Baker v. Industrial Com'n
| Decision Date | 14 September 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 10288,10288 |
| Citation | 405 P.2d 613,17 Utah 2d 141 |
| Parties | d 141 H. Aleen BAKER, Plaintiff, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, W. L. Young Brokerage Company, and the State Insurance Fund, Defendants. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
George E. Bridwell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Ronald N. Boyce, Ronald Spratling, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants.
Review of a denial of compensation to claimant who sustained a ruptured intervertebral disc, on the ground that the injury did not occur in the course of or arise out of her employment.
Claimant, H. Aleen Baker, was employed by Young Brokerage as a clerk-typist. On Friday, May 8, 1964, about 4 p. m., while filing papers in the bottom drawer of a filing cabinet, she felt a sudden sharp pain in her left hip and leg as she 'stooped over or raised up.' Thinking it was a temporary pain, she continued working without reporting it. She experienced pain during the weekend, but returned to work the following Monday (and visited a doctor later in the week during an extended noon hour). She went home at 3 p. m. one day because the pain prevented her from working. On Tuesday she had reported the injury to her supervisor and explained that she must have hurt herself while filing papers the previous Friday. Subsequently, she put herself under the care of doctors who agreed that her pain resulted from a herniated disc. The ruptured disc was corrected and the pain alleviated by surgery.
At the Commission's hearing a waitress,--completely disinterested, and four friends testified that Aleen had told them, within one week of the alleged injury that she was in considerable pain that must have been caused by filing papers at the brokerage company. Her sister testified that Aleen was in pain the night of May 8th and that she attributed the pain to the filing incident, and that she had never previously had any back trouble. The only other rather superficial indication as to any other cause was an employer report concerning the cause of the injury, to the effect that Aleen had changed residences prior to the accident and complained of a pain; however claimant testified that the hired movers lifted all the furniture and heavy household appliances.
The Commission denied compensation on the ground that the injury did not occur in the course of employment or arise out of the employment. The main basis for this determination was the statement in Aleen's testimony:
Q. Now I take it that you do not know exactly what caused this problem with your back?
A. No, I don't. Except that it occurred while I was filing in the office. And I hadn't done anything out of the ordinary either at home or at work, or after work, to have caused it. Very definitely.
The claimant's indefinite statements concerning the cause of the injury should not be held to defeat her recovery. 1 As a matter of fact her candid statement substantiates her claim. Also, the Commission's finding may have been partly based on the fact that claimant did not immediately report the injury. This Court has held that the mere fact that claimant did not report the accident immediately was not sufficiently inconsistent with the facts to be ground for denying compensation where the injury was of the kind that would ordinarily cause the claimant to think that it would soon heal and that it would be alright to continue working. 2
It is undisputed that claimant suffered a disability resulting from a back injury. The sole question is whether the injury resulted from an accident arising out of or in the course of her employment. In accordance with the purpose of the Industrial Compensation Act to alleviate hardships upon workers and their families, the facts and inferences therefrom constituting a worker's right to recover are liberally construed. 3 This court is committed to the rule that as a matter of law the Commission may not, without any reason or cause, arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to believe and act upon substantial, competent and credible evidence which is uncontradicted. 4 In the instant case, claimant's uncontroverted testimony is corroborated by the testimony of five witnesses, one of whom, a waitress, appears to have been a disinterested one, at least. We believe that the Commission as a fact finder acted as it did because apparently it disbelieved uncontroverted testimony of witnesses whose interest was in no way shown or inferrable, which carried a reasonable measure of conviction, and there was nothing in the record which intrinsically would discredit the testimony or be indicative of witness demeanor that would give the Commission an advantage over the court in its determination. 5 The Commission's order recited testimony of the applicant which seems to be taken out of context, without considering the record as a whole. The fact that the applicant admitted that she did not know exactly what caused her injury should not be held against her. Anyone who has a sore throat seldom knows its cause. If knowledge of the cause of an ailment, to be shown by the applicant, is a condition precedent to an award in every case, the letter and spirit of the act become quite uninspiring.
The dissent says that the critical question here is whether the injury occurred in the course of applicant's employment. We think the critical question here is whether the Commission arbitrarily can discount all competent, uncontradicted evidence. We think it can't, but did so here, calling for a reversal. This is the law of the case here, nothing else. (See footnotes 6 through 10)
The dissent cites Smith v. Industrial Commission, and Mr. Justice Wade's statement therein about self-serving statements. All Justice Wade said was that if the applicant is the only witness, the Commission need not believe him, and it is a distortion to urge that he said the same rule applied to a case such as here where the applicant was supported and corroborated by five witnesses, none of whom was shown to be interested or biased, without any countervailing evidence. The Smith case simply is no authority under the facts of the instant case.
There is no lack of evidence or anything in the record to reflect incredibility on the part of the applicant or her witnesses, unless, on uncontroverted testimony we arbitrarily say six persons, under penalty of perjury, all were prevaricators. We prefer to direct the reader to the very case relied upon by the dissent, Smith v. Industrial Commission, 6 together with Norris v. Industrial Commission, 7 Wherritt v. Industrial Commission, 8 Dole v. Industrial Commission, 9 and Ewell v. Industrial Commission, 10 as authority to support the principle that we affirm the Commission on contradictory evidence, if there is substantial competent evidence to sustain it, but otherwise, where there is uncontroverted evidence, supported by corroborating evidence and there is no good reason to believe there is perjury or incredibility, in which latter event any attack thereon must at least be supported by the record and by accurate findings of fact. It is difficult to disagree with the Commission but we believe and hold that here we have such a case, in which we must disagree with the Commission on the record and on principle.
The order of the Industrial Commission denying compensation is reversed.
Insofar as the result reached by the court's decision is concerned, it gives me no displeasure that my colleagues are able to conclude that the plaintiff should have an award of compensation. But because I am unable to reconcile that conclusion with foundational principles of law I am compelled to dissent.
Undoubtedly the evidence as set forth in the main opinion could have justified the Commission in making a finding that the plaintiff's injury occurred in the course of her employment; and if it had done so the decision would have been sustained. But the question for this court on review is not, would the evidence support an award, but rather, does it compel an award?
It is fundamental that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the facts which entitle her to an award, that is, that she suffered an injury from an accident in the course of her employment. It is the prerogative of the Industrial Commission to find the facts; 1 and if there is any basis in the evidence upon which it fairly and reasonably could remain unconvinced of that fact, it may refuse an award. When it has made its findings they should be presumed to be correct; and it is our duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting them.
In approaching the question whether the evidence compels an award, it should be clearly understood that there are two separate issues relating to the defendant's disability: (1) did she have an injured back; and (2) did the injury occur in her employment. As to (1), it is not disputed that she did. It is only as to (2) that we are obliged to examine the evidence to determine whether it compels an affirmative answer. The incident is supposed to have occurred on Friday, May 8, 1964 at about 4 p. m. Even though the rupture of an intervertebral disc ordinarily involves a substantial trauma which, to put it mildly, should be at least noticeable to the victim, the plaintiff made no mention of having a pain or anything about this alleged incident to anyone, but worked right on until quitting time. And except for the claim of telling her sister in a telephone conversation that evening, she did not say anything to anyone about it until the following week. She finished out the day Friday, worked all day Monday; and it was not until Tuesday that she mentioned this incident as is shown by the following testimony:
Q. What did you say to any of the employees or your supervisors down there, concerning this back pain?
A. I believe I told Mr. Douglas Smith. (The sales supervisor)
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