Baker v. Fleet Maintenance, Incorporated

• Decision Date: 11 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 17099.,17099.
• Citation: 409 F.2d 551
• Parties: Charles BAKER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FLEET MAINTENANCE, INCORPORATED and Sears, Roebuck and Co., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

409 F.2d 551 (1969)

Charles BAKER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FLEET MAINTENANCE, INCORPORATED and Sears, Roebuck and Co., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17099.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

April 11, 1969.

Philip R. Davis, Edward L. S. Arkema, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Shayle P. Fox, Philip C. Lederer, Gerard C. Smetana, Jerry Kronenberg, Lawrence D. Ehrlich, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before SWYGERT, FAIRCHILD and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the district court's order granting the defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (1) motion and dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The seventeen plaintiffs, discharged truck drivers, brought this action under the authority of section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act against their alleged employers, Fleet Maintenance, Incorporated and Sears, Roebuck and Company, to enforce certain rights which they claim arose from a labor contract entered into between their union and the defendants on January 1, 1964.¹ The suit was brought to recover money damages for the differential in pay resulting from the plaintiffs' alleged wrongful discharge, to obtain reinstatement of their jobs and seniority rights, and to continue other employee benefits to which their former employment entitled them.

According to the supplemental amended complaint, the following facts give rise to this action. The plaintiffs had been employed as truck drivers by Fleet for an unspecified period prior to their discharge on July 28, 1967. They had been interviewed and hired for this job by Sears. At the time of their employment, Sears promised the plaintiffs compensation, discount privileges, membership in the Sears' pension and profit-sharing plan, and hospitalization and severance pay. During the term of their employment, the plaintiffs were represented by Chicago Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union of Chicago and Vicinity. The Union and Fleet executed a collective bargaining agreement effective January 1, 1964 which related to the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' employment. Defendant Sears was neither a party to this contract nor specifically mentioned anywhere therein. Article 29 of the contract specifically defined the term during which the agreement would remain in effect:

ARTICLE 29

Contract Term

1. This Agreement shall be in full force and effect from January 1, 1964, to and including March 31, 1967, and shall continue from year to year thereafter unless written notice of desire to cancel or terminate the Agreement is served by either party upon the other at least sixty (60) days prior to date of expiration.

On January 12, 1967, seventy-eight days before the contract's expiration date, the Union's executive director, Ed Fenner, forwarded "written notice" of the Union's desire to negotiate a "new contract wage agreement commencing April 1, 1967, modifying the current contract wage agreement * * * which terminates March 31, 1967." According to an affidavit attached to Fleet's motion to dismiss, its general manager, Jack L. Roth, stated that the Union's January 12 notice had the effect of forestalling automatic renewal of the contract which was scheduled to expire on March 31, 1967 and that thereafter no further collective bargaining agreement was entered into between Fleet and the Union.

On July 28, 1967, about two months subsequent to the collective bargaining agreement's expiration date, the plaintiffs were transferred pursuant to an agreement between Fleet, the Union, and Leaseway Trucking, Incorporated, from their positions as private carriers for Fleet to new positions as common carriers for Leaseway. Although the complaint does not state Fleet's reasons for this transfer, the plaintiffs allege that their "wrongful discharge" on July 28 was in breach of Article 19 of the collective bargaining agreement between Fleet and the Union which prohibited "discharge * * * without just cause."

The district court found that no collective bargaining contract existed at the time of the defendants alleged breach and that, since section 301 affords jurisdiction and can be the basis of a cause of action only in situations where there have been breaches of unexpired labor contracts, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter. We affirm the order of the district court dismissing the complaint, but on other grounds.

It is our opinion that the district court did have jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction under section 301. Retail Clerks International Association v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1963). The proper disposition of this case was dismissal for failure to state a claim under section 301. The defendants' motion for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b) (6) relief should have been treated by the district court as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. In effect, the district court, by granting both parties the opportunity to file affidavits on the issue of the contract's termination, handled the matter under summary judgment procedure.

It is our opinion that this section 301 suit failed to state a claim against Sears for the reason that it undisputably appears from the pleadings, affidavits, and the contract in issue that Sears was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement which was the basis of the plaintiffs' claim. Bowers v. Ulpiano Casals, Inc., 393 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1968). When it is alleged that an employment contract exists between employees or their representative and an employer the court does have jurisdiction to determine the matter. Retail Clerks International Association v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1963)....