned on a population basis; and (3) that the plaintiffs' contention would probably be resolved by the imminent decisions in several apportionment cases then pending before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the court ordered a stay of all further proceedings, with the court retaining full jurisdiction.

In an unpublished Opinion filed June 27, 1964, the three-judge court noted that the recent Supreme Court decisions required population-based apportionment for both houses of a state legislature. Accordingly, the court reexamined the entire record and concluded that: (1) the plan for apportioning the Senate, previously submitted by the plaintiffs and modified by the court in its 1963 opinion, was constitutional; and (2) that the plan for apportioning the House previously submitted by the plaintiffs and rejected by the court as unnecessary, was also constitutional. The court directed an Order to be submitted to that effect. Objections to the plaintiffs' House plan could be filed, together with alternative plans, not later than August 3, 1964. If the House and Senate plans, as subsequently modified by the court, were not approved by the 1965 General Assembly, the plans were to "become effective upon adjournment of the 1965 General Assembly, but in no event later than June 1, 1965." These plans are referred to in Appendix "A" as the Court Approved Plan.

The defendants then filed objections to the entry of the order requested by the court in its June 27 Opinion. On August 28, 1964, the court directed that the order be filed approving the plans set forth in the appendix to the June 27 opinion. The court, however, directed that the order be without prejudice to the power of the General Assembly to enact apportionment legislation of its own design, so long as the legislation complied with the recent Supreme Court pronouncements.

On April 2, 1965, the three-judge court entered an Order amending the Order of August 28, 1964 to permit the 1965 General Assembly to consider apportionment legislation in an extraordinary session.

On July 15, 1965, the court entered an Order which noted that the 1965 General Assembly, in extraordinary session, had once again enacted reapportionment legislation,1 and that some of the parties had questioned the validity of the new legislation. The court therefore ordered the action to be re-opened for consideration, and set September 8, 1965 as the hearing date before the three-judge court...

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7 cases
  • Hyden v. Baker
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • 13 Febrero 1968
    ...369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, the Tennessee Legislature has been reapportioned on a constitutional basis. Baker v. Carr, 247 F.Supp. 629 (M.D.Tenn.). Shelby County, one of the two counties involved in the present litigation, has the largest legislative delegation of any county ......
  • Jackman v. Bodine
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 2 Marzo 1970
    ...1965); Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F.Supp. 873, 878 (D.Vt.1965); Stout v. Bottorff, 246 F.Supp. 825, 829 (S.D.Ind.1965); Baker v. Carr, 247 F.Supp. 629, 637--638 (M.D.Tenn.1965); Abate v. Mundt, Supra, 25 N.Y.2d at 316, 317, 305 N.Y.S.2d 465, 253 N.E.2d at 192--193, cert. granted 397 U.S. 904, 90 ......
  • Sincock v. Gately
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • 10 Enero 1967
    ...the ratios are much smaller, however, than those thus far condemned by any court insofar as we have been able to ascertain. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 247 F.Supp. 629, and Baker v. Clement, 147 F.Supp. 886 (M.D. Tenn.1965). It will be observed that the district figures with which the Tennessee Thre......
  • Strickland v. Burns
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • 1 Julio 1966
    ...The next General Assembly of the State of Tennessee will be a validly apportioned body for the first time in many years. Baker v. Carr, 247 F.Supp. 629 (M.D.Tenn.1965). The significance of this, however, is materially diminished by the fact that the defeat or passage of local legislation, s......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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