Baker v. State
| Decision Date | 29 November 1910 |
| Docket Number | No. 21,658.,21,658. |
| Citation | 93 N.E. 14,174 Ind. 708 |
| Parties | BAKER v. STATE. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Huntington County; Samuel E. Cook, Judge.
John Baker was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and he appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.John Baker, R. K. Erwin, and Bowers & Feightner, for appellant. James Bingham, Barrett & Morris, A. E. Thomas, A. G. Cavins, E. M. White, and W. H. Thompson, for the State.
The appellant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter on an indictment charging him (1) with the premeditated murder of Columbus Croy, and (2), while committing a burglary, with the felonious killing of Columbus Croy.
The first contention of his counsel is that the state was improperly allowed to file its brief in this appeal, which was received by the clerk and placed upon the files 100 days after the submission of the cause. Appellant's counsel labors under a misapprehension. On June 20, 1901, an amendment to rule 21 was made and file in these words: “Except that in criminal cases such briefs (by appellee) shall be filed within 120 days after submission.” Under this amendment the state's brief was timely filed.
The Attorney General insists that the three several bills of exception, respectively containing instructions given, instructions requested and refused, and the motion for a new trial and affidavits in support thereof, are not in the record for want of proper identification. It is shown by the record that each of said bills, after being properly signed by the judge, was timely filed in open court. The Attorney General seeks to maintain that a filing in open court is not a compliance with section 2163, Burns' Ann. St. 1908, which requires all bills of exception in criminal cases to be filed with the clerk. We cannot accept his logic. The clerk is the custodian of all the files of the court, and a filing in open court is in effect a placing of the file in the manual possession of the clerk, for the court, which is a substantial compliance with the statute.
Complaint is made of the giving to the jury of instruction No. 32, in which the court, after naming certain witnesses that had been called by the defendant and who had been questioned on cross-examination as to whether or not they had made numerous statements concerning matters in relation to the crime, at various times after the death of Columbus Croy and at times and places when the defendant was not present, said: “You must have in mind that such statements, if any have been shown, are not binding on the defendants, but they are to be taken or considered by you in determining whether these witnesses have any interest, bias, prejudice, feeling, or knowledge of the crime, and to aid you in determining the weight, or credit to be given their testimony, and for no other purpose.”
The objection made to the instructions is, that the singling out of a class of witnesses, and the calling of attention to the class of facts testified about in cross-examination, tended to cast suspicion and discredit upon such witnesses and their testimony. We think counsel wholly misconceive the object and natural effect of such an instruction. Clearly, the court was but calling attention to the particular witnesses and their testimony for the purpose of properly guiding the jury against an unwarranted application of testimony to the injury of the defendant. The limitations stated by the court were correct and discreet, and for the benefit of the defendant, for which he has no ground of complaint.
Complaint is likewise made of the refusal of the court to give to the jury requests numbered 25 and 26. These propositions set forth divers facts appearing in evidence, referring to the character of the wound found upon the deceased, the position of the body when found with relation to the saloon that, it is claimed by the state, was being burglarized at the time of the homicide, and from or near which it is claimed the fatal shot was fired, the condition of the clothing on the body, from all of which attention is called to the possibility of accident and the impossibility of committing the crime in the manner contended for by the state, and which concluded with the statement that if such facts created in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to any material point, it was their duty to give the benefit of such doubt to the defendant and acquit him. We think there was no error in the refusal of the court to give these last-named instructions, because their substance was fully covered by instructions 21, 22, 23, and 38, given by the court of its own motion.
In 21 the jury was advised that circumstantial evidence alone, in order to be sufficient for the conviction of the defendant, would have to be so plain and conclusive as not only to convince each juror of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but it would have to go a step further and also exclude or drive out the defendant's contention that he was at home when the crime was committed. In other words, the circumstances proven in the case would have to show the defendant's guilt and also show that he was not at home when the crime was committed, and the circumstances would have to exclude or overcome every other claim or theory of innocence presented by the defendant before you can rely on them for a conviction. Numbers 22, 23, and 38 are in the same vein, and present the rule of reasonable doubt fully and in a manner eminently fair to the defendant. There was no error in refusing to give the instructions requested.
One La Duke, a witness for the state, testified, in substance that the defendant, John Baker, John Stout, Herman Miller, and he, on invitation of the defendant, some time shortly after midnight of June 17, 1907, went to the saloon of Joe Faulkner in the village of Woodburn to get a drink. The party had been drinking heavily before at other places. They approached the rear of the Faulkner saloon through a muddy alley. It was very dark. Defendant Baker led, Stout next, Miller...
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