Baker v. Union Tank Car Co.
| Decision Date | 09 April 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 5527,5527 |
| Citation | 140 So.2d 397 |
| Parties | Percy W. BAKER v. UNION TANK CAR COMPANY. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, by H. P. Breazeale, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Robert W. Williams, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appellee.
Before LOTTINGER, LANDRY and REID, JJ.
Plaintiff, Percy W. Baker, instituted this action against his employer, Union Tank Car Company, to recover wages due for plaintiff's alleged discharge in violation of the employment contract existing between plaintiff and defendant. In the court below judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $145.00 each two weeks commencing June 1, 1960 until plaintiff's reinstatement in the employ of defendant in the classification of car repairer (plaintiff's former position) or until plaintiff's regular retirement date. From said adverse judgment defendant has taken this appeal.
The events giving rise to this litigation are, for the most part, without dispute between the litigants at bar.
Defendant Union Tank Car Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to simply as 'defendant') operates establishments in East Baton Rouge Parish (as well as certain other locations), for the repair, maintenance and rebuilding of railroad tank cars. Plaintiff was employed by defendant at the latter's shop in East Baton Rouge Parish as a car repairman for a period of approximately 20 years prior to May 5, 1960, on which date plaintiff was discharged by defendant.
For several years prior to plaintiff's discharge, defendant had, from year to year, entered into a collective bargaining agreement or 'labor union contract' with United Tank Car Workers of America, Local No. 3 () a local independent labor union of which plaintiff was a member in good standing on May 5, 1960, and which said union was on said date of May 5, 1960 duly recognized by defendant as the bargaining agent for all production and maintenance employees in defendant's Baton Rouge shop. By virtue of annual contracts entered into between defendant and the union (known as collective bargaining agreements), the hours of employment, wages, working conditions and other terms of employment which govern the relationship between defendant and those employees of defendant represented by the union were fixed and stipulated. The last written collective bargaining agreement between defendant and the union was entered into February 1, 1959 and by its own terms expired February 1, 1960.
Upon expiration of the aforesaid bargaining agreement on February 1, 1960, negotiations then in progress between defendant and the union with respect to renewal of the contract were, by mutual consent of said parties, continued with the view of ultimately arriving at a new accord. Pending such negotiations defendant maintained its plant in operation and its employees continued work as usual.
Although, as previously stated, the principal facts are not in dispute between the parties, a controversy does exist with respect to the circumstances under which defendant continued operation of its facilities. In this regard plaintiff contends that in order to stabilize the relationship of the parties and avoid a work stoppage, defendant entered into an agreement with the union to the effect that the terms and provisions of the expired collective bargaining agreement which ended February 1, 1960, would, by mutual agreement, continue in force and effect until such time as defendant notified the union differently. On the other hand, defendant contends that upon expiration of the bargaining agreement which ended February 1, 1960, defendant agreed only to use the expired contract as a 'guide post' with the specific understanding defendant was free to deviate therefrom unilaterally at will and without notice to either the union or any individual employee. It is undisputed and agreed that the expired contract between defendant and the union contained inter alia the following provision:
'Article VII--Seniority, Section 4 (a)--An employee's seniority and his employment relationship with the Company, shall be terminated when the employee:
'* * * (4) is absent from work for three (3) consecutive work days without notifying the Company, unless it is physically impossible for the employee to so notify the Company.'
Following the February 1, 1960, expiration of the contract between defendant and the union, more specifically, in late April, 1960, defendant promulgated and made known to an assembly of its employees that a 'table of standard penalties' was being immediately placed in effect and would henceforth and until further notice govern the relationship between defendant and its employees and that the following provision constituted part thereof:
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CODE NATURE OF OFFENSE Numerals in these columns denote
days employee will be suspended
1st 2nd 3rd
offense offense offense
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M-7 Repeated absence from duty or Warning 5 10
tardiness, without notice to or
permission from Superintendent or
Foreman
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On May 2, 3, and 4, plaintiff absented himself from work but returned and reported for duty on May 5, 1960, and after having worked an hour or two was summoned by his foreman and notified of his discharge for violation of Article VII 4(a)(4) of the expired contract of February 1, 1959. Plaintiff freely admits he did not notify defendant of his intention to be absent from work on May 2, 3 and 4, but contends that knowledge by his foreman, Robert E. Arnheim, Sr., of certain circumstances constituted notice as intended by the hereinabove cited provision of Article VII of the union contract.
The theory of plaintiff's case as we understand it, is that whereas plaintiff is not herein suing upon the union contract as such and is not therefore asserting rights litigable under the National Labor Relations Law, nevertheless, in large measure, the relationship of plaintiff and defendant is to be governed by Federal laws and jurisdiction governing labor and employment. Plaintiff concedes that he has no justiciable rights under Federal law and that the relief to which he is entitled may be afforded, if at all, in the state courts but contends, however, that Federal interpretation of applicable principles if not binding upon this court should be accepted and adopted by the courts of this state in enforcing plaintiff's rights herein.
As succinctly and clearly as we are able to express plaintiff's views, we understand the position of esteemed counsel for plaintiff to be that Federal law and jurisprudence, particularly the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762, has in effect established that every contract of employment wherein a collective bargaining agreement between a labor union and employer is involved, in essence consists of two separate but interrelated contracts or agreements between the employer and each of his individual employees, namely, (1) the contract or trade agreement between the bargaining agent (union) and the employer; and (2) the contract of hiring or employment between each individual employee and the employer. Learned counsel for plaintiff reasons that according to the J. I. Case Co. decision, supra, the individual hiring contract between employee and employer, standing alone, usually consists merely of the hiring but that the hiring agreement is expanded and conditioned by the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union for the benefit of its members inasmuch as each member of the collective bargaining agency (union) becomes a third party beneficiary of the terms of the bargaining agreement between employer and union. According to counsel, the contract, terms and provisions are superimposed upon and, therefore, became part of the hiring agreement with the result that under Federal law the individual employment or hiring contract cannot be less favorable to the employee than the terms of the trade agreement existing between the company and the union. Illustrious counsel also asserts the law in the Federal and common law jurisdictions to be settled to the effect that upon expiration of a company-trade union agreement the terms thereof inure to the benefit of the employee and remain in force and effect as part of the continuing individual hiring contract, consequently, even though the trade union agreement may no longer be effective as between bargaining agent and employer, its terms and conditions nevertheless continue and remain in force and effect as part of the hiring agreement between each employee and employer and continue to govern the relationship between employee and employer until a new trade union agreement is reached or until such time as the employer affirmatively establishes that he no longer intends to be bound thereby. In this latter regard, illustrious counsel for plaintiff relies not only upon the hereinabove cited J. I. Case Co. decision but also Durazo v. Sanburg Manufacturing Co. decided September 1, 1960 by the California Superior Court, Los Angeles County and cited in C.C.H. 41 Labor Cases, P. 23 to 257, Par. 16, 559. The following language appearing in the hereinabove cited J. I. Case Co. decision is pointed to by counsel for plaintiff in support of plaintiff's position.
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