Bakersfield Elem. Teachers v. The District

Decision Date19 December 2006
Docket NumberNo. F048665.,F048665.
Citation145 Cal.App.4th 1260,52 Cal.Rptr.3d 486
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesBAKERSFIELD ELEMENTARY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BAKERSFIELD CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Littler Mendelson, Barrett K. Green, Los Angeles, and Daniel Cravens, Fresno, for Defendants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Margaret A. Chidester & Associates, Margaret A. Chidester and Cathie L. Fields, Irvine, for California School Boards Association's Education Legal Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Driscoll & Associates and Thomas J. Driscoll, Jr., Lodi, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Joseph R. Colton, Beverly Tucker, Burlingame, Rosalind D. Wolf, Robert E. Lindquist, Santa Fe Springs, Brenda E. Sutton-Wills, Michael D. Hersh and John F. Kohn, Santa Fe Springs, for California Teachers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

HILL, J.

On February 25, 2003, faced with mounting uncertainties about a state budget for the upcoming fiscal year, the governing board of the Bakersfield City School District (the District) adopted a resolution approving a reduction or discontinuation of some "particular kind[s] of service" (PKS) specified in the resolution (see Ed.Code, § 44955),1 which in turn would necessitate the elimination of up to 89 certificated positions (teachers and counselors) in the 2003-2004 school year. The resolution directed the superintendent "to send appropriate notices to all employees, including temporary employees, whose positions may be affected by virtue of this action."

In fact, the superintendent then sent notices to over 225 certificated employees: "nonreemployment" notices to some 74 persons classified by the District as probationary employees (§ 44949), and about 154 "release" notices to persons classified as temporary employees (§ 44954). Within the latter classification, the District included all teachers and counselors holding anything less than a regular credential, which in this case meant all those working under an internship credential, a preintern certificate, an emergency teaching permit, or a credential waiver. As we will explain, there are several significant differences between probationary and temporary employees in terms of layoff procedures and reemployment rights, which in turn affect their opportunities to accrue seniority and permanent status. Probationary employees, for example, but not temporary employees, have the right to an administrative hearing to determine if a PKS layoff is supported by legitimate economic reasons. (§§ 44949, 44955; San Jose Teachers Assn. v. Allen (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 627, 192 Cal.Rptr. 710.)

The nonmanagement employees, both probationary and temporary, who received the layoff notices all were members of the Bakersfield Elementary Teachers Association (BETA or the Association). Most of the probationary employees, acting through BETA, exercised their right to a hearing. BETA argued at the hearing, among other things, that the rights of the probationary employees, or at least their relative seniority, could not be determined without regard to the temporary employees, many of whom BETA claimed had been misclassified and actually were entitled under the Education Code to be treated as probationary. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that even if this were true, it would not affect the seniority rankings of the probationary employees because, he said, service under an emergency permit (the basis upon which the District had made some of the temporary classifications) does not count toward seniority. The ALJ concluded the District's proposed layoffs were reasonable under the circumstances, and the governing board adopted the ALJ's proposed decision without change.

As it turned out, the District was able to rehire all of the certificated employees it had classified as probationary, and 87 of the employees it had classified as temporary, for the 2003-2004 school year.

BETA, on behalf of its members affected by the layoffs, brought the present action against the District on August 6, 2003.2 It sought a writ of mandate directing the District to reinstate and reclassify the temporary employees (Code Civ. Proa, § 1085); a writ of administrative mandate setting aside the District's layoff of the probationary employees (Code Civ. Proa, § 1094.5); declaratory relief establishing the employees' rights under the Education Code as to classification and seniority; and injunctive relief prohibiting the misclassification of certificated employees. The trial court granted the requested relief, but stayed its application pending this appeal by the District.

We will affirm the judgment insofar as it holds the District's policy of classifying teachers and counselors solely on the basis of their certification is invalid, and insofar as it directs the District to reinstate the misclassified employees, for the 2003-2004 school year, to positions and status consistent with their correct classification. We will remand the matter for further proceedings to determine the employees' correct classification, and the amount of back pay and benefits, if any, to which each is entitled. We will reverse the judgment insofar as it orders reinstatement beyond the 2003-2004 school year, and insofar as it denies the District an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of the employees' claims for lost compensation.

DISCUSSION
Standard of Review

"Ordinarily, a trial court's findings and judgment on a petition for writ of mandate are upheld if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] However, the trial court's construction of a statute is purely a question of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal. [Citation.] The principles governing the proper construction of a statute are well established ...: `Courts must ascertain legislative intent so as to effectuate a law's purpose. [Citations.] "In the construction of a statute ... the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is ... contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; ..." [Citation.] Legislative intent will be determined so far as possible from the language of statutes, read as a whole, and if the words are reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty, the courts will look no further to ascertain its meaning. [Citation.] "`The court should take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction.'" [Citations.] "Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." [Citations.]'" (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Golden Valley Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 369, 375-376, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 642 (Golden Valley), italics omitted.)

The principal issue on appeal is whether some or all of the teachers and counselors classified by the District as temporary employees properly should have been classified instead as probationary. If so, it follows we then must determine the effect, if any, of this misclassification on their dismissals, and on the seniority and reemployment rights of the employees the District classified as probationary. We begin, however, with the District's contention the temporary employees are barred by the doctrine of laches from objecting to their classification.

I, Did the Temporary Employees Wait Too Long to Object to Their Classification?

When it becomes necessary, as the result of a reduction or discontinuation of services within a district, to reduce the number of permanent or probationary employees, the district must give notice to the affected employees, setting out reasons for the action and the employees' right to a hearing, no later than March 15. (§§ 44955, 44949; Cousins v. Weaverville Elementary School Dist. (1994) 24 Cal. App.4th 1846, 1854, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 310 (Cousins) [distinguishing procedure to lay off probationary employees for economic reasons from procedure to nonreelect them for subsequent year] Gassman v. Governing Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 137, 144-145, 133 Cal.Rptr. 1, 554 P.2d 321 [distinguishing procedure to lay off probationary employees for economic reasons from procedure to dismiss them for unsatisfactory performance].)3 If the district fails to give the required notice by March 15, the employee "shall be deemed reemployed for the ensuing school year." (§ 44955, subd. (c).)

No permanent employee may be laid off if a probationary employee, or any other employee of less seniority, occupies a position the permanent employee is certificated and competent to fill. (§ 44955, subd. (c).) Likewise, a probationary employee may "bump" another probationary employee with less seniority. Seniority is determined as of the date the employee "first rendered paid service in a probationary position." (§ 44845, italics added.) Temporary employees therefore do not accrue seniority, and so must be released before probationary employees.4

Moreover, temporary employees, unlike permanent and probationary employees, may be dismissed at the pleasure of the board and need be given only a more limited form of notice before the end of the school year, and no hearing. (§ 44954; Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 917-918, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 811, 62 P.3d 54 (Kavanaugh).)5 (The school year runs from July 1 to June 30 (§ 37200).)

Thus, if the employees in this case whom the District classified as temporary were in fact entitled to be classified as probationary, the District's failure to give them a timely notice of nonreemployment caused them in effect to be rehired for the following year. It also, depending upon when they should have been classified as probationary employees, may have...

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