Baker v. City of Seatac

• Decision Date: 13 January 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. C12–1985JLR.
• Citation: 994 F.Supp.2d 1148
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: Cynthia L. BAKER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SEATAC, et al., Defendant.

994 F.Supp.2d 1148

Cynthia L. BAKER, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF SEATAC, et al., Defendant.

Case No. C12–1985JLR.

United States District Court,

W.D. Washington,

at Seattle.

Signed Jan. 13, 2014.

Jon Howard Rosen, Rosen Law Firm, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff.

Diana Virginia Blakney, Michael Barry Tierney, Tierney & Blakney, Mercer Island, WA, for Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JAMES L. ROBART, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court are Plaintiff Cynthia Baker's motion for partial summary judgment (Plf. Mot. (Dkt. # 53)) and Defendants City of SeaTac's (“City”) and Todd Cutt's motion for summary judgment (Def. Mot. (Dkt. # 50)). Having considered the submissions of the parties, the balance of the record, and the relevant law, and no party having requested oral argument, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

II. FACTS

The City hired Ms. Baker as Community and Economic Development Department Director in February, 2011. ( See Hoang Dep. (Dkt. # 54–1) at 5.) Ms. Baker received on offer letter signed by City Manager Mr. Cutts on February 1, 2011, which she accepted on February 3, 2011. (Offer Letter (Dkt. 52–1).) The offer letter describes Ms. Baker's position as a “regular, full-time” employee of the City. ( Id. at 2.) Ms. Baker states that when she read the offer letter, she was “surprised” that it did not state that she was an “at-will” employee. (Baker Dep. (Dkt. # 51–1) at 3, 4.) Ms. Baker claims that when she mentioned to the City's Human Resources Director, Anh Hoang, “Oh, this [offer letter] doesn't have anything in here about at-will,” Ms. Hoang responded: “We're not an at-will city.” ( Id.) Ms. Baker testified at deposition that she concluded she was a for-cause employee because of the offer letter and Ms. Hoang's statement. ( Id. at 5.)

At the time Ms. Baker was hired, the City maintained an employee handbook (“the Handbook”). ( See Handbook (Dkt. # 35–1).) Ms. Baker acknowledged that she received a copy of the Handbook at her orientation meeting on February 23, 2011. (Receipt (Dkt. # 52–2); see also Orientation Checklist (Dkt. 54–1).) The Handbook stated:

The City may end its employment relationship with its regular, part-time, and full-time employees for cause, including but not limited to those listed in the Standards of Conduct & Discipline section. The City may end its employment relationship with its temporary, seasonal, and probationary employees at any time and for any reason.

(Handbook at 4.) The Handbook also stated that it was “intended to be a source of general information concerning City personnel policies and procedures” and that it “sets out basic personnel policy and procedural guidelines for those ... working in the City.” ( Id. at 3.) Ms. Baker asserts that although she read the Handbook when she was first hired, the sentence about termination for cause “did not stand out” to her. (Baker Dep. at 5.)

In February, 2012, after concerns arose regarding Ms. Baker's management style, Mr. Cutts authorized an investigation by Ms. Hoang. (Cutts Dec. (Dkt. # 32) ¶ 3.) Over the next five months, Ms. Hoang interviewed numerous employees who reported to Ms. Baker and reviewed relevant personnel files and documents. (Hoang Dec. (Dkt. 33–1) Ex. 1 (Report) at 6–7.)

Ms. Hoang also interviewed Ms. Baker nine times, for a total of over 25 hours. ( Id. at 7.) City Manager Mr. Cutts attended many of Ms. Baker's interviews. (Cutts Dec. ¶ 5.) City Attorney Mary Bartolo attended five. (Bartolo Dec. (Dkt. # 31) ¶ 2.) The City did not permit Ms. Baker's attorney, Mr. Rosen, to attend any of her interviews. (Baker Dec. ¶ 13.) Instead, Ms. Baker received audio recordings of her interviews, as well as “interview notes” from other employees' interviews. (Bartolo Dec. ¶¶ 3–6.)

