Baker v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L.L.C.
Decision Date | 12 February 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–12217–RBC. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Parties | Rachelle BAKER, etc., Jason Dittmann, etc., Plaintiffs, v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., EQR–Walden Park, LLC, Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joshua N. Garick, Law Offices of Joshua N. Garick, P.C., Woburn, MA, Preston W. Leonard, Leonard Law Office, LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Thomas H. Wintner, Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REMAND TO STATE COURT (6)
Putative class representatives Rachelle Baker and Jason Dittmann (“Plaintiffs”) filed a class action against Equity Residential Management, L.L.C. and EQR–Walden Park, L.L.C. (collectively “Equity”) for claims arising out of Equity's failure to provide heat and hot water service for two apartment buildings (collectively “Walden Park”) at sporadic intervals on about twenty-four occasions between April 2012 and the present. These outages lasted anywhere from one to twenty-four hours at a time.
Ms. Baker and Mr. Dittmann are residents of one of the two Walden Park buildings, 225 Walden Street, Apartment 1L, Cambridge, Massachusetts. They seek to represent a putative class of similarly situated individuals living at Walden Park for a period during which the outages occurred. Equity Residential Management, L.L.C. is the plaintiffs' lessor and is a Delaware corporation with a principle place of business located in Chicago, Illinois. EQR–Walden Park, L.L.C. owns the apartment complex and is a Delaware corporation with a principle place of business in Chicago, Illinois.2 Plaintiffs Baker and Dittmann filed this class action in the Massachusetts Superior Court of Middlesex County on August 15, 2013 pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 23. Equity filed a Notice of Removal from State Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453 claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship and satisfaction of the other elements under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Remand, disputing satisfaction of the amount in controversy under § 1332(d)(2).
CAFA provides for the removal to federal court of class actions filed in state court if they satisfy the statute's minimal diversity and class size requirements and have more than $5 million in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(b), 1446(c), 1453; Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 42–43 (1st Cir.2009). The only CAFA requirement at issue in this case is whether or not the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.
“[D]etermining whether a case belongs in federal court should be done quickly, without an extensive fact-finding inquiry.” Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2001). There is a “general rule of deference to the plaintiff's chosen forum.” Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50 ( )(recognizing that “a greater burden [is imposed] on defendants in the removal situation than is imposed on plaintiffs who wish to litigate in federal court by invoking its original jurisdiction” to demonstrate the amount in controversy but that “[t]his discrepancy in treatment of plaintiffs and defendants may be justified by the historical tradition that the plaintiff is the master of the forum and is empowered to choose the court system and venue in which litigation will proceed”). Thus, any doubts in the evidence should be resolved in favor of remand because the court has “a responsibility to police the border of federal jurisdiction.” Spielman, 251 F.3d at 4.
Law in the First Circuit, along with seven other circuits, places the burden of showing federal jurisdiction on the defendant removing under CAFA. Amoche, 556 F.3d at 48–49; accord Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir.2008) (); Strawn v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir.2008); Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 404–05 (6th Cir.2007); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir.2006); DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New York, 469 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir.2006); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1329–30 (11th Cir.2006); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685–86 (9th Cir.2006); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir.2005).
Where the complaint does not contain specific damage allegations, the removing defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds the $5 million threshold at the time of removal Amoche, 556 F.3d at 43, 51; see also Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir.2006)(“[The removing defendant] must show that it appears to a ‘reasonable probability’ that the aggregate claims of the plaintiff class are in excess of $5 million.”); Brill, 427 F.3d at 449 (). “When a plaintiff's complaint fails to specify damages, or specifies damages less than the federal jurisdictional amount, the courts have disagreed as to the burden that a defendant must meet to establish the jurisdictional sufficiency of the amount in controversy for removal purposes.” 14C Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3725.1, at 76 (4th ed. 2009). Where the complaint filed in state court alleges a specific damage amount that is less than the federal jurisdictional minimum, many circuits place a heavier burden—showing to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold—on the defendant than if the complaint did not claim a specific amount. See14AA Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3702.2, at 395–96 (4th ed. 2011). This heavier burden reflects “the respect accorded the plaintiffs forum choice and the strict construction accorded the removal statute, which effectively amounts to a presumption against the amount in controversy requirement being satisfied and therefore a presumption against removal.” Id. (footnote omitted). In that situation, the defendant's notice of removal does not meet the legal certainty burden that the presumption creates if it is merely conclusory assertions. Id. at 396. This heavier burden is much like that imposed on a defendant seeking dismissal for want of federal subject matter jurisdiction by challenging a plaintiff's claim for damages allegedly in excess of the jurisdictional minimum. Id. (). Compare St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) ( , with Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095–96 (11th Cir.1994) ( , and Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.2007) ( ).
The Amoche court, in holding that the removing defendant must show to a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million where the complaint does not contain specific damage allegations, found the reasonable probability standard to be substantively the same as the preponderance of the evidence standard adopted in several circuits. See Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50. Because a preponderance of the evidence standard is less burdensome than legal certainty and reasonable probability is substantively the same as preponderance of the evidence, the reasonable probability standard applied in Amoche is less burdensome than the legal certainty standard applied in othercircuits. See id.;14AA Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3702.2, at 396–400 (4th ed. 2011).
In the instant case, the defendants removed from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(b), 1446(c), and 1453, claiming that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. The complaint itself does not contain a specific damage amount, but the civil case cover sheet attached to the complaint does claim $3 million in damages. If the civil case cover sheet is not considered in conjunction with the complaint for the purpose of determining whether a specific damages amount is alleged, then Amoche controls and the burden on the defendants in this case is proving to a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. See Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50. The First Circuit has not spoken on whether or not the civil cover sheet may be considered, but there is an opinion in this District which holds that it can be. Williams v. Litton Loan Servicing, 2011 WL 3585528, at *6 (D.Mass. Aug. 15, 2011) ...
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Baker v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L. L.C.
...the case to state court for failure to satisfy CAFA's $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. See Baker v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L.L.C., 996 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D. Mass. 2014).Back in state court, Equity moved for partial summary judgment. On August 5, 2016, the state court granted ......
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Toro v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc.
...of a civil cover sheet's role in determining the amount in controversy is not settled in this Circuit. See Baker v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L.L.C. , 996 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.Mass.2014) ; Williams v. Litton Loan Servicing, No. CA 10–11866–MLW, 2011 WL 3585528, at *6 (D.Mass. Aug. 15, 2011). H......
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Zayas-Carmona v. Rent-A-Center E., Inc.
...are provided for by contract, and (2) when a statute mandates or allows payment of the fees. Id.; see also, Baker v. Equity Residential Management, 996 F.Supp.2d 1, 6–7 (D.Mass.2014). The second exception is applicable to the case at bar because Law No. 80 provides for payment of a discharg......
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Toro v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc.
...sheet's role in determining the amount in controversy is not settled in this Circuit. See Baker v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L.L.C., 996 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D. Mass. 2014); Williams v. Litton Loan Servicing, No. CA 10-11866-MLW, 2011 WL 3585528, at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2011). However, it is ......