Baker v. John Morrell & Co.
| Decision Date | 21 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. C01-4003-MWB.,C01-4003-MWB. |
| Citation | 263 F.Supp.2d 1161 |
| Parties | Rita Lynn BAKER, Plaintiff, v. JOHN MORRELL & CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Jay Elliot Denne, Stanley E. Munger, Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
Gary P. Thimsen, Melanie L. Carpenter, Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, PC, Sioux Falls, SD, Leslie R. Stellman, Hodes, Ulman, Pessin & Katz, PA, Towson, MD, Scott C. Folkers, Scott Folkers Law Firm, Sioux Falls, SD, for Defendant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................................1168
II. ANALYSIS ...............................................................1169
A. Prospective Equitable Relief Available Under Title VII ..............1169
B. Baker's Request For Prospective Equitable Relief ....................1170
1. Reinstatement ....................................................1170
2. Front Pay ........................................................1175
3. Calculation of the front pay award ...............................1184
C. Plaintiffs Request for Attorney's Fees ..............................1187
1. Applicable standards .............................................1188
2. Reasonable hourly rate ...........................................1189
3. Hours reasonably expended ........................................1195
4. Partial success ..................................................1199
5. Calculation of attorney fee award ................................1202
D. Recoverable Costs and Expenses ......................................1202
III. CONCLUSION ............................................................1208
This action arose out of Rita Baker's ("Baker") claim that her long-time employer, John Morrell, maintained a hostile work environment and retaliated against her for complaining about that environment and subjected her to disparate treatment. From 1984 until 2002, Baker worked on the plant floor at John Morrell, and, at the time of her constructive discharge, she was a Computer Scale Operator in the defendant's Sioux City, Iowa meat packaging plant. At trial, she alleged that she was constructively discharged, subjected to disparate treatment and a sexually hostile work environment, and retaliated against for challenging the sexual discrimination she endured at John Morrell—all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
The case was tried to a jury for seven days, beginning on September 23, 2002. The case was submitted to the jury in the late afternoon of October 1, 2002. The following afternoon, on October 2, 2002, the jury returned its verdict. It found in favor of Baker on her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. The jury also found on both of these claims that Baker was constructively discharged, and, pertinent to her retaliation claim, the jury found that John Morrell had failed to prove its "same decision" defense. On Baker's claim of disparate treatment, the jury found in favor of John Morrell.
In a separate Order dated March 17, 2003, the court disposed of several posttrial motions, including the defendant's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial and the plaintiffs motion to amend complaint. Presently before the court is the plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Judgment, in which she seeks an award of front pay, and Application for Attorney's Fees.
The court held a post-verdict evidentiary hearing on April 2, 2003 in order to reopen the record so that Baker could present evidence concerning front pay calculations and so that she could supplement the record on her request for fees. At this hearing, the plaintiff was represented by Stanley Munger and Jay Denne of Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, Sioux City, Iowa. The defendant was represented by Leslie Stellman of Hodes, Ulman, Pessin & Katz, P.A., Towson, Maryland, and by Scott Folkers, in-house counsel for John Morrell in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
Both parties presented evidence at this hearing. In support of her request for front pay, Baker presented her own testimony as well as various tax forms. John Morrell presented the testimony of a representative from Iowa Workforce Development, which is a state job placement agency. After the hearing, the parties submitted briefs in which they summarized their view of the evidence and of applicable law.
John Morrell has not timely argued that reinstatement would be appropriate. Neither has John Morrell timely argued that attorney's fees would be improper in this case.1 However, it has timely challenged the amount of Baker's request for both front pay and attorney's fees.
The court will first consider Baker's request for front pay, beginning with a succinct review of the prospective equitable remedies available under Title VII. Next, the court will consider which future equitable remedies—if any—should be awarded to Baker in this case. And finally, the court will consider Baker's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses.
