Baker v. Novak

Decision Date19 September 1956
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesJack BAKER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Anton NOVAK, Individually and doing business as Sea Crest Service, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 5412.

William Murray Hill and Murry Luftig, San Diego, for appellant.

Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps, San Diego, for respondent.

BURCH, Justice pro tem.

Plaintiff Jack Baker sues defendant Anton Novak to recover for damages he received when the 'jeep' in which the parties were riding went out of control and catapulted into a canyon. The accident occurred at about 4:30 p. m. November 11, 1954, while Novak was driving the 'jeep' in an easterly direction on U.S. Highway 76 at a point approximately 6 miles southeast of a junction known as Rincon Springs in San Diego County.

Trial by jury resulted in a general verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered upon the verdict.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff was a passenger at the time of the accident. He contends upon appeal that the court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury that plaintiff was a passenger as a matter of law, whereas, the court, considering the question was in conflict, left the matter to the jury as a question of fact. Plaintiff is entitled to a ruling on whether or not plaintiff was a passenger as a matter of law, even though the jury's general verdict could find support in plaintiff's failure to prove to the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his injuries, and thereby justifying the verdict for defendant. Although the record indicates that the jury might have based its verdict on the absence of negligence it appears to be settled law, though with some debate, that prejudicial error results 'in submitting to the jury as a question of fact' an issue on compensation for a ride 'that on the record was one of law' Huebotter v. Follett, 27 Cal.2d 765, 770, 167 P.2d 193, 196, even though the record shows the verdict would be supported because of failure to establish negligence.

In considering the question of status as guest or passenger within the meaning of Vehicle Code Section 403 (the guest law) we center our attention upon the phrase therein requiring 'compensation'. The terms 'guest', 'passenger', and 'compensation' are legal concepts in relation to the guest statute which carry the meanings given to them, respectively, by a long line of decisions from which it appears that the circumstances of each case fit more readily into one or the other of the two categories, guest or passenger, covered by the statute. Conceivably a rider may give a stipulated compensation, money or something else of value, to the driver, and come under the protection of the general law of negligence. But conceivably also the driver, motivated by sheer good will, may invite or permit to ride the well-known 'hitchhiker' who loses his right thereby to compensatory damages for negligence, but must prove injuries caused by the driver's intoxication or wilful misconduct. These various decisions v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d v. Southern Pacific Co., 45Cal.2d 244, 288 P.2d 868, and the line of demarcation there drawn indicates to us that the jury could in this case draw an inference that Mr. Baker was either one or the other. It is the function of the jury to draw that one of the two possible inferences supplied by the evidence offered upon the decisive question: Did Mr. Baker confer upon Mr. Novak a benefit within the meaning of compensation as used in the statute, or did Mr. Baker at his own request go along for the fun of the ride. The ultimate fact to be determined is whether he did or did not give compensation for the ride.

The record discloses evidence for and against the legal concepts of 'passenger' and 'guest'. The parties were friends. Novak testified: 'Well I think I have known him (Mr. Baker) about a year before this accident * * *. The first time I ever met him was he stopped in at the station and wanted to know if he could leave a little radio he had there for some money, take his wife to the hospital. So I give him enough money to take her up to the doctor. And a few days later he picked his radio up * * *. Yes, he brought Dean (Mr. Dean Cabble, Mr. Baker's son-in-law) down one day and asked me if I would give him a job, and I did.' Novak and Cabble went on a uranium hunt in the fall of 1954, but found no uranium. Novak and his wife had been on two uranium hunts before that, but none was found.

'Q. Now when you returned from your trip with Mr. Cabble you arrived back a short period before you went on your trip with Mr. Baker; is that right? A. Yes, four days, I guess.

'Q. Was Mr. Baker working there at the station when you got back? A. Yes, he was.

'Q. And did Mr. Cabble then take over? A. Yes.

'Q. Now was Mr. Baker living there on your premises when you first came back from the trip? A. Well, he had a small truck, he had a bed in back of it, and he lived there, I guess * * *.

'Q. Now when you originally planned to go on this second trip after coming back from Arizona with Mr. Cabble did you originally plan to go with Mr. Baker or with your wife? 'A. I was planning on taking my wife. Then Jack wanted to go so I took Jack. * * *

'Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Baker before leaving about sharing of expenses or groceries or gas and oil? A. No.

'Q. Did Mr. Baker contribute anything toward the purchase of the groceries? A. He never gave me anything.

'Q. Did he pay you anything for the gas and oil? A. No.

'Q. Did he say to you that he would? A. There was nothing mentioned about he would or he wouldn't.'

On examination under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure Mr. Novak testified that the trip was headed for Palm Springs as a likely place to find uranium and that this was at Mr. Baker's suggestion; that they were equipped with a Geiger Counter, a couple of small shovels, bed rolls and a tent. Mr. Novak had previously testified in a deposition:

'Q. Was Jack Baker sharing the expenses of the trip, the ride? A. Yes.

'Q. And what was he to give you for that or what did he give you? A. Well, he put in half the gas and half the groceries and that was it * * *.'

The witness continued under section 2055, supra:

'Mr. Cabble and I got back on a trip before Jack and I left on this one. And him and I shared expenses * * *. Dean had $13 and I put the rest of the money into the trip. So I figured this would be the same way. That would be all. There was nothing mentioned about money or anything else.'

A suggestion is also made that certain work was performed by Mr. Baker with others upon the jeep, putting in new rings and giving it a general overhaul, and that this, being in anticipation of the trip, was contributed as far as Mr. Baker was concerned, as compensation, to bring him into the category of a passenger and not a guest. We think we have quoted sufficiently from the record to show that the parties evidenced a situation with regard to 'compensation' which would make the question one of fact and not one of law. The probative facts, in our view, do not establish as a matter of law that Mr. Baker was a passenger or that he was a guest. The hunt by Mr. Novak for uranium may have been purely by way of recreation from work, and he may have acceded to Mr. Baker's request to go along solely to accommodate a wish of a friend and to enjoy his company. Many people we think might envisage such a trip as purefun, and Mr. Baker could be among them for all we find in the record. We think the court properly left the question to the jury insofar as the Geiger Counter, pick and shovels affected the issue.

"'The designations 'passenger' and 'guest' have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing a person who has given compensation within the meaning of section 403 of the Vehicle Code from one carried gratuitously." Thompson v. Lacey, 42 Cal.2d 443, 444, 267 P.2d 1, 2; Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal.2d 744, 746, 235 P.2d 3. Under this section one who is a guest in the automobile of another cannot recover against the driver for injuries or death unless he establishes that the injuries or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of the driver; but where one is a passenger, the driver is liable for ordinary negligence proximately causing the injuries or death. Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal.App.2d 466, 470, 265 P.2d 183, 42 A.L.R.2d 832.' Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 249-250, 288 P.2d 868, 871.

As for the new rings and repair work on the jeep by the parties, again Mr. Baker's part is not necessarily to be taken as compensation for the ride. Gratitude for other and different accommodations that the trip, that he had received from Mr. Novak, may have been his motive. He kept his own truck on the premises and lodged therein. He had been befriended when his wife was ill. He had been casually employed at times around the station. The jury would have to judge which motive actuated Mr. Baker, friendship or a bargain for the ride. Assuming such an implied finding by the jury for the purposes of appellant's contention on appeal, we find...

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