Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-op., Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-1628,92-1628
• Citation: 34 F.3d 274
• Parties: 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2415, 129 Lab.Cas. P 11,191 Richard BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. and Lawson White, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 274

34 F.3d 274

147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2415, 129 Lab.Cas. P 11,191

Richard BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. and Lawson White Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.

No. 92-1628.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 23, 1994.

S. Price Barker, Cook, Yancy, King & Calloway, Shreveport, LA, Bryce J. Denny, Lindsey S. Birdsong, Lawrence, McNally & Cooper, Tyler, TX, for appellants.

Bridgett Carlene Anderson, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, TX, William John Bux, Locke Purnell Rain & Harrell, Dallas, TX, for Farmers Elec. Coop. and White.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges, and LAKE ^*, District Judge.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Richard Baker (Baker) brought a state court action in Hunt County, Texas, against his employer, Farmers Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Farmers), and Lawson White (White), individually and as manager of Farmers, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a job reassignment. Defendants removed the suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas on the ground that federal labor law preempted the state law claim because resolution of the action required the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The district court denied Baker's motion to remand and dismissed the action without prejudice for Baker's failure to exhaust contractual grievance procedures. Baker appeals from this order; defendants cross-appeal, asserting that the dismissal should have been with prejudice.

Facts and Proceedings Below

Baker is an employee of Farmers and a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 59 (the Union). When the events underlying this lawsuit occurred, Baker was a member of the Union and he was a Farmers' employee covered by a CBA between Farmers and the Union; at Farmers, he was a journeyman lineman and had held that position for fourteen years. In early 1992, White, the general manager of Farmers, assigned to Baker the duties of a custodian/yardman. ¹ Baker's duties as a custodian/yardman include sweeping the warehouse and driveway, mowing the yard, and cleaning the bathrooms and breakrooms. He contends that these duties are demeaning and cause him physical and emotional distress.

Baker alleges in his state court petition that he was reclassified to the maintenance position in retaliation for participating in an arbitration against Farmers; that arbitration is unrelated to this matter. Following the completion of the arbitration, defendants informed him that he could no longer drive a company truck. According to Baker, driving a truck was not a condition of employment as a journeyman lineman. ² He claims that the defendants are intentionally trying to force him to resign by making his work environment unpleasant. Baker has filed an unfair labor practice charge against Farmers with the National Labor Relations Board.

Defendants claim that Farmers acted within its legal rights in reassigning Baker, under the terms of the CBA which was in effect from 1990 to 1992.

On May 8, 1992, Baker filed this action in state court in Hunt County, Texas, against Farmers and White, individually and as manager of Farmers, claiming damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants timely removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. As grounds for removal, defendants claimed that resolution of Baker's state tort claim required interpretation of the CBA and thus the case involved a federal question arising under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 141, et seq., and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, et seq.

On June 11, 1992, Baker moved to remand the action to state court. Defendants responded. On June 30, 1992, the district court entered an order denying the motion to remand and dismissing the action without prejudice. The court determined that resolution of the dispute depended on Baker's ability to establish either that his reassignment violated the terms of the CBA which governed matters of his employment at Farmers or that the CBA was invalid. The court concluded that the NLRA and the LMRA preempted Baker's state tort claim and denied his motion to remand.

Upon finding that Baker had failed to exhaust the remedies set forth in Article 29 of the CBA which required resolution of disputes arising from the CBA through grievance or arbitration proceedings, the district court dismissed the action without prejudice to allow Baker to comply with this requirement.

Discussion

I. Denial of Motion to Remand

A. Claims against Farmers

Preemption is a question of law reviewed de novo. Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir.1991).

Where removal jurisdiction is predicated on the existence of a federal question, the federal question generally must appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). The removing defendant's interjection of a federal defense is normally insufficient to remove the case. Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430. One exception to this rule, however, occurs where an area of state law has been completely preempted by federal law. Id. Controversies involving collective bargaining agreements, where section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a), provides the grounds for preemption, constitute such an area of preemption. ³ Id. at 394, 107 S.Ct. at 2430-31; Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988).

Defendants removed this action to federal court on the grounds that resolution of Baker's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim required interpretation of the CBA. This claim implicates preemption under section 301 of the LMRA, which vests jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear claims for violation of labor contracts. ⁴"Section 301 not only gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear employment cases covered by collective bargaining agreements, but also directs them to fashion a body of federal common law to resolve such disputes, and preempts any state law claims which require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement." Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1325 (4th Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted).

The purpose behind section 301 preemption is to ensure that issues raised in actions covered by section 301 are decided in accordance with the precepts of federal labor policy. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (quoting Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962)).

In Lueck, the Supreme Court recognized that the coverage of section 301 extends beyond contract claims for breach of a labor agreement to include state tort claims which require analysis of a labor contract:

"If the policies that animate Sec. 301 are to be given their proper range, however, the pre-emptive effect of Sec. 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations. These policies require that 'the relationships created by [a collective-bargaining] agreement' be defined by application of 'an evolving federal common law grounded in national labor policy.' ... Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort." Lueck, 471 U.S. at 210, 105 S.Ct. at 1911 (internal citations omitted).

A state tort claim is preempted by section 301 if "evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Id., at 212, 105 S.Ct. at 1912.

The Court revisited the issue of preemption of state claims in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1885, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), holding that application of state law is preempted by section 301 only if such application requires the interpretation of a CBA. "[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute." Id. at 405, 108 S.Ct. at 1881.

The Lingle Court found that preemption was not required on the facts before it. The plaintiff's allegations concerned retaliatory discharge, a claim requiring proof that (1) the plaintiff was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter him from exercising his rights under the Act or to interfere with his exercise of those rights. The Court decided that neither the elements of the plaintiff's case nor the defense of proving a nonretaliatory motive for discharge required the interpretation of any term of a CBA, although some of the factual inquiries under the state claim might be similar to those under section 301:

"[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for Sec. 301 preemption purposes." Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408, 108 S.Ct. at 1883.

Thus the critical inquiry concerns the necessity of looking to the terms of a CBA to resolve the state law claim. "Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' "...