Baker v. State
| Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2469,2469 |
| Parties | JASON PATTON BAKER v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
UNREPORTED
Kehoe, Wells, Wright, Alexander, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Wright, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
A jury, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, convicted Jason Baker, appellant, of involuntary manslaughter, distribution of fentanyl, possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute, possession of fentanyl, and reckless endangerment. The court sentenced appellant to a total term of 20 years' imprisonment, with all but 15 years suspended. In this appeal, appellant presents two questions for our review:
For reasons to follow, we hold that the trial court did not err in precluding the disputed evidence or in denying appellant's request for a postponement or a mistrial. We, therefore, affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
On January 18, 2018, a 16-year-old male, J.K., was found dead in his bedroom. An autopsy was performed by the State's medical examiner, and the medical examiner determined the cause of death to be an overdose of Fentanyl, a synthetic opioid. It was later discovered that appellant had sold heroin laced with Fentanyl to J.K. just before his death. Appellant was ultimately arrested and charged with involuntary manslaughter and other offenses related to J.K.'s death.
Prior to trial, appellant informed the State that he intended to call several expert witnesses, one of whom had prepared a report indicating that J.K. had ingested additional substances other than Fentanyl with the intent of doing himself harm. The State thereafter filed a motion asking the court to exclude that expert from testifying.
On the first day of trial, after jury selection but before opening statements, the trial court heard argument on the State's motion. The State argued that its sole theory of the case was that appellant had distributed heroin laced with Fentanyl, that the act was grossly negligent, and that the grossly negligent act caused J.K.'s death. The State asserted that, in order to prove that offense, i.e., grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter, the State only needed to show that appellant's distribution of heroin laced with Fentanyl to J.K. was grossly negligent and that it was the actual and legal cause of J.K.'s death. The State argued, therefore, that any opinion by appellant's expert as to whether J.K. had intended to harm or kill himself when he took the heroin laced with Fentanyl was irrelevant and would only confuse the jury.
Defense counsel proffered that his expert, Dr. Michael Arnall, was going to testify "as to the cause of death and the manner of death." Defense counsel stated that the defense was going to provide evidence that "it was not the Fentanyl that caused the death" but rather that "there were other factors that caused the death." Regarding the evidence that J.K. may have been suicidal, defense counsel argued that the evidence was relevant to "foreseeability" because "you can't foresee suicide." Defense counsel argued that J.K.'s death was the result of "an intent to do self-harm," which was "the cause of death."
The trial court ultimately granted the State's motion and found that "what was in the victim's mind at the time [he] ingested the heroin" was not relevant. The court then clarified that the defense's expert, Dr. Arnall, could testify "as to other causes of death other than Fentanyl" but could not "opine as to the victim's intention or intent to commit suicide."
Immediately after the trial court announced its ruling, defense counsel asked if he could "still argue suicide." The court denied the request, stating that its ruling - that the victim's conduct was irrelevant - applied to Dr. Arnall's testimony and to argument. Defense counsel then asked for a postponement on the grounds that the "entire defense strategy" was based on the argument that J.K. had committed suicide. Defense counsel also argued that the defense needed some time to investigate the possibility of an interlocutory appeal. Shortly thereafter, the court recessed for lunch, with the trial judge explaining that she would speak with the Administrative Judge about the postponement request.
When the proceedings resumed following the lunch break, defense counsel renewed his request for a postponement and added a request for a mistrial. Defense counsel argued that the trial court's ruling "completely obliterated the defense theory" and "fundamentally impacted" appellant's constitutional right to present a defense. The State opposed the mistrial request.
The trial court eventually denied the mistrial request. The court explained that its initial ruling was limited to the question of whether Dr. Arnall could testify regarding the victim's intent to commit suicide. The court stated that it was not until defense counsel asked if he could "argue suicide" that the court declared that it did not believe the argument was relevant. The court further stated that the defense should have known that its theory of suicide was "going to be an issue in this case" given the State's motion and the defense's clear knowledge of the relevant case law, which, according to the court, cast doubt on the relevance of a victim's state of mind when a defendant is charged with grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter.
After ruling on the mistrial request, the trial court recessed so that the parties could argue defense counsel's postponement request before the administrative judge. At that hearing, defense counsel argued that a postponement was necessary so that the defense counsel file an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's decision to preclude the defense from arguing that the victim had committed suicide. The administrative judge denied the request. Shortly thereafter, the trial resumed.
Throughout the ensuing trial, appellant attempted to present evidence and argument as to J.K.'s "suicidal behavior," but the trial court repeatedly thwarted those efforts, citing its prior ruling. Appellant was, however, permitted to present evidence, including two expert witnesses, in support of other defense theories. Those theories included that J.K.may have procured the Fentanyl from an alternate source; that J.K.'s death was caused by something other than Fentanyl; and, that appellant would not have known that the heroin he sold to J.K. contained Fentanyl.
Appellant was ultimately convicted. Additional facts will be supplied below.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from presenting evidence or argument that the victim, J.K., may have committed suicide. Appellant asserts that the defense's theory was that the actual cause of death was suicide and not the grossly negligent act of distributing heroin laced with Fentanyl. Appellant maintains that, by disallowing him to present evidence in support of that theory, the court violated his constitutional right to present a defense.
The State asserts that the trial court properly precluded appellant from presenting evidence of J.K.'s suicidal intent. The State argues that the sole factual question as to the charge of grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter was whether the substance that appellant sold to J.K. was the actual and legal cause of J.K.'s death. The State contends that J.K.'s mental state would not have resolved that question and was therefore irrelevant.
The right to present a defense, and the right to present evidence in support of that defense, is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Taneja v. State, 231 Md. App. 1, 10 (2016). That right is circumscribed, however, by "two paramount rules ofevidence, embodied both in case law and in Maryland Rules 5-402 and 5-403." Smith v. State, 371 Md. 496, 504 (2002). The first rule is "that evidence that is not relevant to a material issue is inadmissible." Id.; see also Md. Rule 5-402. The second rule is that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Id.; see also Md. Rule 5-403. We review the trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Muhammad v. State, 177 Md. App. 188, 273-74 (2007).
"Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being, irrespective of malice." State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 152 (2019). Gross negligence involuntary manslaughter occurs when a defendant negligently does some act that results in death. Id. To convict a defendant of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the State must show: 1) that the defendant acted in a grossly negligent manner; and 2) that the defendant's grossly negligent act caused the victim's death. Beckwitt v. State, 249 Md. App. 333, 371 (2021). "In determining whether a defendant's actions constituted gross negligence, we must ask whether the accused's conduct, under the circumstances, amounted to a disregard of the consequences which might ensue and indifference to the rights of others, and so was a wanton and reckless disregard for human life." State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 500 (1994) (citations and quotations omitted). In determining whether the grossly...
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