Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-3513,94-3513 |
| Citation | 70 F.3d 951 |
| Parties | John W. BAKER, Norma J. Baker, Douglas Baker, and Jennifer Baker, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
David S. McCrea (argued), McCrea & McCrea, Bloomington, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Jan Feldman (argued), Melisa G. Thompson, Phelan, Cahill & Quinlan, Chicago, IL, Joseph B. Carney, John R. Schaibley, III, Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before WOOD, Jr., ROVNER, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
John W. Baker, Norma J. Baker, Douglas Baker, and Jennifer Baker (collectively, "the Bakers") appeal the decision of the district court to partially grant the motion to dismiss filed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse"). For the reasons given below, we affirm the decision of the district court.
The facts of this matter, viewed in the light most favorable to the Bakers at this stage of the proceedings, are as follows. John W. Baker was employed by Westinghouse at its Muncie, Indiana facility from 1965 until 1984. In 1973, Baker requested that he be allowed to remove to his home some scrap insulation from the Muncie plant for his personal use. Westinghouse granted this request despite its knowledge that this insulation was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls--more commonly known as "PCBs." Before its removal, the insulation in question had been attached to certain equipment in the Muncie plant. Baker, who did not know of the insulation's contamination, used it to insulate his garage, a chicken coop, and an underground water line.
In 1989, Baker's wife, Norma J. Baker, became concerned that the insulation might contain PCBs. She consequently contacted the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("the EPA"). The EPA initially declined to take any action; Mrs. Baker responded by threatening to burn down her garage. The EPA thereafter conducted a removal action pursuant to its authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601 et seq.
The procedural history of this case is somewhat complex; the relevant portions are summarized here in order to illuminate the present stance of the parties. The Bakers, together with their children Douglas and Jennifer, initially brought suit against Westinghouse in October, 1990, in state court. Westinghouse filed a Notice of Removal on November 6, 1990--jurisdiction in the district court being founded upon diversity of citizenship.
The Bakers then filed an amended complaint on January 8, 1991, which alleged causes of action for negligence, nuisance, indemnity, and intentional misconduct under Indiana law. The amended complaint sought compensation for the following categories of damages: (1) the costs of future medical monitoring; (2) compensatory damages for annoyance and disruption; (3) compensatory damages for loss of homeowner's insurance; (4) compensatory damages for the decrease in the value of their real estate; (5) indemnification for any cleanup costs assessed by the EPA; and (6) punitive damages.
Westinghouse filed a motion on February 19, 1991, to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 25, 1991, the district court partially granted this motion, dismissing the Bakers' nuisance count. 1 The district court ruled that the Bakers had failed to state a cause of action for nuisance because the case did not involve a conflict between neighboring land uses. 2 Furthermore, the district court dismissed, without prejudice, the Bakers' claims for future medical monitoring expenses. The district court did, however, afford the Bakers an opportunity to amend their medical monitoring claim: The district court stated that it would reconsider the matter if the Bakers amended their complaint, within twenty days, to allege that some present physical injury was caused by the contaminated insulation.
The Bakers then filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on July 11, 1991. On November 15, 1991, the district court denied this motion as the second amended complaint contained counts that had been dismissed by the district court in its June 25, 1991 order. The district court ordered the Bakers to file a third amended complaint which contained only counts unaffected by its previous order.
The Bakers filed a third amended complaint on November 27, 1991. The third amended complaint was essentially identical to the first amended complaint, except that it no longer contained counts based upon nuisance and indemnity. Furthermore, the third amended complaint did not pray for compensation for annoyance and disruption.
On June 15, 1992, Westinghouse filed a motion for summary judgment on the two counts--negligence and intentional misconduct--remaining in the third amended complaint. The Bakers had earlier, on June 10, 1992, filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On November 23, 1992, the district court partially granted Westinghouse's motion; the Bakers' motion was wholly denied. The district court first dismissed the Bakers' damage claims for future medical monitoring expenses insofar as they related to John Baker after it found that no genuine issue existed regarding whether he had suffered from any physical injury caused by exposure to PCBs at his home. The court concluded that, if John did suffer from PCB-related personal injuries, no evidence of record indicated that that harm had not occurred on the work site. The district court further found that the Bakers had withdrawn their medical monitoring and personal injury claims regarding Norma, Douglas, and Jennifer. This order did, however, reject Westinghouse's motion for summary judgment to the extent that that motion challenged (1) the Bakers' claims relating to the negligent diminishment of the value of their property and the loss of their homeowner's insurance; and (2) the Bakers' claims for punitive damages.
Westinghouse then filed a second motion for summary judgment on November 24, 1993. In this motion, Westinghouse alleged that the Bakers had failed to introduce any admissible evidence regarding (1) a decrease in their property's value due to the presence of PCB contamination; and (2) their inability to procure homeowner's insurance. Westinghouse also argued that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on the punitive damages claim. On April 18, 1994, the district court partially granted Westinghouse's second motion for summary judgment after finding that the Bakers had failed to establish that their property had diminished in value. Then, on May 13, 1994, Westinghouse filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment. This motion addressed the Bakers' alleged inability to obtain homeowner's insurance and punitive damages, the Bakers' last remaining claims. On September 19, 1994, the district court granted this supplemental motion in full.
To summarize, the district court has cumulatively addressed and dismissed the negligence, nuisance, indemnification, and wilful misconduct counts of the Bakers' complaints. Furthermore, the district court has expressly rejected the Bakers' damage claims which were based upon (1) future medical monitoring; (2) present personal injuries; (3) loss of homeowner's insurance; (4) the decrease in the value of their real estate; (5) indemnification for cleanup costs; and (6) punitive damages. The Bakers have limited their appeal before this court, however, to the district court's decision to dismiss their nuisance count.
In reviewing the district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, we note that such a motion is properly granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any...
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