Baker v. State

Decision Date01 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. 150,150
Citation632 A.2d 783,332 Md. 542
PartiesWesley E. BAKER v. STATE of Maryland. ,
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Nancy S. Forster, Asst. Public Defender, (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, and Michael R. Braudes, Asst. Public Defender, all on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Ann N. Bosse, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

We are called upon to decide the propriety of decisions made by the judge (Whitfill, J.) during the guilt and death-penalty sentencing phases of Wesley Eugene Baker's first degree murder trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County. The first question before this Court is whether the trial judge abused his discretion by not calling two individuals as the court's witnesses at the sentencing hearing. The second is whether the judge abused his discretion by admitting "victim impact" testimony that included hearsay statements made by the victim's family members. The third issue is whether the trial judge's jury instructions, regarding first degree murder, were adequate in light of our recent holding in Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 613 A.2d 956 (1992). The fourth and final issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to permit a finding that the Defendant was a principal in the first degree in the murder of Jane Tyson. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the jury's verdict and the death sentence imposed by the trial judge.

I. Facts

On the evening of June 6, 1991, the victim, Jane Tyson, went to Westview Mall with her four-year-old granddaughter, Carly, and her six-year-old grandson, Adam. At approximately 9:00 p.m. that evening, the victim's husband, John Tyson, was notified that his wife had been shot.

Wesley Eugene Baker was indicted for the murder and the State filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 412(b)(1)(i). At Baker's trial, a stipulation of Adam's testimony was admitted into evidence. The stipulation stated that as Carly, the victim, and Adam were getting into their automobile, a man ran up to them. Adam heard Ms. Tyson scream "No," the man shot her in the head, and Adam saw blood coming out of her mouth. The man then ran to a blue Chevrolet S-10 Blazer, entered it, and the truck pulled away from the scene.

Chief Deputy Medical Examiner, Dr. Ann M. Dixon, testified that the gunshot wound that killed Jane Tyson was a "contact wound, meaning that the end of the gun was up against the deceased's ear at the time it was discharged...." Dr. Dixon also testified that Tyson died from the single wound to the left side of her head.

Carolyn Davis, another patron of the mall, testified that she was in the parking lot when she heard the gunshot and saw Adam running toward her. Adam told Ms. Davis that his grandmother was dead. Davis then went to Tyson's car where she saw the victim on the ground with blood coming from her head.

Another witness for the State, Scott Faust, testified that he was driving by the mall when he saw the blue Blazer parked in the lot. Faust saw a man enter the driver's side of the Blazer, followed by another man who ran from a nearby car and jumped into the passenger side of the truck before it sped out of the parking lot. Faust followed the Blazer, wrote down the license tag number, and observed the occupants through the truck's rolled-down windows. Faust returned to the mall parking lot and gave a description of the men to the police who had arrived at the scene. Faust positively identified the Appellant, Wesley Eugene Baker, at a police "show-up" later that evening. Faust also made a positive in-court identification of Baker during trial.

Baltimore County Police Officer Frank Barile testified that he and Officer Nick McGowan were on duty in an unmarked police cruiser on Security Boulevard when the suspect vehicle drove past them. The officers activated their emergency lights and pursued the vehicle at a high rate of speed until it turned onto Old Frederick Road and pulled to the right side of the roadway, where the passenger fled from the truck. Officers Barile and McGowan stopped the vehicle and placed the driver, Gregory Lawrence, under arrest. Following his flight from the vehicle, Wesley Eugene Baker was also arrested by Officer James Conaboy. One of the arresting officers at the scene, Officer William Harmon, noticed what appeared to be blood splattered on Baker's sock and shoe. Officer Conaboy then lifted Baker's pants' leg and the officers discovered blood on his shoe, sock, and leg. Upon a visual inspection of Gregory Lawrence, no blood was observed on any of his clothing. The blood found on Baker was later identified, by a serology comparison and positive DNA test, as that of Jane Tyson.

