Baker v. Milam
| Decision Date | 09 June 1950 |
| Citation | 27 Beeler 54,231 S.W.2d 381,191 Tenn. 54 |
| Parties | , 191 Tenn. 54 BAKER et al. v. MILAM, County Judge, et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Ross & Ross, Savannah, for appellants (intervening petitioners).
W. H. Fisher, Memphis, for complainants (appellees).
E. C. Kennedy, Decaturville, for defendant Otto Milam.
By a resolution adopted at its July 1946 term, the Decatur County Quarterly Court directed the issuance of $50,000.00 of those school bonds contemplated by Chapter 60 of the Act of 1911, code commencing at § 2557, for the purpose of building a school at Parsons. At the time of the passage of this resolution the amount of bonds which could be issued under this statute was limited to 3% of the value of the taxable property of the county, Code, § 2567.
Shortly thereafter certain taxpayers of Decatur County filed their bill in this suit for the purpose of enjoining the County Judge from issuing these bonds on the allegation (1) that the amount of bonds to be issued under the resolution in question exceeded 3% of the value of the taxable property of the county when there is taken into consideration other bonds which allegedly had been issued to pay for the repair, equipment and building of schools; and (2) that the Quarterly Court was without authority to specify the location of school buildings, that being a function of the Board of Education under the general law. Issue was made by the answer of the County Judge.
Before any proof was taken the Legislature enacted Chapter 328 of the Private Acts of 1947 purporting to eliminate any question as to the validity of this resolution or of these bonds, notwithstanding the fact that the amount of this issue added to allegedly previously issued and outstanding bonds of this character would or might exceed the 3% limitation. A motion to dismiss the suit on the ground that this statute made the issues in this case moot was overruled by the Chancellor.
On proof subsequently taken the Chancellor found that the outstanding bonded indebtedness of Decatur County for expenses incurred in building, repairing and equipping schools exceeded the 3% limitation, and that Chapter 328 purporting to authorize the issuance of these bonds 'is of no effect'. The temporary injunction granted upon the filing of the bill whereby the County Judge was restrained from issuing these bonds was made permanent, and the case is here upon appeal.
If Chapter 328 of the Private Acts of 1947 purporting to validate the allegedly invalid aforesaid resolution of the Quarterly Court and the bonds issued under it is constitutional, then all other questions made in the case are of no consequence. Hence, this question will be considered now.
Chapter 328, after reciting the contents of the July 1946 Quarterly Court resolution, further recites that 'the necessity for said school building (at Parsons) being apparent and urgent, and to the end that no question can be raised or made as to the validity of said bonds and of the power and authority of the Quarterly Court of said County to provide for the issuance of the same', then provides that the proceedings of that Court with reference to the issuance of these bonds for the building of the school at Parsons are 'in all respects ratified, validated and approved', the 3% limitation notwithstanding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The accuracy of the statement made in Chapter 328 that there is an urgent necessity for the erection of this school building at Parsons is clearly established by a letter from the Deputy State Fire Marshal to the Chairman of the Decatur County Board of Education. That letter states that the condition of the school building at Parsons creates a serious fire hazard and a fire trap endangering the lives of the children, if a fire should start during school hours, and concludes with the statement that proper steps should be taken no remedy these conditions 'without delay'.
It is the insistence of the complainants appellees that Chapter 328 suspends the general law in that it permits the Quarterly Court of Decatur County to issue bonds for this school building notwithstanding such issuance will result in the outstanding of such bonds to an amount in excess of 3% of the value of the taxable property of that county, while the general rule, code § 2567, prohibits the Quarterly Courts of all other counties of the State from issuing such bonds to an amount in excess of 3% of such value. Hence, that this statute violates Section 8 of Article 11 of our Constitution. It is to be noted that the Act does not give the Quarterly Court of Decatur County this authority except in this one instance where an urgent necessity exists.
Education is a governmental function and in the exercise of that function the county acts in a governmental capacity. State ex rel. Bales v. Hamilton County, 170 Tenn. 371, 95 S.W.2d 618. Therefore, Chapter 328 is an Act which effects Decatur County in its governmental capacity.
A special act applicable to a single county and contrary to the general law applicable to all the other counties...
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Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools v. Shelby County
...a judicial function. Justice Cook's dissenting opinion, Darnell v. Shapard, 156 Tenn. 544, 566, 3 S.W.2d 661.' The case of Baker v. Milam, 191 Tenn. 54, 231 S.W.2d 381, is neither controlling nor persuasive in this case, as the Private Act involved therein was upheld on the ground of 'urgen......
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Brentwood Liquors Corp. of Williamson County v. Fox
...this Court, inter alia, has decided the following cases: Southern v. Beeler, 183 Tenn. 272, 195 S.W.2d 857 (1946); Baker v. Milam, 191 Tenn. 54, 231 S.W.2d 381 (1950); Wilson v. Beeler, 193 Tenn. 213, 245 S.W.2d 620 (1951); Board of Education of Memphis v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 339 ......
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Metro. Gov't v. Tenn. Dep't of Educ.
...is a governmental function and in the exercise of that function the county acts in a governmental capacity." Baker v. Milam, 231 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tenn. 1950). The Baker Court further held that, because the act itself disclosed a reasonable basis for the discrimination and because it only af......
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Cagle v. McCanless
...181 Tenn. 57, 178 S.W.2d 618. There can be no reason for sustaining the Act on the ground of 'urgent necessity' as held in Baker v. Milam, 191 Tenn. 54, 231 S.W.2d 381, i. e. the need for funds to erect a public school We respect the wishes of the citizens of Hamilton County, as expressed i......