Baker v. Paxton

• Decision Date: 08 May 1923
• Docket Number: 1087
• Citation: 215 P. 257,29 Wyo. 500
• Parties: BAKER v. PAXTON
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

215 P. 257

29 Wyo. 500

BAKER v. PAXTON

No. 1087

Supreme Court of Wyoming

May 8, 1923

ERROR to District Court, Platte County; WM. C. MENTZER, Judge.

Action by William A. Baker and others against Robert F. Paxton, as county assessor and others to enjoin the collection of taxes. There was a judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

C. A Paige and Corthell, McCullough & Corthell, for plaintiffs in error.

The period for assessment had expired at the time the state board ordered the increase in valuations complained of; (2794-2798 C. S.) and other revenue laws cited. Prior to 1909 county assessors and county boards controlled the entire process then followed the commissioner of taxation, (Laws 1909 page 108,) and in turn increased powers of the State Board of Equalization. (C. S. 2810;) the state board can act only through the county board; the authority of the county board ends at the close of its July meeting; 2810 C. S. did not repeal prior statutes on the subject. (Cattle Co. v Baird, 8 Wyo. 144; Hagett v. Hurley, 40 A. 562; Manuel v. Manuel, 13 O. St. 458; St. v. R. R Co., 81 Vt. 459; Webb v. Ritter, 54 S.E. 484; Lowe v. Water Co., 96 P. 379; St. v. Hocker, 98 P. 964.) The constitution and statutes on the subject should be harmonized. (People v. Pitcher, 138 P. 509; Burton v. Coal Co., 18 Wyo. 362.) Tax proceedings are in invitum and are strictly construed. (Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 385, 399; Mathews v. Blake, 16 Wyo. 116, 125; Bailey v. Smith, (Ill.) 52 N.E. 948, 949; Walton v. Moore, (Ore.) 113 P. 58, 59; Mattox v. Stephens, (Md.) 39 N.E. 480; Lamberida v. Barnum, (Tex.) 90 S.W. 698, 699; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. People, ex rel. Sonnet, (Ill.) 72 N.E. 1105, 1107,) and not extended by implication. (St. v. Thomas, (Utah) 50 P. 615, 618; Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Cruce, 147 P. 152, 155; Bell v. Meeker, (Ind.) 78 N.E. 641, 644; Orr v. St. Brd. (Ida.) 28 P. 416, 419; St. v. Vaile, (Mo.) 26 S.W. 672.) Tax authorities have only such powers as are conferred by statute. (St. v. R. R. Co., 212 S.W. 317; Horton v. Driscoll, 13 Wyo. 66; St. v. Cage, 176 S.W. 928.) The board of county commissioners and board of equalization are distinct and separate; the county board of equalization cannot raise an assessment after the time limited for its meeting. (Napa Bnk. v. County, 120 P. 449; Wolfenden v. Brd., 67 S.E. 319; Farmers Co. v. McDonald, 150 N.W. 640; People v. Pitcher, 138 P. 509; Sparkman v. St., 71 So. 34; San Diego Co. v. Brd. , 127 P. 153; Espalla v. County, 73 So. 761; Waters Oil Co. v. Roberts, 131 S.W. 205; People v. Neff, 156 (N. Y.) 701; Barkley v. Dale, 73 N.E. 325; N. J. Zink Co. v. Brd., 56 A. 138; Brothers v. Beck, 75 Miss. 482; Auditor v. Sparrow, 74 N.W. 881; St. v. Brd., 127 P. 727.) The statutory period for completing assessments expires with the July meeting of the county board, with the exception of assessments of railroad and other property by the state board; the only authority for classifying property for taxation is found in Secs. 2757, 2775 and 2776 C. S.; the classifications involved in this case were unauthorized. (Bell v. Meeker, 78 N.E. 641; Gray v. Foster, 92 N.E. 711; Ore. Co. v. Croisan, 30 P. 219; Campbell v. Bnk., 76 N.W. 10; St. v. Thomas, 50 P. 615; St. v. Empanger, 76 N.W. 53; St. v. Vaile, 122 Mo. 33.) An increase of an unauthorized class of property is an unlawful discrimination. (Grt. N. R. R. v. County, 223 F. 198,) and in conflict with the principle of uniformity. (Hawkins v. Mangrum, 28 So. 872,) even the legislature is restricted in its power of classification to subjects which possess the characteristics of uniformity, (Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle, 201 P. 449,) the classification here attempted, conflicts with Sect 2769 C. S., and Const. Art. I, Sect. 28, (Marsh v. Supr's., 42 Wis. 502.) The state board's action operated to increase individual assessments without notice or opportunity to be heard, and in such case notice is required, (2810 C. S.) (Mayor v. Brd., 67 A. 38; Scott v. Barr, 26 N.E. 891; R. R. Co. v. Minn., 159 U.S. 526; Paulson v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30; Bowan Hicks Co. v. Aden, 36 So. 313,) a statute of similar purport, was considered and criticized by the Supreme Court of North Dakota, (St. v. Leech, 157 N.W. 492,) Sect. 2810 C. S. should receive a construction so restrained and adapted to other coordinate legislation as to remove the grounds of criticism, found in the North Dakota decision; the state board omitted to adopt necessary rules as required by Sec. 2810 C. S., the power is analagous to that delegated to municipal corporations requiring the execution of certain powers by ordinances; (28 Cyc. 275,) (Public Service Co. v. Camden, 112 A. 421;) the statute attempts to confer upon the state board unconstitutional powers; the authority of the state board is fixed by the constitution.