Officer Barile and a fellow officer searched the area where Baker exited the Blazer and found a white purse and an empty plastic card holder on the ground. Tyson's wallet was also found in the area by another officer. Both the purse and the wallet were identified at trial as belonging to Jane Tyson. Incident to the arrest, Officer Barile searched the Blazer and found Tyson's "MOST" bank card on the passenger-side floorboard. Finally, there was testimony at trial that Baker's fingerprints were found on the driver's side door and window of Jane Tyson's car.

On October 26, 1992, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, a jury found Baker guilty of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and the use of a handgun during the commission of a felony. By a special verdict, the jury also found Baker was a principal in the first degree. Baker then elected to be sentenced by Judge Cypert O. Whitfill. 1

At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the State incorporated all of the evidence from the trial and also introduced Baker's prior criminal record. The record revealed prior criminal convictions for unauthorized use in 1975 and 1978, two 1979 convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon, and a 1989 conviction for unlawful possession of a pistol and a controlled dangerous substance. At the time of the murder, Baker had been on parole for less than nine months. The State also presented testimony from John Tyson as to the impact the victim's death had on him and on other members of their family.

Appellant presented testimony from Paul Davis, Chairman of the Maryland Parole Commission, and Dr. Robert Johnson, an expert in criminal justice and prison adjustment. Defense counsel then informed the court that, pursuant to their client's instructions, they did not intend to call Baker's mother or Lori James, a social worker who prepared a history of Baker's family, to testify on Baker's behalf. Defense counsel offered the following reason for this decision:

"Mr. Baker has, as I have said, directed us to not call either of those two witnesses, and I think it's fair to say that I understand, in a sense, why, because there were going to be very painful kinds of things testified about. But we have to respect ... Mr. Baker's very clear, unequivocal and express directions to us, and therefore, we will not be calling those two witnesses...."

The judge responded, "I certainly have a concern, from my standpoint, of not hearing anything about Mr. Baker's social background." At which point, the judge stated his inclination to call the individuals as court's witnesses and he invited both State and defense counsels' comments. Defense counsel offered the following response:

"Your Honor, two comments. One, in our judgment, as an officer of the Court, we have to recognize that the Court has the common law power to call any witness the Court desires on making a determination on anything.

The second comment is, if asked, Mr. Baker will indicate in person, before Your Honor, now that he does not wish you to call those two individuals as Court's witnesses."

The record also indicates the judge was initially informed that Baker refused to offer the testimony because it would prove embarrassing to his family. The judge recognized, however, that "[i]f it's a tactical decision ... I think that decision should and must rest with the Defendant. As I understand it, that's not what's coming forward."

After further discussion, the following colloquy took place between the judge and Mr. Baker:

"THE COURT: Mr. Baker, my inclination, at this moment, is to ask those witnesses to testify, recognizing that information may come out which could be painful to you or painful to other members of your family, but also looking at the reality of the decision that I have to make, literally, whether or not you live or die, and that whatever pain that your family is suffering from the information coming out, in my judgment, is not apt to be more painful than it would be if I imposed a sentence of death and did not have the information, and the feeling that had they overridden your choices, that at least that would have been considered.

So, I am at a loss as to believe that any more pain can be inflicted on your family than a sentence of death without their having had the opportunity to speak.

Do you wish to comment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I feel like the information will be more damaging than helpful to me.

THE COURT: Say that again.

THE DEFENDANT: I feel as though the information would be more damaging than helpful towards me and my case.

THE COURT: Is that your reason for asking [that] I not do this? Because you believe it is more damaging?

THE DEFENDANT: That reason and personal reasons." (Emphasis added).

The judge thereafter decided he would not call either individual to testify. Baker also knowingly and intelligently waived his right of allocution. Following closing arguments, and after weighing all the factors and giving the case careful consideration, the judge...

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