Baker v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 30 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-CV-60876-RAR |
| Parties | RONALD BAKER, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.[1] |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND DISMISSING IN PART HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging Petitioner's convictions and sentences imposed by the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, in Case No 12-5496CF10A. See Amended Petition [ECF No. 7] (“Am. Pet.”). Respondent filed a Response to the Amended Petition, see Response to Order to Show Cause (“Response”) [ECF No. 12], and Petitioner filed a Reply, [ECF No. 19].
Having carefully reviewed the record and governing law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES Grounds 7 and 9 of the Amended Petition and DENIES the remaining grounds for relief.
On November 12, 2008, Petitioner was charged by Information in Case No. 08-19713CF10A with twenty-one counts: two counts of sexual battery by a person with familial or custodial authority, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(8)(b); four counts of lewd or lascivious molestation, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(5); one count of lewd or lascivious exhibition, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(7); seven counts of using a child in a sexual performance, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 827.071(2); and seven counts of possessing images of a sexual performance by a child, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 827.071(5). See Information [ECF No. 13-1] at 5-11. The Information alleged that, between August 2003 and October 2008, Petitioner engaged in multiple instances of illegal sexual activity with “T.B.,” a minor child who was also Petitioner's biological daughter. See generally id.
On April 13, 2012, the State filed a new Information in Case No 12-5496CF10A, which superseded the original Information and charged Petitioner with additional counts related to earlier alleged instances of sexual misconduct dating back to July 2000. See generally Second Information [ECF No 13-1] at 13-23. This Second Information now charged Petitioner with twenty-seven counts: three counts of sexual battery by a person with familial or custodial authority, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 794.011(8)(b) (Counts 1-3); eight counts of lewd or lascivious molestation, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(5) (Counts 4-8, 10-12); one count of lewd or lascivious conduct, in violation of Fla. Stat § 800.04(6) (Count 9); one count of lewd or lascivious exhibition, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(7) (Count 13); seven counts of using a child in a sexual performance, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 827.071(2) (Counts 14-20); and seven counts of possessing images of a sexual performance by a child, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 827.071(5) (Counts 21-27). See id. Just four days after the Second Information was filed, Petitioner's defense attorney filed a motion to sever the six new counts from the Second Information that were not present in the original Information (Counts 3 and 8-12), arguing that “[t]he Defense did not have an opportunity to investigate the new allegations” and that “[i]f the Defendant is required to meet all these charges in one hearing he will be prejudiced and injured in his defense.” Motion to Sever [ECF No. 13-1] at 42-43. The state trial court denied the Motion to Sever two days later. Order Denying Motion to Sever [ECF No. 13-1] at 45.
Petitioner proceeded to trial on all twenty-seven counts of the Second Information. On May 9, 2012, a Broward County jury found Petitioner guilty of all but one count (Count 26) as charged in the Second Information. See Verdict [ECF No. 13-1] at 47-72. The state trial court adjudicated Petitioner guilty in accordance with the jury's verdict and sentenced Petitioner to thirty (30) years on Count 1, a life sentence on Counts 2 and 3, fifteen (15) years on Counts 4-10, two more life sentences for Counts 11 and 12,[2] five (5) years on Count 13, fifteen (15) years on Counts 14-20, and five (5) years on Counts 21-25 and 27. See Sentencing Orders [ECF No. 13-1] at 91168.
Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth DCA”). Petitioner raised three arguments on direct appeal: (1) “the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress where the search warrant affidavit was lacking in probable cause and contained material misrepresentations[,]” Direct Appeal Initial Brief [ECF No. 13-1] at 190; (2) the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's severance motion “where the additional charges alleged to have taken place . . . were added less than three weeks before [the] jury trial,” id. at 195; and (3) the trial court failed to hold “an adequate Richardson[3] hearing when Defendant argued the State failed to provide him with the dates and times the photographs were posted on the computer,” id. at 197. On May 8, 2014, the Fourth DCA summarily affirmed the state trial court in an unwritten opinion. See Baker v. State, 138 So.3d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
After his conviction was affirmed, Petitioner returned to the Fourth DCA on August 8, 2014,[4] by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, as required by Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c). See State Habeas Petition [ECF No. 13-1] at 26980. Petitioner then amended his state habeas petition to include the following two claims: (1) appellate counsel failed to argue that “the trial court committed fundamental error while instructing the jury” on Counts 1, 7, 9, and 10, Amended State Habeas Petition [ECF No. 13-2] at 7; and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective “when he failed to brief issues relating to the trial court departing from its role as an impartial, neutral arbiter,” id. at 16. On August 25, 2015, the Fourth DCA summarily denied Petitioner's state habeas corpus petition in a one-sentence order. See Order Denying State Habeas Petition [ECF No. 13-2] at 37 ().
Petitioner then filed a second habeas petition with the Fourth DCA on December 31, 2015, again alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Second State Habeas Petition [ECF No. 13-3] at 2-43. This second state habeas petition raised the same two claims from Petitioner's first state habeas petition as well as one new claim: that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court abused its discretion “when it denied a defense motion for a continuance needed to investigate and obtain newly discovered evidence of [an] alibi.” Id. at 23. Once again, the Fourth DCA summarily denied this Second State Habeas Petition. See Order Denying Second State Habeas Petition [ECF No. 13-3] at 45.
Thereafter, on February 3, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief in the state trial court pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. See Motion for Postconviction Relief [ECF No. 13-2] at 135-85. Petitioner then amended his motion for postconviction relief several times until he filed the operative “Third Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief” (hereinafter, the “Postconviction Motion”). See Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 13-2] at 187-231. The Postconviction Motion alleged ten grounds of relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “move the Court for dismissal of counts charged in the Information which were beyond the statute of limitations period[,]” id. at 190; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “strike prospective jurors who demonstrated a predisposed prejudice against the defendant[,]” id. at 193; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “investigate Defendant's alibi defense through employment records and obtaining state computer forensic reports,” id. at 197; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “investigate and obtain forensic experts in scientific fields in order to refute the State's evidence and develop a viable trial strategy[,]” id. at 200; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate “a severe break in the chain of custody” as it relates to “the computer and digital media seized,” id. at 209; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for giving “affirmative misadvise that [Petitioner's] testimony on the alibi could be disallowed by the court,” which prevented Petitioner from exercising his right to testify at trial, id. at 215; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an adequate motion “to recuse the trial court for abandoning its role as a neutral, impartial arbitrator[,]” id. at 216; (8) trial counsel was ineffective “when he failed to make contact with and depose a witness who would have provided trial testimony directly refuting statements made by the alleged victim[,]” id. at 218; (9) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “object to the court's imposition of an illegal sentence on Counts [2, 3, 11, and 12,]” id. at 221; and (10) the State deliberately “withheld critical exculpatory evidence . . . [which] would have established an alibi defense, exposed gross misconduct committed by law enforcement, and would have damaged the alleged victim's credibility[,]” id. at 225.
On January 11, 2018, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Postconviction Motion. See State's Response [ECF No. 13-2] at 233-66. The State conceded that the court should partially grant relief on Ground 1 of the Postconviction Motion because Counts 1 and 9 of the Information charged Petitioner with conduct that was beyond the relevant statute of limitations. See id. at 237 (...
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