Baker v. City of McKinney
| Decision Date | 29 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-00176 |
| Citation | 601 F.Supp.3d 124 |
| Parties | Vicki BAKER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MCKINNEY, TEXAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Jeffrey H. Redfern, Robert James McNamara, Suranjan Sen, William Aronin, Institute for Justice, Arlington, VA, for Plaintiff.
Edwin Armstrong Price Voss, Jr., Michael Lee Martin, Brown & Hofmeister, Richardson, TX, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Vicki Baker's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #19). Having considered the motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion should be GRANTED .
On July 25, 2020, the City of McKinney Police Department (the "Department") destroyed Vicki Baker's ("Baker") home during a standoff with an armed fugitive. When Baker sought compensation for the destruction of her private property, the City refused to pay. This lawsuit followed.
Baker was a long-time resident of McKinney, Texas when she made plans to sell her house and retire. She had already moved to Montana when she contracted with buyers to sell her McKinney home (the "House"). In Baker's absence, her daughter, Deanna Cook ("Cook"), was staying in the House to prepare it for final sale. On the morning of July 25, 2020, Cook learned that a man named Wesley Little ("Little") had kidnapped a fifteen-year-old girl and evaded Department officers. Cook recognized Little because he had previously performed odd jobs for Baker around the House.
Later that same day, Little arrived at Baker's front door with the fifteen-year-old hostage in tow. Little asked to hide out in the House and requested to hide his car in the garage. Cook acquiesced but, in a ploy to escape the House, convinced Little to allow her to go the grocery store. In the parking lot of a local Walmart, Cook called Baker, and together, the two called the McKinney police to report the situation. When Department officers arrived at Cook's location, Cook provided the officers with the code to enter the House and the garage door opener. Department officers then went to the House where Little remained in hiding with the teenage girl.
Upon arrival, Department officers surrounded the House and attempted to negotiate with Little. Little released the fifteen-year-old girl unharmed, but the girl informed Department officers that Little possessed multiple firearms and that he refused to leave the House alive. Following hours of unsuccessful negotiations, Department officers attempted to draw Little out of the House through several forceful tactics, including the use of tear gas. Despite the Department's efforts, Little would not leave the House. Department officers then forcefully entered the home by breaking down both the front and garage door and running over the backyard fence with a tank-like vehicle known as a BearCat. Upon entry, Department officers found Little had taken his own life.
Department officers documented the damage to Baker's home in their police records. One officer documented the damage through photographs, which show "the toppled fence and battered front door; the broken windows; the damaged roof and landscaping; the blown-out garage door; and the garage ceiling, attic floor, and dry walls all torn through with gas canisters" (Dkt. #19 at p. 4). Much of the damage went beyond what could be captured visually:
The explosions left [ ] Baker's dog permanently blind and deaf. The toxic gas that permeated the [H]ouse required the services of a HAZMAT remediation team. Appliances and fabrics were irreparable. Ceiling fans, plumbing, floors (hard surfaces as well as carpet), and bricks needed to be replaced—in addition to the windows, blinds, fence, front door, and garage door. Essentially all of the personal property in the [H]ouse was destroyed, including an antique doll collection left to [ ] Baker by her mother. In total, the damage ... was approximately $50,000.
(Dkt. #19 at pp. 4–5). The prospective homebuyers backed out of the sale. As is typical for homeowners’ policies, because the Department is a government entity and caused the damage, insurance denied the claim.1
Two weeks later, Baker filed a claim for property damage with the City of McKinney (the "City"). The City replied in a letter that it was denying the claim in its entirety because "the officers have immunity while in the course and scope of their job duties" (Dkt. #19-4 at p. 2).
On March 3, 2021, Baker filed suit against the City for violations of the takings clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions. Baker alleges that extensive damage to her House resulted from the Department's standoff with Little. Specifically, Baker claims that: (1) every window needed replacing; (2) a hazmat remediation team had to clean the House due to the tear gas; (3) various appliances were destroyed; (4) the front and garage door needed replacing (5) tear gas cannisters had destroyed parts of the drywall; and (6) carpets, blinds, and ceiling fans needed replacing.
On November 11, 2021, the Court denied the City's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #23). On September 20, 2021, Baker filed the present motion (Dkt. #19), and on October 12, 2021, the City responded (Dkt. #20). On October 19, 2021, Baker replied (Dkt. #21). The City filed a sur-reply on October 25, 2021 (Dkt. #22). On December 3, 2022, the City filed its Answer (Dkt. #25). On December 6, 2021, the Court referred this case to mediation (as is standard) (Dkt. #26), but on February 22, 2022, Baker filed a notice with the Court that the parties had not reached an agreement (Dkt. #28). The City followed Baker's notice with a demand for trial by jury (Dkt. #29) and an opposed motion to reopen discovery (Dkt. #30). This case is set for trial by jury to begin on May 11, 2022.
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. The trial court "must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment." Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. , 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its motion and identifying "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) ; Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the movant bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense for which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come forward with evidence that establishes "beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co. , 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant's case. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc. , 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000).
Once the movant has carried its burden, the nonmovant must "respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial." Byers , 209 F.3d at 424 (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). A nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden. Rather, the Court requires "significant probative evidence" from the nonmovant to dismiss a request for summary judgment. In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig. , 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Ferguson v. Nat'l Broad. Co. , 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978) ). The Court must consider all of the evidence but "refrain from making any credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr. , 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
Baker asserts she is entitled to summary judgment on both her Fifth Amendment and Texas state law takings claims. The Court will address the merits of both claims but will first dispose of the procedural arguments the City raised in its response.
First, the City argues Baker's filing is a non-dispositive motion in excess of fifteen pages and, therefore, in violation of Local Rule 7(a)(1). Baker concedes that she violated Local Rule 7(a)(1) when she filed a 19-page partial motion for summary judgment, which this Court considers a non-dispositive motion. See E. D. TEX. CIV. R. 7(a)(2) (). But as Baker points out, "courts in this district rarely strike briefing solely for exceeding page limitations—particularly in cases of good faith" (Dkt. #21 at p. 5 (citing Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Heiberg , No. 4:17-CV-690, 2020 WL 949207, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2020) ; Vanderbol v. State Farm Mut....
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Slaybaugh v. Rutherford Cnty.
...the Eastern District of Texas, Baker v. City of McKinney, 601 F.Supp.3d 124 (E.D. Tex. 2022). In response, the plaintiffs rely heavily on Baker, they argue that the significant damage to their home constitutes a per se taking that triggers their right to compensation. While asserting that t......