Baker v. John Morrell & Co., C01-4003-MWB.
| Court | United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa |
| Citation | 266 F.Supp.2d 909 |
| Docket Number | No. C01-4003-MWB.,C01-4003-MWB. |
| Parties | Rita Lynn BAKER, Plaintiff, v. JOHN MORRELL & CO., Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 11 June 2003 |
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v.
JOHN MORRELL & CO., Defendant.
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Jay Elliot Denne, Munger, Stanley E. Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
Gary P. Thimsen, Melanie L. Carpenter, Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, PC, Sioux Falls, SD, Leslie R. Stellman, Hodes, UIman, Pessin & KIatz, PA, Towson, MD, Scott C. Folkers, Scott Folkers Law Firm, Sioux Falls, SD, for Defendant.
BENNETT, Chief Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 916
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER .......................................... 917
A. Factual and Procedural Background ...................................... 917
B. Applicable Standards Governing Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider ........ 918
1. Rule 59(e) .......................................................... 918
2. Rule 60(b) .......................................................... 919
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ...................................... 921
1. Did Baker plead her ICRA claims out of court? ....................... 922
2. Rule 10(b)'s effect on Baker's Rule 8 argument ...................... 925
D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) .................................. 926
E. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) .................................. 929
1. Mandatory nature and purpose of Rule 54(c) .......................... 929
2. "Unfairly prejudicial" exception .................................... 930
a. Did Baker prove her ICRA claims? ................................. 930
b. Does the ICRA's absence of a damages cap unfairly prejudice
John Morrell? .................................................. 931
3. Are the ICRA claims a separate "theory" or "issue"? ................. 933
III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT .................................. 939
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A. Allocation of Compensatory Damages to ICRA Claims ...................... 939
B. Emotional Distress Damages ............................................. 942
1. Sufficiency of the evidence ......................................... 942
a. Applicable standards ............................................. 942
b. Baker's evidence of emotional distress and causation ............. 943
2. Excessive verdict ................................................... 944
a. Applicable standards ............................................. 944
b. Do Baker's awards shock the conscience? .......................... 945
C. Pre-judgment Interest on State-Law Claims .............................. 948
D. Punitive Damages ....................................................... 949
1. Applicable standards ................................................ 950
2. Malice or reckless indifference ..................................... 951
3. Good faith efforts .................................................. 959
4. Amount of punitive damages award .................................... 960
a. Application of statutory damages cap provision ................... 960
b. Excessive verdict ................................................ 960
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................ 963
This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs March 28, 2003 Motion to Reconsider Allocation of Damages and, in the Alternative, Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Ruling. (Doc. No. 184). In her motion, Baker urges the court to reconsider its March 17, 2003 Memorandum Opinion and Order denying her Motion to Amend Complaint. In that order, the court found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) did not impart the court with authority under the facts of this case to grant amendment. Because of the lack of prejudice to the defendant in this case, the court was inclined to grant the amendment but ultimately determined that Rule 15(b) did not authorize amendment.
Nevertheless, on November 27, 2002, the court directed the parties to brief the allocation of damages, assuming the court were to grant the plaintiffs motion to amend. (Doc. No. 140). On December 20, 2002, the plaintiff responded to the court's order (Doc. No. 161), and, in her brief, Baker made the following observation without any legal citation, invocation of a procedural rule, or further support:
As an initial matter, Baker submits that the Court does not necessarily need to grant the Motion to Amend to allocate damages to claims based on Iowa law. Baker believes that her original Complaint puts John Morrell on notice of her state law claims because the Complaint specifically references the fact that she filed a charge with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, that a right to sue letter had been issued by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, and that the Complaint was filed within 90 days of the right to sue letter.
(Doc. No. 161).
In her Motion to Reconsider, the plaintiff asks the court to address this argument, which she now frames in terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which establishes the liberal notice pleading standards. Baker initially moved to amend her complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, and the parties were in agreement that Rule 15 governed. This is the rule upon which the court's March 17, 2003 Order was based. The issue in this Motion to Reconsider is not squarely controlled by case law as it developed under any single Federal Rule of Procedure. The court, instead, must resolve this motion by looking at a combination of Rules, including Rules 8, 15, and 54(c), to determine whether Baker's request to add paralled
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state-law claims is appropriate in this novel set of circumstances.
Because the court has addressed in detail the jury's findings and the factual background of this case, the court, in the present Order, will not repeat them in their entirety here, instead providing only a brief background of this employment discrimination lawsuit.
This sex discrimination case arose out of Rita Baker's ("Baker") employment with the defendant, John Morrell & Co. ("John Morrell"), as a Computer Scale Operator in the defendant's Sioux City, Iowa meat packaging plant. Baker began her employment at John Morrell in 1984, and she continued to work for John Morrell until April of 2001. She initiated this lawsuit, claiming that she was constructively discharged, subjected to disparate treatment and a sexually hostile work environment, and retaliated against for challenging the sexual discrimination she endured at John Morrell—all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
The case was tried to a jury for seven days, beginning on September 23, 2002. The case was submitted to the jury in the late afternoon of October 1, 2002. The following afternoon, on October 2, 2002, the jury returned its verdict. It found in favor of Baker on her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. The jury also found on both of these claims that Baker was constructively discharged, and, pertinent to her retaliation claim, the jury found that John Morrell had failed to prove its "same decision" defense. On Baker's claim of disparate treatment, the jury found in favor of John Morrell.
The jury awarded the following damages for John Morrell's wrongful conduct: On her claim of sexual harassment, $250,000.00 for past emotional distress and $50,000.00 for future emotional distress; on her retaliation claim, $75,000.00 for past emotional distress and $10,000.00 for future emotional distress. The jury also awarded $150,000.00 for past emotional distress and $200,000.00 for future emotional distress for Baker's constructive discharge. Moreover, the jury awarded $14,470.24 for Baker's past medical expenses and $90,000.00 for future medical expenses on her sexual harassment claim. The jury also found that Baker was entitled to a $33,314.73 award for backpay. Finally, the jury assessed a sizable punitive damages award against John Morrell: $600,000.00 for sexual harassment and $50,000.00 for retaliation. The Clerk of Court entered judgment in the amount of $1,522,784.97 on October 2, 2002.
A flurry of post-trial motions followed the trial, the majority of which this court resolved in an Order, dated March 17, 2003. Front pay, attorney's fees, costs and expenses were awarded in an Order, dated May 21, 2003. Pertinent to this motion, in its March 17, 2003 Order, the court denied Baker's Motion to Amend Complaint, in which she sought to add retaliation and hostile-work-environment claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Iowa Code ch. 216. The ICRA is Iowa's parallel anti-discrimination counterpart to Title VII. The import of such an amendment is clear: only by adding a state-law claim on her sexual harassment and retaliation claims can she escape the Title VII damages liability cap, which, in this case, is $300,000.00.
The court held a telephonic hearing on the plaintiffs motion on May 14, 2003. At
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this hearing, the plaintiff was represented by her lead counsel Stanley Munger of Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, Sioux City, Iowa. The defendant was represented by Leslie Stellman of Hodes, Ulman, Pessin & Katz, P.A., Towson, Maryland, and by Scott Folkers, in-house counsel for John Morrell in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
Baker's motion fails to identify the authority for a motion to reconsider. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals commented on the "dangers of filing a selfstyled `motion for reconsideration' that is not described by any particular rule of federal civil procedure,"...
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