Baker v. Krietenstein

• Decision Date: 19 December 1916
• Docket Number: 23,173
• Citation: 114 N.E. 445,185 Ind. 693
• Parties: Baker v. Krietenstein, Sheriff
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

114 N.E. 445

185 Ind. 693

Baker v. Krietenstein, Sheriff

No. 23,173

Supreme Court of Indiana

December 19, 1916

From Vigo Superior Court; James P. Stunkard, Special Judge.

Habeas Corpus proceeding by Lusco Baker against George W Krietenstein, sheriff. From an order quashing the writ, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Charles M. Fortune, for appellant.

Walker & Blankenbaker, for appellee.

OPINION

Erwin, J.

Appellant, on March 28, 1916, was by the circuit court of Vigo county adjudged guilty of petit larceny on his plea of guilty, and was on said day sentenced to the jail of Vigo county for a term of 150 days and fined in the sum of $ 100 and ordered committed to said jail until the fine was paid or replevied. No exceptions were taken to the action of the court at the time or at any time, and no appeal was ever taken from the judgment so entered.

On September 19, 1916, appellant filed his petition in the superior court of said county asking that a writ of habeas corpus issue against the sheriff of said county, alleging the facts as set out above and averring that the judgment of the circuit court was void for the reason that the court had no power to commit him, appellant, to the jail for a period of more than sixty days, but that he should have been committed to the Indiana State Farm, under the provisions of § 8 of the act of the general assembly approved March 14, 1913, Acts 1913 p. 660, § 9926h Burns 1914. Upon the filing of the petition duly verified, the Superior Court ordered the writ, directing the sheriff of said county to produce the body of appellant in court on September 28, 1916, at 9 o'clock a. m. On the date of the return of the writ appellee, sheriff of said county, produced appellant in open court and thereupon moved to quash the writ. The court sustained the motion to quash and remanded appellant to the custody of appellee, as sheriff. A motion to quash the writ is the proper proceeding to test the sufficiency of the petition. Edenharter etc. v. Connor (1916), 185 Ind. 643, 114 N.E. 212; Willis v. Bayles (1886), 105 Ind. 363, 5 N.E. 8.

It is insisted by appellant that the judgment of the Vigo Circuit Court is utterly void and that therefore he has a right to his liberty, under the writ of habeas corpus. Appellant insists that the judgment committing him to jail is void by reason of the provisions of the Act of March 14, supra, which provides that in cases of the character of the one in question the court had no jurisdiction to commit him to jail, but that he should have been committed to the State Farm.

Appellee insists that as the circuit court has jurisdiction of appellant and the subject-matter in the original action by which judgment appellant was committed to jail; that the judgment was at most erroneous and that appellant had the remedy of appeal from that judgment if not satisfied therewith, and, not having appealed, that he cannot now attack the same collaterally, which this proceeding seeks to do.

We are of the opinion that appellee's contention must prevail. Where a court, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the litigation, and the parties to the action, enters a judgment, that judgment is final unless appealed from to some court having jurisdiction to review the errors of law arising upon the record. The power to decide includes the power to decide wrong, and an erroneous decision is not subject to collateral attack, irrespective of whether the mistake is one of common, statutory or constitutional law. Stone v. Elliott (1914), 182 Ind. 454, 466, 106 N.E. 710, and cases cited; Koepke v. Hill (1901), 157 Ind. 172, 176, 60 N.E. 1039, 87 Am. St. 161.

It is not contended but that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the charge of larceny brought against appellant. If the question of the jurisdiction of the circuit court was debatable, that court in assuming jurisdiction decided that it had jurisdiction to enter the judgment. Its judgment is impervious to collateral attack. Stone v. Elliott, supra, and cases cited on pages 476, 477. "It is a familiar principle that, when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of; and no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its actions. This doctrine is applicable both to civil cases, and to criminal prosecutions." 7 R. C. L. § 105, p. 1067, and cases cited under notes 8 and 9. In the case of Lowery v. Howard (1885), 103 Ind....