Baker v. Compton
| Decision Date | 02 November 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 30628,30628 |
| Citation | 211 N.E.2d 162,247 Ind. 39 |
| Parties | Mary BAKER, Appellant, v. David Lowell COMPTON and Evelyn Ruth Compton, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
William H. Tallman, Wabash, for appellant.
Charles R. Tiede, Tiede & Magley, Wabash, for appellees.
Appellees, who are husband and wife, initiated this proceeding by filing in the court below a petition for the adoption of Christina Lynn Baker, a minor child born out of wedlock to appellant. Attached to the petition was consent to said adoption signed by appellant in the presence of a notary public who acknowledged the same.
The issue upon this appeal involves a construction of Burns' Sec. 3-120 (1946 Repl.) 1. The question was presented in the lower court by appellant's petition to set aside her consent to the adoption and to obtain custody of her minor child alleging appellant's consent was invalid because it was executed and acknowledged before a notary public rather than in the presence of a duly authorized agent of the state department of public welfare or approved adoption investigation agency.
The trial court held appellant's consent was valid within the Indiana statutes and granted appellee's petition for adoption. Appellant assigns as error the overruling of her motion for new trial.
The pertinent portions of Burns' Sec. 3-120 (1946 Repl.), supra, here involved are as follows, viz.:
* * *' Acts 1941, ch. 146, Sec. 6, p. 438; 1943, ch. 40, Sec. 5, p. 89.
Appellant's argument in essence on the appeal is that Burns' Sec. 3-120 (1946 Repl.), supra, sets out two procedural requirements for the valid consent from the parent or parents of the child to be adopted, viz: (1) the consent must be signed in the presence of a duly authorized agent of the state department of public welfare or of such approved investigation agency; (2) the consent must be attested to by such agent, or by a notary public.
Appellant however cites 1 I.L.E., Adoption, Sec. 3, Note 30, with reference to the above quoted statute as follows:
'Acknowledgment may be before a notary public or an employee of the State Department or an approved county department of public welfare who has been authorized to administer oaths.'
Where acknowledgment is before a notary public, there is no place on the form to indicate whether or not it was signed in the presence of a duly authorized agent of the State Department...
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