Baker v. Chartiers Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd.

• Citation: 677 A.2d 1274
• Parties: Carol BAKER, v. CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Chartiers Township and Chartiers Township Board of Supervisors and William H. Martin, Inc. Appeal of CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP, and Chartiers Township Board of Supervisors, Appellants. Carol BAKER, v. CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Chartiers Township and Chartiers Township Board of Supervisors and William H. Martin, Inc. Appeal of WILLIAM H. MARTIN, INC., Appellant.
• Decision Date: 15 July 1996
• Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Page 1274

677 A.2d 1274

Carol BAKER, v. CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Chartiers

Township and Chartiers Township Board of

Supervisors and William H. Martin, Inc.

Appeal of CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP, and Chartiers Township Board

of Supervisors, Appellants.

Carol BAKER, v. CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Chartiers

Township and Chartiers Township Board of

Supervisors and William H. Martin, Inc.

Appeal of WILLIAM H. MARTIN, INC., Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 14, 1996.

Decided May 7, 1996.

Reargument Denied July 15, 1996.

James P. Liekar, for Appellants, Chartiers Township and Chartiers Township Board of Supervisors.

Douglas R. Nolin, for Appellant, William H. Martin, Inc.

Peter M. Suwak, for Appellee, Carol Baker.

William A. Johnson, for Appellee, Chartiers Township Zoning Hearing Board.

Before McGINLEY and PELLEGRINI, JJ., and NARICK, Senior Judge.

NARICK, Senior Judge.

William H. Martin, Inc. (Martin), Chartiers Township (Township) and Chartiers Township Board of Supervisors (Board of Supervisors) (Appellants, collectively) appeal from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County (trial court), which reversed the orders of the Chartiers Township Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) and the Board of Supervisors and granted the appeal of Carol Baker (Baker) from the grant of approval of the conditional use application filed by Martin, and from the rezoning of the land known as the Shaw farm. We affirm.

The relevant facts are as follows. On August 25, 1992, the Board of Supervisors amended the Township Zoning Ordinance which, among other zoning changes, resulted in the rezoning of the Shaw farm from an agricultural to an industrial district. The Shaw farm consists of approximately 221 acres of land, which is adjacent to a landfill operation owned or controlled by Martin. Martin had previously filed a request for rezoning of the Shaw farm on March 30, 1991, which was subsequently withdrawn and then resubmitted on December 27, 1991.

On September 24, 1992, Baker filed an appeal with the ZHB and the trial court, ¹ challenging the validity of the zoning ordinance amendment. On December 15, 1992, the ZHB sent a letter to Baker informing her that pursuant to City of Hermitage v. Zoning Hearing Board of the City of Hermitage, 149 Pa.Cmwlth. 488, 613 A.2d 612 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 637, 621 A.2d 582 (1993), her appeal was not yet ripe for review by the ZHB because no permit had yet been requested by Martin, nor had Martin attempted to use the property in a manner consistent with the amended zoning regulations. Therefore, the ZHB declined to take any action on the basis that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. On December 23 1992, Baker appealed this decision (Hermitage appeal) to the trial court, and at the same time, filed a notice of "deemed approval" claiming that because of the ZHB's failure to hold a timely hearing on her challenge to the validity of the amendment, her challenge was deemed approved. On January 21, 1993, Martin filed a protective appeal from the "deemed approval" notice ("deemed approval" appeal).

On February 3, 1992, following published notice of an upcoming hearing regarding Martin's conditional use application, Baker filed a second appeal to the ZHB contesting the validity of the zoning amendment. By letter of February 17, 1993, Baker was informed by the Township zoning officer that the hearing would be held within sixty (60) days of receipt of a completed ZHB hearing form and the application fee. On or about March 9, 1993, the application and fee were submitted.

On April 14, 1993, the Board of Supervisors granted approval of Martin's conditional use application for expansion of its local landfill operation onto the Shaw farm. On May 14, 1993, Baker filed an appeal from the conditional use approval to the trial court (conditional use appeal).

On April 21, 1993, the ZHB began a series of hearings on Baker's validity challenge to the amendments to the zoning ordinance. At the first hearing before the ZHB, Appellants raised the issue of a "deemed denial," based on the ZHB's failure to timely act on Baker's second appeal. On May 4, 1993 Baker filed an appeal from Martin's "deemed denial" argument ("deemed denial" appeal). The hearings on Baker's challenge to the ordinance's validity ended on July 14, 1993, and a decision was rendered on September 20, 1993, upholding the validity of the zoning amendment. On October 20, 1993, Baker appealed this decision (validity appeal) to the trial court.