As the investigation continued, Mr. Cutts placed Ms. Baker on administrative leave on April 13, 2012. (Baker Dec. ¶ 10.) Ms. Hoang drafted a 48–page Personnel Investigation Report (“Report”) summarizing the results of her investigation.¹ ( See Report.) In the Report, Ms. Hoang concluded that Ms. Baker “has not demonstrated that she has this [sic] combination of skills to effectively lead this department.” ( Id.) On July 17, 2012, Ms. Baker received a copy of the Report in conjunction with a “Pre-disciplinary Hearing Notice” (“Hearing Notice”). ( See Cutts Dec. Ex. 13 (Hearing Notice).)

The Hearing Notice identified specific “Allegations of Misconduct” and listed Ms. Baker's “Alleged Violations” of the City's employee handbook and other policies. ( Id.) The Hearing Notice gave Ms. Baker only two days to respond, setting a hearing date for July 19, 2012. ( Id. at 1.) At the request of Ms. Baker's attorney, the hearing was delayed until July 30, 2012. (Resp. (Dkt. # 34) at 8.) In the interim, Ms. Baker provided the City a 19–page written response. ( See Cutts Dec. Ex. 14.)

On July 30, 2012, Ms. Baker and Mr. Rosen attended a telephonic hearing with City employees Mr. Cutts, Ms. Bartolo, and Ms. Hoang. (Cutts Dec. ¶ 10.) On this telephone call, Ms. Baker requested and was granted an opportunity to submit a supplemental response. (Cutts Dec. ¶ 11.) On August 7, 2012, Ms. Baker hand-delivered to Ms. Bartolo an eight-page response that included almost 200 pages of attachments. ( See Bartolo Dec. Ex. 1.) Mr. Cutts admits that he did not read the attachments to Ms. Baker's response. (Cutts Dep. (Dkt. # 54–2) at 6–7.) Nonetheless, the very next day, Mr. Cutts emailed Ms. Baker a “Notice of Discipline—Termination” (“Termination Notice”) indicating that he had decided to terminate her employment, effective immediately. ( See Cutts Dec. Ex. 15 (Termination Notice) at 5.)

Mr. Rosen wrote two letters to the City requesting a post-termination hearing for Ms. Baker. ( See Rosen Dec. Ex. 1). The City denied these requests. ( See Bartolo Dec. Ex. 2.)

After the City denied Ms. Baker a post-termination hearing, Ms. Baker filed this suit. ( See generally Compl. (Dkt. # 1).) Ms. Baker alleges (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and (2) wrongful discharge under Washington law.² The court denied the Defendants' previous motion for summary judgment that Ms. Baker (assuming she possessed a property interest in her employment) was not entitled to a post-termination hearing. ( See 10/22/13 Am. Ord. (Dkt. # 43).)

The Defendants now bring a motion for summary judgment that Ms. Baker did not possess a property interest in her employment and that Mr. Cutts is entitled to qualified immunity. (Def. Mot. at 7–9.) Ms. Baker brings her own motion for partial summary judgment that she was denied due process because she did not receive a post-termination hearing. (Plf. Mot. at 1.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to grant summary judgment where the moving party demonstrates (1) the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and (2) entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir.2007). The moving party bears the initial burden of production of showing an absenceof a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it can show an absence of issue of material fact in two ways: (1) by producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or, (2) showing that the nonmoving party lacks evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.2000). If the moving party will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it must establish a prima facie showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v. Nor–Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir.1994). That is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id. at 1473.

If the moving party meets its burden of production, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the [nonmoving] party's pleading,” but must provide affidavits or other sources of evidence that “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” from which a factfinder could reasonably find in the non-moving party's favor. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether the factfinder could reasonably find in the non-moving party's favor, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

B. Property Interest

The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of property by the government without due process. Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir.1993). A procedural due process claim under section 1983 has two elements: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir.1998).

As to the first element, a government employee has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment when the employee has a reasonable expectation or a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the job. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 475 (9th Cir.1991), quotin...