Baker v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 31 July 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 5-71937,5-72264.
• Citation: 458 F. Supp. 379
• Parties: Kenneth BAKER, Arthur Bartniczak, Hanson Bratton, Patrick Jordan, Frank Krezsowik, Elbert McVay and Roger Scally, Plaintiffs, and Hanson Bratton, Gale Bogenn, William Shell, Patrick Jordan, Charles Mahoney, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and the Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, Coleman Young, Mayor, City of Detroit, Philip G. Tannian, Chief of Police, City of Detroit, jointly and severally, Defendants, and Guardians of Michigan, David L. Simmons, Arnold D. Payne, James E. Crawford, Clinton L. Donaldson, Willie Johnson, Kenneth M. Johnson and Alfred Brooks, Intervening Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

458 F. Supp. 379

Kenneth BAKER, Arthur Bartniczak, Hanson Bratton, Patrick Jordan, Frank Krezsowik, Elbert McVay and Roger Scally, Plaintiffs and Hanson Bratton, Gale Bogenn, William Shell, Patrick Jordan, Charles Mahoney, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and the Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants Association, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, Coleman Young, Mayor, City of Detroit, Philip G. Tannian, Chief of Police, City of Detroit, jointly and severally, Defendants and Guardians of Michigan, David L. Simmons, Arnold D. Payne, James E. Crawford, Clinton L. Donaldson, Willie Johnson, Kenneth M. Johnson and Alfred Brooks, Intervening Defendants.

Civ. Nos. 5-71937, 5-72264.

United States District Court, E. D. Michigan, S. D.

July 31, 1978.

James P. Hoffa, Detroit, Mich., for Kenneth Baker, Arthur Bartniczak, Hanson Bratton, Patrick Jordan, Frank Krzesowik, Elbert McVay and Robert Scally.

Bernard Friedman, Marc G. Whitefield, Preston Oade, Jr., Southfield, Mich., H. Barry Woodrow, Detroit, Mich., for Hanson Bratton, Gale Bogenn, William Shell, Patrick Jordan, Charles Mahoney and Detroit Police Lieut. & Sergeants Association.

Roger Craig, Corp. Counsel, James R. Andary, Sp. Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, Mich., O. Peter Sherwood, New York City, Lowell Johnston, San Francisco, Cal., for City of Detroit, Detroit Board of Police Commissioners, Coleman Young and Philip G. Tannian.

Warren J. Bennia, Washington, D. C., John R. Runyan, Jr., Detroit, Mich., for intervening defendants-guardians of Michigan et al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation.

These two consolidated cases were brought by white officers of the Detroit police department. They challenge the legality of Detroit's affirmative action promotion program¹ by which equal numbers of white and black police sergeants were promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Plaintiffs allege that they were better qualified than the minority officers promoted, and that the affirmative action program thus discriminated against them solely because they were white. Plaintiffs' cause of action is based on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000d, 1981, 1983, 1985 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition, violations of state law are alleged. Plaintiffs seek actual damages, exemplary damages, back pay and injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs have demanded that a jury try all factual issues.² Defendants deny that a right to trial by jury exists in this case. The issue has been fully briefed and the matter was referred to United States Magistrate Paul Komives who held lengthy hearings on the matter.

The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in all actions at common law where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970). There is no requirement that a jury try equitable issues, but where a case involves both legal and equitable claims, the right to trial by jury must be preserved. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959).

Determining whether a claim is legal or equitable is not always easy. Even a money damages claim may not always be deemed "legal" relief. See Curtis v. Loether, supra, 415 U.S. at 196, 94 S.Ct. 1005. In actions brought for back pay and injunctive relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the courts of appeals have uniformly held that no right to trial by jury attaches. See, e. g. Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 2669, 53 L.Ed.2d 267 (1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 573, 30 L.Ed.2d 655 (1971); King v. Laborers Int. Union, 443 F.2d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 1971) (dicta); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).

It is the discretionary aspect of the back pay award, coupled with its restitutionary nature, designed to "make whole" the victims of employment discrimination, which distinguishes a claim for back pay from an ordinary legal damages claim. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 441-444, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Slack v. Havens, supra at 1094; EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., supra at 308; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra at 1125.

Pointing to Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) and Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), plaintiffs state that it is "unsettled" whether one has the right to a jury trial under Title VII. They further urge that even if a jury trial is ordinarily unavailable, it should be provided in the instant case because trial on the issues of liability and damages has been bifurcated. Finally, they argue that even if a jury trial is unavailable under Title VII, it should be available to them under the damage claims based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and various pendent state claims.

It is true that the Supreme Court in Lorillard and Curtis reserved the issue of whether the Seventh Amendment mandates a jury trial for any or all money damages awards under Title VII. However, as indicated above, the Courts of Appeals have spoken with one voice on the question. This Court is unwilling to disregard this clear and well-reasoned mandate.

Plaintiffs' argument that bifurcating the trial entitles them to a jury trial has no merit. Actions seeking injunctive relief only are commonly divided into a trial on the merits and then a separate hearing on the injunctive remedy, yet, clearly, no jury trial rights attach there. Plaintiffs in no way indicate why bifurcation makes any difference here.

Plaintiffs' third argument has facial appeal. At first glance, it appears that legal issues, triable to a jury, exist here since plaintiffs seek actual and punitive damages³ in addition to back pay and injunctive relief. See Curtis v. Loether, supra at 195-196, 94 S.Ct. 1005. Plaintiffs particularly point to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that actual and punitive damages claims are allowable and must be tried to a jury. There is direct support for their argument in this Circuit. Amburgey v. Cassady, 507 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School District, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975).

At the same time this Circuit has held that a § 1983 action seeking reinstatement and back pay is equitable and no jury trial rights attach. McFerren v. County Board of Ed. of Fayette Co., Tenn., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972), Accord Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n.8 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc).

The question remains whether adding actual and punitive damages claims to the complaint (as the Plaintiffs have done here) converts an equitable employment discrimination action to a legal one, requiring a jury trial. The Fifth Circuit has said no. A plaintiff cannot, by framing his complaint under § 1981 "or by making unsupported allegations for compensatory and punitive damages — unilaterally alter the equitable genre of the proceeding." (emphasis added) Lynch v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 475 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1973).

This Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit. Congress' determination that no jury trial be afforded in Title VII cases⁴ cannot be evaded by appending additional claims under §§ 1981 or 1983 or other related statutes.

This is especially true in a situation, such as here, where an express employment discrimination claim has been made by plaintiffs under Title VII and joined with claims under §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985. "In fashioning a substantive body of law under § 1981 the courts should, in an effort to avoid undesirable substantive law conflicts, look to the principles of law created under Title VII for direction." Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir. 1976) quoting Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974). See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Detroit Edison, supra at 309. These salutory principles are directly applicable to the case at bar. Nor is there any reason to distinguish claims under § 1983. The only reason § 1983 is applicable here is because defendants act on behalf of the state.⁵ An outcome mandating jury trials in employment discrimination cases against state defendants under § 1983, but not private or state defendants under § 1981 or Title VII, would be irrational. Title VII should provide the guidance here, not plaintiff's ingenuity in adding additional causes of action.⁶

The facts of this case present additional, compelling grounds for denying a jury trial. The gravamen of this action is injunctive relief and back pay for alleged employment discrimination. Making bald assertions of malice, plaintiffs ask for additional relief in the form of actual damages for mental anguish and for punitive damages. Yet it is clear that in a § 1983 action for money damages, public officials have qualified immunity if they acted in good faith. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (state hospital superintendent); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (school board members). The standard applied to test good faith is two pronged: 1) Whether the...