1. To fix the valuation of live stock.

2. To assess railroads and common carriers.

3. To equalize properties in counties for the state revenue.

Three noteworthy limitations are thus expressed or implied, to-wit: limitation of time for valuing live stock; the exclusion of machine shops, etc., from railroad assessments and the denial of power to equalize valuations for other than state revenue purposes. The board's power cannot be enlarged by statute, (8 Cyc. 763; People v. Ames, 60 P. 340; Peoples v. Pitcher, supra;) the words (and such other duties as may be prescribed by law,) found in the constitution do not enlarge the power, but are to be understood as referring to things of the same kind, enumerated in the section. (Sutherland St. Con. 268, People v. Dolan, 5 Wyo. 245; St. v. Clay, 3 Wyo. 393; Baker v. Comm., 9 Wyo. 51; Rasmusson v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117.) Implied powers and restraints found in a constitution are a very important part of it. (8 Cyc. 729, People v. Albertson, 55 N.Y. 50, 55; St. v. Kohnke, La. 335, 793, 804, et seq.; St. v. Moores, Nebr. 76 N.W. 175; Brown v. Lakeland, Fla. 54 So. 716; Hopper v. Britt, N. Y. 96 N.E. 371; Lexington v. Thompson, Ky. 68 S.W. 477.) The Colorado cases cited by defendants below do not establish a stable rule on the subject of the powers of State Boards of Equalization. A review of the Colorado decisions, as cited below, will confirm this statement. The reasons urged for the reversal of the judgment are that the raise in value was attempted after authority to do so, had expired; the arbitrary classification of property, and the application of an increase to an arbitrary class defeated the principle of uniformity. The statute under which the board attempted to act, is not in harmony with the revenue system of the state, that has been followed since the organization of our territorial government, and thereafter during statehood.

W. L. Walls, Attorney General, and W. E. Mullen, for defendants in error.

The period prescribed for equalizations by the state board, under 2810 C. S., is a part of the assessment period; the contention that the county board is, after its July meeting powerless to carry out orders made by the state board, increasing or decreasing valuations is a mere absurdity; the state board cannot perform its duties in equalizing valuations between counties until assessment returns have been sent in; the clause found in Art. 16, Sec. 10, of the constitution authorizing the state board to equalize valuations in the several counties for the state revenue, and to perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law, imports no limitation of power of the kind contended for; the legislature may confer all powers upon the state board, not denied by the constitution; the state board is not required to give notice to individual taxpayers of its orders increasing or decreasing property in the aggregate, or of a class. (People v. Pitcher (Colo.) 138 P. 509; People v. Pitcher, (Colo.) 156 P. 812; St. v. Metallic Inv. Co., (Colo.) 138 P. 1010; Metallic Inv. Co. v. Brd., (U. S.) 60 L.Ed. 372; Hubbard v. Windsor, 15 Mich. 146; Lee v. Mehew, 8 Okla. 136; Cooley on Taxation, (3rd Edition) 785.) The classification of lands for taxation as prescribed by the state board is not in conflict with 2769 C. S., since it was shown by the evidence that lands of a class are not valued alike, but valued with regard to quality, locality, etc., as required by statute. This meets the requirement of true value, as well as uniform taxation. The increase here involved, was not an increase of individual assessments and did not require notice to individual property owners. The cases cited by plaintiff in error on this point relate to statutes different from ours, and the North Dakota case of St. v. Leech turned upon an assessment grossly excessive, and not upon a question of notice; no contention is made by plaintiffs in error, that their lands were assessed at a valuation in excess of their actual value; the discussion appearing in plaintiff's brief on the subject of rules, and the necessity of the state board performing its duties under rules of its own creation, is without merit; the record shows that the state board performed its duty as prescribed by statute, and there is no contention to the contrary, the validity of the statute, (2810 C. S.) is assailed as being in conflict with the constitution; that the power delegated by Art. 16, Sec. 10, to equalize property for the state revenue, is an implied restriction upon the legislature, in the enactment of laws for the equalization of property for purposes other than state revenue; state revenue might include all forms of revenue collected by authority of the state; the constitution requires uniformity of taxation; such uniformity could not be accomplished by different standards of valuation, that is, one for state taxation, and another for local taxation; Art. 16, Sec. 10, of the constitution requir...