Baker v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 December 2019
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 14-370 (PGS)
• Parties: STEVEN L. BAKER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

STEVEN L. BAKER, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Civ. No. 14-370 (PGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

December 18, 2019

OPINION

PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Steven L. Baker, is a federal prisoner proceeding through counsel with a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the majority of petitioner's § 2255 claims will be denied. However, a few of his claims necessitate an evidentiary hearing.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner's convictions arise from three separate armed bank robberies. The first occurred on September 24, 2009 at the Investors Savings Bank in Lakewood, New Jersey. (See Crim. No. 10-266 ECF 39 at 3). The second occurred at PNC Bank in Brick, New Jersey on November 9, 2009. (See id.) Finally, the third occurred on January 13, 2010 at the First Atlantic Credit Union in Neptune, New Jersey. (See id.)

Petitioner committed these robberies with his cousin, Deshawn Clayton. (See id.) The three robberies followed a similar pattern. Petitioner and Clayton would wear gloves and masks as they committed the robberies. (See id. at 29-30). Clayton would typically jump up on the bank

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counter during the robberies. (See id. at 41). After completing the robberies, petitioner and Clayton would go to a motel to split the proceeds of their bounty. (See id. at 42).

At the time of the third robbery, Bryce Byham - a Neptune police officer, happened to be in the parking lot near the bank. (See Crim. No. 10-266 ECF 60 at 66) He noticed two men who appeared suspicious. He took down their vehicle's (a green Cadillac) license plate number. (See id. at 69) Byham ultimately drove with an FBI agent to the address where the car was registered. (See id. at 70-71). While there, they observed the green Cadillac. (See id. at 71) Alvin Hare was in the vehicle and was initially detained.¹ (See id. at 72). Thereafter, Clayton returned to the vehicle. (See id.) Byham thought he looked familiar to the driver of the car who had left the parking lot earlier. (See id. at 72-73). Cash was ultimately found in the Cadillac. (See id. at 74). Subsequently, Byham went to the Days Inn in Neptune which was close to the First Atlantic Credit Union. He found that Clayton had rented a room there earlier that morning. (See id. at 73).

Upon his arrest, Clayton confessed to the robbery and ultimately identified petitioner as his co-conspirator. (See Crim. No. 10-266 ECF 39 at 71-72). Thereafter, petitioner's residence was searched. (See id. ECF 60 at 186). Evidence corroborating certain aspects of Clayton's testimony was found during this search such as money transfers that corroborated the reasons petitioner had given to Clayton for wanting to rob the banks. (See id. at 186-96).

Petitioner was ultimately charged with three counts of bank robbery by force or violence along with three counts of using a firearm in connection with the three robberies. Petitioner's trial took place in early August, 2010, before now retired District Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr. A jury convicted petitioner on all counts. He received a sentence of eighty-seven months imprisonment on the armed robbery counts to be served concurrently with one other, along with

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fifty-seven years total on the firearms counts. The eighty-seven month and fifty-seven year sentences were to be served consecutively.

Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On appeal, petitioner asserted several claims; namely: (1) trial court error by excluding testimony regarding other cash deposits petitioner made around the time of the robberies; (2) trial court error in giving an "equally available witness" instruction; (3) trial court error in allowing testimony regarding the mapping of cell tower locations and petitioner's cell phone; and (4) that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. On September 17, 2012, the Third Circuit affirmed petitioner's judgment of conviction. See United States v. Baker, 496 F. App'x 201 (3d Cir. 2012). On January 22, 2013, the United States Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. See Baker v. United States, 568 U.S. 1148 (2013).

In January, 2014, petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petitioner raised three claims in his initial filing. Petitioner's first claim raised eight sub-claims of purported ineffective assistance of counsel:

1. Counsel was ineffective for rejecting a plea offer from the government without first conveying the offer to Petitioner.

2. Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of cell phone data for geographical information without the government first obtaining a search warrant.

3. Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and or move to suppress De Shawn Clayton's trial testimony on the basis of Prosecutorial misconduct.

4. Counsel failed to request a Franks hearing concerning the issuance of the warrant.

5. Counsel was ineffective for failing to call Agent Gallagher as a defense witness.

6. Counsel was ineffective for failing to object and/or request jury instruction.

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7. Counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to obtain the conviction.

8. Counsel was ineffective in her failure to hire a latent print examiner, and a forensic video analyst, and/or present exculpatory evidence, namely, fingerprints, fabric, footwear, and glove impressions.

(ECF 1 at 4-5). Petitioner's second ground raised in his initial filing was for prosecutorial misconduct. His third ground was for cumulative error.

The government filed a response in opposition to petitioner's § 2255 motion. (See ECF 7). Thereafter, petitioner filed a traverse. (See ECF 8). Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel along with a motion to amend his § 2255 motion. (See ECF 11 & 13). In the motion to amend, petitioner sought to add claims to this action pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Ultimately, this Court granted both motions. Giselle R. Pomerleau, Esq., of the Federal Defender's Office was appointed to represent petitioner. (See ECF 23).

Thereafter, petitioner, now represented by counsel, filed a supplemental brief in support of his § 2255 motion. (See ECF 32). In that supplemental brief, petitioner asserted that trial counsel's inaccurate advice regarding the expected Sentencing Guidelines calculation during plea negotiations led petitioner to go to trial and reject a plea offer of 168-189 months. Additionally, the supplemental brief sought to preserve all arguments concerning the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(1)(C)(I).

The government then filed a response to petitioner's counseled supplemental brief. (See ECF 36). Subsequently, petitioner filed a supplemental brief considering the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). In that brief,

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petitioner withdrew his Johnson claim. The matter is now ripe for adjudication on petitioner's remaining claims.

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR § 2255 MOTION

A motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence of a person in federal custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 entitles a prisoner to relief if "the court finds . . . [t]here has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). "In considering a motion to vacate a defendant's sentence, 'the court must accept the truth of the movant's factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous based on the existing record.'" United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989)) (citing R. Governing § 2255 Cases R. 4(b)). A District Court "is required to hold an evidentiary hearing 'unless the motion and files and records of the case show conclusively that the movant is not entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting Forte, 865 F.2d at 62). The Third Circuit has stated that this standard creates a "'reasonably low threshold for habeas petitioners to meet.'" Id. (quoting United States v. McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001))). Accordingly, this Court abuses its discretion "if it fails to hold an evidentiary hearing when the files and records of the case are inconclusive as to whether the movant is entitled to relief." Id. (citing McCoy, 410 F.3d at 134).

IV. DISCUSSION

Most of petitioner's claims assert that trial counsel was ineffective. The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court articulated the two-prong test for demonstrating when counsel is deemed ineffective. First, the petitioner must show that considering all of the circumstances,

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counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id. at 688; see also Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that it is necessary to analyze an ineffectiveness claim in light of all of the circumstances) (citation omitted). A petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Under this first prong of the Strickland test, scrutiny of counsel's conduct must be "highly deferential." See id. at 689. Indeed, "[c]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The reviewing court must make every effort to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's...