Baker v. Gaffney, Civ. A. No. 1848-54.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1956
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1848-54.
• Parties: Marjorie A. BAKER, Plaintiff, v. Paul L. GAFFNEY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

141 F. Supp. 602

Marjorie A. BAKER, Plaintiff, v. Paul L. GAFFNEY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 1848-54.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

May 18, 1956.

Edward J. Skeens, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., for defendant.

HOLTZOFF, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Marjorie Baker, now Marjorie Bean, was a passenger in a car driven by Paul Bean, who was then her fiance. Bean had borrowed the car from a friend of his, the defendant, Paul Gaffney. Bean, while driving the car, had an accident as a result of which the car struck a tree and the plaintiff, Marjorie Baker, was injured. She brought this suit against Gaffney and Bean, both. Subsequently, however, she married Bean and the case was dismissed against Bean on the ground that a married woman may not sue her husband for damages sustained by her as a result of his negligence.

The suit having been dismissed against Bean, it is now before the Court only as against the defendant, Gaffney, who was the owner of the automobile and who, as a Good Samaritan, had lent it to Bean.

The defendant moves for a directed verdict on the basis of the opening statement of plaintiff's counsel. It is well settled that in the District of Columbia a married woman may not sue her husband for damages in tort even in a case in which the tort was committed prior to the marriage, Spector v. Weisman, 59 App.D.C. 280, 40 F.2d 792.

The question still remains, however, whether the suit may be maintained against the owner of the car driven by the man who later became the plaintiff's husband. Under the Financial Responsibility Act, which exists both in this jurisdiction and in New York, D.C.Code 1951, § 40-417 et seq.; Vehicle and Traffic Law, McK.Consol.Laws, c. 71, § 94 et seq., where the accident occurred, the owner of a car who lends it to another is liable for the negligence of that other person. It is sought to hold the defendant, Gaffney, liable on that basis.

We have a situation, however, in which the driver of the car cannot be held liable because the action against him is barred by reason of the fact that he was married to the plaintiff. We have no authority on this point in the District of Columbia, but there is one in Maryland. It must be observed that, in the absence of authorities in the District of Columbia, decisions of Maryland courts on questions of common law are authoritative in this jurisdiction since we derive our common law from Maryland.

In the case of Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99, 131 A.L.R. 307, decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, it was held that a husband's employer is not liable to the employe's wife for injuries that she sustained as the result of the husband's negligence while he was acting in the scope of his employment. That court held that the rule of respondeat superior did not apply in a case in which the agent, who was primarily guilty of negligence, was free of liability, since the employer is liable only if the employee is liable.

This Court is of the opinion that this principle is equally applicable in a situation in which it is sought to hold the owner of an automobile liable under the so-called Financial Responsibility Act, for the negligence of the person to whom he lends his car.

These considerations, however, are not sufficient to dispose of this case. This accident took place...