Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Com'n, 89-5096
Decision Date | 09 October 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-5096,89-5096 |
Parties | Dewey BAKER, Appellant v. DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 88-03565).
Dewey Baker, pro se.
Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellees.
Before SILBERMAN, GINSBURG and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
Dewey Baker challenges the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his complaint seeking declaratory relief and damages for an alleged denial of due process. The district court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Because we conclude that dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) was appropriate, we affirm.
Baker was convicted of unarmed bank robbery in 1978 and sentenced to sixteen years for that offense. Subsequent to his imprisonment for bank robbery, but before the effective date of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1 Baker escaped three times and received additional prison time. Baker claimed in his district court complaint that if he were sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines, he would serve less time in prison. Before service of process, the district court sua sponte dismissed Baker's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
A dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The dispositive question in this case is whether we may affirm the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the complaint. The district court, relying on Rule 12(b)(6), disposed of Baker's action prior to service, and without providing Baker with notice or an opportunity to respond. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor any federal statute expressly prohibits sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim, 2 and this court has never confronted the issue directly.
The Ninth Circuit in Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.1987), adopted a pragmatic approach to the issue, refusing to remand where it was apparent that the claimant could not possibly prevail. Cf. Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir.1987) ( ); Tyler v. Mmes. Pasqua & Toloso, 748 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir.1984) (, )overruled on other grounds, Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.1987). In Omar, the appellant challenged a pretrial ruling of the district court which, in effect, sua sponte dismissed a counterclaim for failure to state a claim. The district court did not give appellant notice of its intent to dismiss the counterclaim or an opportunity to oppose such a dismissal. The Ninth Circuit refused to find reversible error holding that a trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte without notice "where the claimant cannot possibly win relief." Omar, 813 F.2d at 991. We adopt the position taken by our sister circuit: it is practical and fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights and the efficient use of judicial resources.
We note that certain other circuits enforce a strict notice requirement with regard to sua sponte dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and mandate reversal for noncompliance with procedural steps dictated by the court. See, e.g., Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797-98 (2d Cir.1988); Morrison v. Tomano, 755 F.2d 515, 516-17 (6th Cir.1985); Jefferson Fourteenth Associates v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526-27 (11th Cir.1983); cf. Literature, Inc. v. Quinn, 482 F.2d 372, 374 (1st Cir.1973) ( ). Such an approach, however, in cases where the plaintiff has not advanced a shred of a valid claim can only lead to a waste of judicial resources.
The standard we articulate today does not conflict with our holding in Brandon v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 811, 83 L.Ed.2d 804 (1985). The Brandon court, in the context of discussing the standards for sua sponte dismissals of in forma pauperis petitions under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d), lauded the procedural safeguards inherent in the disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by a defendant. Brandon, 734 F.2d at 59. This emphasis on the "sharply honed adversarial exchange" involved in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Brandon, 734 F.2d at 59, however, does not suggest that Rule 12(b)(6) may never be used as a basis for dismissal except upon motion by the defendant.
Because it is patently obvious that Baker could not have prevailed on the facts alleged in his complaint, we find that sua sponte dismissal was appropriate. It is clear that the Sentencing Guidelines apply only to those defendants whose offenses were committed on or after November 1, 1987. See 18 U.S.C. Sec....
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