Baker v. City of Garden City

• Decision Date: 16 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 59025,59025
• Citation: 731 P.2d 278,240 Kan. 554
• Parties: Cecil W. BAKER, Appellant, v. CITY OF GARDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation, and The Secretary of Transportation of Kansas, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 278

731 P.2d 278

240 Kan. 554

Cecil W. BAKER, Appellant, v. CITY OF GARDEN CITY, A Municipal Corporation, and The Secretary of Transportation of Kansas, Appellees.

No. 59025.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 16, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to K.S.A. 60-250, the trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought, and where the evidence is such that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions thereon, the motion must be denied and the matter submitted to the jury.

2. In reviewing a directed verdict, the appellate court will apply the same rule on appeal that was required in the trial court, and if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions then the verdict should be reversed.

3. Prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if left unexplained or uncontradicted, would be sufficient to carry the case to the jury and sustain a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue it supports.

4. In a negligence case, the plaintiff must establish a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, damage to plaintiff, and a causal connection between the duty breached and the damage sustained.

5. In order to recover in a negligence action, the breach of duty must be the actual and proximate cause of the injury. The proximate or legal cause of an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act.

Phyllis F. Wendler of Law Offices of Michael J. Friesen, P.A., Garden City, argued the cause and was on briefs, for appellant.

B.G. Larson of Williams, Larson, Strobel, Estes & Malone, P.A., Dodge City, argued the cause, and Gregory J. McDonald, City Atty., was with him on brief, for appellee City of Garden City.

Jay L. Smith, Office of Chief Counsel, argued the cause, and Michael B. Rees, Chief Counsel, and Kris E. McKinney, of the same office, were with him on brief, for appellee Kansas Dept. of Transp.

HOLMES, Justice:

This is a personal injury suit arising out of a controlled intersection traffic accident which occurred on the outskirts of Garden City, Kansas. At the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, the City of Garden City, Kansas, (Garden City or the City), and the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT). Plaintiff, Cecil W. Baker, appeals.

The accident occurred at the intersection of United States Highway 83 and Mary Street on the western edge of Garden City. At this location the highway consists of two lanes running north and south with one lane of traffic in each direction. East of the intersection Mary Street is a divided four-lane east and west city thoroughfare with two lanes of traffic in each direction. West of the intersection Mary Street is a two lane county road with one lane of traffic in each direction. Traffic at the intersection was formerly controlled by stop signs for the east-west traffic on Mary Street. Traffic on U.S. Highway 83 was not required to stop. In November of 1980 a fatal accident occurred at the intersection and in response to this tragedy Garden City officials decided to replace the stop signs with four-way electric signals. The City contacted KDOT regarding the installation of temporary signals during construction and it is disputed whether KDOT approval was given for temporary signalling. It is clear that no written approval had been obtained from KDOT. See K.S.A. 8-2002(b). During mid-December the City installed four temporary signals which were hung in the intersection from wires strung between poles at each corner and the stationary stop signs for Mary Street traffic were removed. At the time the temporary signals were emplaced, their installation did not meet the standards specified in the Uniform Manual of Traffic Control. Although a diagram of the installation was sent to KDOT, the inadequate nature of the signals apparently was not discovered by KDOT until after the plaintiff's accident.

On the day of the accident, an eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer, loaded with sheep, driven by Clyde Tyson was southbound on Highway 83 approaching the Mary Street intersection. At the same time, Eldon Wagner sat in his westbound vehicle at the intersection waiting for the temporary light to turn green in his direction. Behind the Wagner vehicle were Robert and Beverly Chartier in their car, also waiting for the light to change. Cecil W. Baker, in his pickup truck, was northbound on Highway 83 approaching the intersection. As the light turned green for east-west traffic, the Wagner vehicle moved into the intersection. Simultaneously, the southbound tractor-trailer ran the red light and struck the Wagner vehicle in the passenger's side, spinning it back into the eastbound lane of Mary Street. The Tyson truck careened on down the highway, collided with Baker's pickup truck, and came to rest on its side with the cab of the truck on the Baker vehicle.

Baker suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident. He required hospitalization for three weeks following the accident, including two operations to refabricate one knee. Plaintiff filed suit against the trucking company which operated the truck, its insurance carrier, the driver Tyson, the City of Garden City, the Board of County Commissioners of Finney County, and the Kansas Department of Transportation. Prior to trial the County was granted summary judgment and no appeal is taken from that ruling. The defendant trucking company, its insurance carrier, and Tyson settled with plaintiff and were dismissed from the action. The case went to trial on the issue of the negligence of the City and KDOT in erecting the temporary traffic signals. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial court sustained the defendants' motions and directed verdicts in their favor. Baker has appealed.

The only issue raised on appeal is the plaintiff's contention that the trial court improperly directed a verdict for the defendants.

In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to K.S.A. 60-250, the trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought, and where the evidence is such that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions thereon, the motion must be denied and the matter submitted to the jury. Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, Syl. p 1, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982). In reviewing a directed verdict the appellate court will apply the same rule on appeal that was required in the trial court, Fisher v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 207 Kan. 493, 495, 485 P.2d 1309 (1971), and if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions then the verdict should be reversed. Stair v. Gaylord, 232 Kan. 765, 769, 659 P.2d 178 (1983).

Thus, the issue in the present case is whether Baker presented a prima facie case of negligence at trial. Prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if left unexplained or uncontradicted, would be sufficient to carry the case to the jury and sustain a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue it supports. Van Brunt, Executrix v. Jackson, 212 Kan. 621, 623, 512 P.2d 517 (1973). In a negligence case the plaintiff must establish a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, damage to plaintiff, and a causal connection between the duty breached and the damage sustained. Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. 484, 673 P.2d 86 (1983). In order to recover in a negligence action, the breach of duty must be the actual and proximate cause of the injury. The proximate or legal cause of an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act. Wilcheck v Doonan Truck & Equipment, Inc., 220 Kan. 230, 235, 552 P.2d 938 (1976).

Whether conduct in a given case is the cause in fact or proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries is normally a question of fact for the jury. Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. at 488, 673 P.2d 86; Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 379, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958). However, where the facts are such that they are susceptible to only one inference, the question is one of law and may be disposed of summarily by the court when the plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary burden of proof. 57 Am.Jur.2d, Negligence § 137.

In the present case it was the position of the defendants that even if the temporary signals were not properly installed and timed, there was no showing that such defects were the cause of Tyson's running the red light and the resultant collision with Mr. Baker's truck. The trial court reviewed the evidence, prior to directing verdicts for the defendants, and stated:

"The city and the Department of Transportation have made a motion to this Court for a directed verdict. The city and department state that there is no evidence presented to indicate that either the city or the department were at fault in the injuries sustained by Mr. Baker.

"Van Brunt Executrix versus Jackson, 212 Kansas 69--or excuse me--621, 1973 case, states that when such a motion is made 'the issue is whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie case. "Prima facie" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient in a jury case to carry the case to the jury and to sustain a verdict in favor of the issue upon which it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence....'

"As such the question becomes whether or not the plaintiff has...