Title VII, like other federal antidiscrimination laws, supplies broad legal and equitable remedies to make successful plaintiffs whole.2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357-58, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995) (); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (); Cowan v. Strafford R-VI Sch. Dist, 140 F.3d 1153, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998) (). Among the myriad of remedies available to individuals who prevail on their claims of employment discrimination are two alternative types of equitable prospective relief: reinstatement and front pay.3 Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., 110 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir.1997). These equitable remedies may be awarded to compensate successful plaintiffs for lost future earnings. Feldman v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 832-33 (3d Cir.1994).
The purpose of and method for calculating these equitable remedies have been characterized in largely the same manner whether relief is sought under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., (ADEA), or the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (ADA). Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (1st Cir. 1995). The choice of which prospective equitable remedy, if either, should be awarded in a given case is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. E.E.O.C. v. ERE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 555 (8th Cir.1998); Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1458 (10th Cir. 1997); Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Management, 72 F.3d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir. 1996); Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist, 5 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir.1993); Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1056 (7th Cir.1990).
In Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 29 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1008-15 (N.D.Iowa 1998), affd, 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir.2000), this court provided a comprehensive examination of reinstatement and front pay as remedies for prospective equitable relief available under Title VII, as well as examined the factors considered in ordering reinstatement and in awarding front pay. Id. The court, therefore, will not expound upon those remedies and factors extensively here. Rather, the court will address the remedies and apply the factors that it enumerated in Ogden in conjunction with Baker's request for front pay.
Baker has requested prospective equitable relief in the form of front pay. The starting point for the court's analysis of this request is a consideration of whether the "preferred" remedy of reinstatement is appropriate in this case. See Newhouse, 110 F.3d at 641; Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 1988).
Baker contends that an award of front pay, as opposed to reinstatement, is the appropriate remedy in this case. John Morrell did not address whether it considers reinstatement to be a viable option in this case until its supplemental brief filed after the post-verdict hearing. However, John Morrell's only timely argument concerning whether or not front pay is appropriate in this case is this: Baker is not entitled to an award of front pay because she failed to mitigate her damages by, after she was constructively discharged from John Morrell, choosing to embark on a career at a nursing home facility, which offered much lower pay. John Morrell contends that an award of front pay would effectively be "subsidizing" Baker's choice to seek work in a lower paying position because she did not seek employment at any other similar manufacturing plants.
Before the court may consider the propriety of a front pay award, it must be assured that reinstatement is an infeasible or otherwise inappropriate remedy. See Williams, v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 730 (8th Cir.1992) () (quoting Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., Ill F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985)). In Ogden, this court identified the following factors that are potentially useful in determining whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy:
(1) whether the employer is still in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sherman v. Kasotakis
...court has discussed the standards by which fees are awarded in its prior decisions, including, for example, Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1188 (N.D.Iowa 2003); Rural Water Sys. No. 1 v. City of Sioux Ctr., Iowa, 38 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1062-63 (N.D.Iowa 1999), aff'd, 202 F.3d ......
-
Armstrong v. AMERICAN PALLET LEASING INC.
...Ia. L.R. 7.1(g); Lorenzen v. GKN Armstrong Wheels, Inc., 345 F.Supp.2d 977, 992 n. 4 (N.D. Iowa 2004); Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1169 n. 1 (N.D. Iowa 2003), and, in this circuit. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881 (8th Cir. 2001) ("It is well es......
-
Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 4:03 CV 90174.
...physicians are entitled to reasonable fees over and above the standard $40 statutory witness fee. See e.g., Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1206 (N.D.Iowa 2003) (adopting view that treating physicians should ordinarily be allowed a reasonable fee beyond the statutory limit)......
-
Richardson v. Tricom Pictures & Productions, Inc.
...diligence to locate other suitable employment and [or] maintain a suitable job once it is located." Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 263 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1179 (N.D.Iowa 2003); see also Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635 (8th "If an employee suffers a `[willful] loss of earnings, however, the em......