Baker v. Garner
| Decision Date | 30 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:20-CV-03278-RMG |
| Parties | Randy Levins Baker, Plaintiff, v. Desmend Garner, in his individual capacity; A. Nichols, in his individual capacity; City of Summerville, SC; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 35) recommending the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 20). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts in part and declines to adopt in part, the R & R as the Order of the Court.
Randy Levins Baker (“Plaintiff”) initiated the instant civil rights action against Defendants Desmend Garner, Brian Nichols, the City of Summerville, South Carolina, and the City of Summerville Police Department arising out of an incident where Garner and Nichols allegedly unlawfully entered Plaintiff's hotel room and utilized excessive force to arrest Plaintiff. Garner and Nichols are police officers employed by the City of Summerville Police Department. The incident was captured on the officers' body camera footage.
On May 3, 2019, at approximately 1:00 a.m. Garner and Nichols responded to a report of a disturbance between roommates at the Wyndham Gardens Hotel in Summerville, South Carolina, which resulted in their arrest of Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 2) (Dkt. No. 20 at 2). Garner and Nichols spoke with various individuals at the hotel who said Plaintiff, as the head foreman, told one of the workers to kick his roommate out of the hotel room. (Dkt. No. 30-4, Nichols BWC at: 0:00:1-30; 0:04:32-40). Garner and Nichols knocked on the door of Plaintiff's hotel room and Charlie Couch answered. Garner told Couch he wanted to speak to Plaintiff. Couch gestured to the officers and retreated into the room to awaken Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-5). The parties dispute Couch's gesture. Defendants represent that Couch waved Garner and Nichols into the hotel room and held the door open while he walked back into the room to get Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 34-3, Nichols Depo. at 12:1519); (Dkt. No. 34-2, Garner Depo. at 15:7-10); (Dkt. No. 30-4, Nichols BWC at 07:32); (Dkt. No. 30-5, Garner BWC at 06:37.). Plaintiff represents that Couch did not wave Garner and Nichols into the room, nor did he hold the door open for them. (Dkt. No. 34-1, Plaintiff Depo. at 54).
Less than one minute after Couch retreated into the room to get Plaintiff, Garner entered the room and called Plaintiff's name. (Dkt. No. 30-5, Garner BWC at 0:07:28-45). Plaintiff was in bed at the time and cursed at Garner and told him to leave the room. (Id. at 0:08:32). Garner did not leave and told Plaintiff he could not speak to him like that because he was investigating an incident involving Plaintiff's workers. (Id.). Plaintiff became heated, arose from his bed, and approached Garner. (Id. at 0:08:40). Plaintiff eventually made physical contact with Garner. (Id. at 0:08:41). The parties disagree about what happened next. Defendants represent that during the altercation, Plaintiff chest bumped Garner and then held Garner in a headlock. (Dkt. No. 20 at 2). Plaintiff represents that Garner and Nichols “wrestled Plaintiff to the ground and continued to assault Plaintiff by way of both physical violence and the administration of electric shocks” delivered by a taser. It is undisputed that Garner deployed his taser on Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 34-3, Garner Depo. at 15, 18, 21). Plaintiff was arrested. (Dkt. No. 34-3, Nichols Depo. at 19:17-20); (Dkt. No. 30-3).
Plaintiff initiated the instant lawsuit on September 15, 2020, asserting both federal and state law claims against Defendants as follows: (1) unlawful entry pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights against Defendants Garner and Nichols; (2) excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights against Defendants Garner and Nichols; (3) state law claim for assault as to Defendants Garner and Nichols; (4) state law claim for battery against Defendants Garner and Nichols; (5) state law claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against Defendants City of Summerville and City of Summerville Police Department; (6) state law claim for malicious prosecution against Defendants City of Summerville and City of Summerville Police Department.
The City of Summerville Police Department was dismissed from this action on October 2, 2020. (Dkt. No. 6). On February 14, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending the Court grant in part, deny in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 35). On March 31, 2022, Garner filed objections to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 42). On March 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Garner's objections to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 43). The matter is ripe for the Court's review.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of identifying the portions of the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, any admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Court will construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. US. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). However, an issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 257.
“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 587. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Id. quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with this Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 - 71 (1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made. Additionally, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of any specific objections, “a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Defendant filed objections and therefore the R & R is reviewed de novo.
Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendants Garner and Nichols for unlawful entry and excessive force. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5-7). Garner and Nichols assert that exceptions to the warrant requirement preclude a finding of unlawful entry and that the force used to arrest Plaintiff was reasonable. In addition, they argue they are entitled to qualified immunity as to each claim. The Court will consider the Magistrate Judge's findings as to each claim in turn.
Plaintiff alleges Garner and Nichols unlawfully entered his hotel room without a warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants argue the entry was proper under the consent and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement. (Dkt. No. 20 at 6-7).
“Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). The Fourth Amendment ensures the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .” U.S. Const. amend. 4. “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. “This Fourth Amendment protection extends to guests staying in hotel rooms.” Workman v. Cooper, No. 6:08-CV-3429-HFF-KFM, 2010 WL 3192911, at * 4 (D.S.C. July 16, 2010), adopted by, 2010 WL 3190869 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2010).
An exception to the warrant requirement is made when certain exigent circumstances exist. United States v Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 2001). “[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Whether an officer's entry into a home is justified under this...
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