The validity appeal was consolidated with Baker's Hermitage appeal, her "deemed approved" appeal, and her conditional use appeal, as well as with Martin's "deemed denial" appeal, for review by the trial court, which took no additional evidence. By opinion and order of the trial court on May 24, 1995, the ZHB's decision upholding the validity of the zoning amendment was reversed and vacated, as was the Township's grant of Martin's conditional use permit. It found all the other appeals moot. It is from this order that Martin appeals.

In zoning appeals, where the trial court takes no additional evidence, this Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the zoning hearing board committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law. A conclusion that the zoning hearing board abused its discretion may be reached only if its findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Valley View Civic Association v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 501 Pa. 550, 462 A.2d 637 (1983); Constantino v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Forest Hills, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 258, 618 A.2d 1193 (1992). Similarly, in an appeal from the decision of the Board of Supervisors regarding a conditional use permit, our scope of review is whether the Board of Supervisors committed an error of law or abused its discretion in approving Martin's application for a conditional use permit. Brentwood Borough v. Cooper, 60 Pa.Cmwlth. 462, 431 A.2d 1177 (1981).

The trial court determined that the ZHB committed an error of law when it concluded that the rezoning of the Shaw farm did not constitute spot zoning. The trial court's determination was based on a number of factors, including: (1) the failure of the Board of Supervisors to provide a full and fair examination of the impact which the rezoning would have on adjacent properties; (2) the special relationship between Martin and the Board of Supervisors which led to an expedited deliberation process to the detriment of the public interest; (3) the Township's knowing failure to comply with the statutory mandate to submit the comprehensive plan to the County Planning Commission for comparison with the rezoning request; and (4) the failure to consult a third-party expert, which, although not required by law, was absolutely necessary to protect the interests of all parties when land was to be used in such an environmentally volatile fashion.

Martin argues that Baker has not met her burden of proof to show that the rezoning was an illegal spot zone. In Township of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 109 Pa.Cmwlth. 200, 531 A.2d 49, 57 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 622, 554 A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021, 109 S.Ct. 1748, 104 L.Ed.2d 184 (1989), Judge Craig defined illegal spot zoning as, "zoning provisions adopted to control the use of a specific area of land without regard to the relationship of those land use controls to the overall plan and the general welfare of the community."

Spot zoning is more than an "island" of discriminatory zoning, the land area involved being only one of the determining factors. Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township Planning Commission, 89 Pa.Cmwlth. 468, 492 A.2d 818 (1985). Rather, as held in Township of Plymouth:

The key point is when a municipal governing body puts on blinders and confines its vision to just one isolated place or problem within the community, disregarding a community wide perspective, that body is not engaged in lawful zoning, which necessarily requires that the picture of the whole community be kept in mind while dividing it into compatibly related zones by ordinance enactments. In other words, legislating as to a spot is the antithesis of zoning....

Township of Plymouth, 531 A.2d at 57 (emphasis in original). In the Township of Plymouth, for example, the court concluded that the zoning regulations were adopted for the purpose of excluding a refuse disposal plant, and thus there was illegal spot zoning and not zoning for legitimate land planning purposes.

Martin argues that the rezoning of the Shaw farm was not a spot zone for a number of reasons. First, the Shaw farm is a considerably larger plot of land, 221 acres, than other areas found by our Courts to be the object of spot zoning. However, our Supreme Court has stated in Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 311, 211 A.2d 514, 519 (1965), that, "[i]t makes no difference whether it is a one-quarter acre lot or a 50 acre industrial complex which is the subject of the rezoning. If it is aimed at preventing a theretofore legal use of an integrated unit owned by one common interest, the action cannot be supported as a valid zoning." (Emphasis added.) Here, the subject of the rezoning is one integrated unit, the former Shaw farm, owned by one interest, Martin. Therefore, the size of the area is not determinative of whether there has been spot zoning.

Next, Martin argues that there was no illegal spot zoning because the Shaw farm property is not an illegal spot separate and distinct from all surrounding property. Rather, the property is proximate to the existing Martin landfill area, and it therefore does not create an island surrounded by inconsistently zoned property. However, as Martin concedes, a zone can be a spot zone even if it is a peninsula surrounded on all but one side by inconsistently zoned land, as appears to be the case here. ² C.L. Associates v. Board of Supervisors...