Bakhtiari v. Madrigal, 3:18-CV-38
| Decision Date | 09 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:18-CV-38,3:18-CV-38 |
| Parties | ALIREZA BAKHTIARI PLAINTIFF, v. JASON MADRIGAL, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
(MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLSON)
Presently before me is Magistrate Judge Carlson's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 83) to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Kent Frederick, Thomas R. Decker, Jennifer D. Ritchey, Paul Posluszny, Jason Madrigal ("ICE Defendants"), and the United States of America ("Federal Defendants"). (Doc. 43). For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to grant the Motion to will be adopted.
The facts as alleged in the Complaint are as follows:
Plaintiff, an Iranian national, entered the United States on a student visa in January of 2002. (Doc. 1 ¶ 25). Removal proceedings were initiated against him for overstaying his visa in March of 2004. (Id.). By June of 2007, Plaintiff became a lawful permanent resident of the United States and his removal proceedings were terminated. (Id.).
On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to obstructing, influencing, or impeding any official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and was sentenced to fifty-one (51) months in prison. (Id.). Removal proceedings were again initiated against Plaintiff and he was taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") upon completing his criminal sentence in January of 2017. (Id.). United States Immigration Judge ("IJ") Walter A. Durling issued a removal order on April 18, 2017 and Plaintiff was transferred to Pike County Correctional Facility ("PCCF") by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").1 (Id. ¶¶ 26, 29). Plaintiff appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), who upheld the removal order on September 6, 2017. (Id.). Plaintiff was ultimately released from detention on December 5, 2017. (Id. ¶ 33).
Plaintiff alleges a number of hostile verbal encounters took place between himself and Defendant Madrigal while he was detained at PCCF, which he claims were "[o]k'ed" by Defendant Madrigal's supervisor, Defendant Posluszny. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-33). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges he was exposed to Hepatitis-C from an inmate who salivated on the food trays while "handling" them and that he reported this concern to a number of DHS and PCCF officials. (Id. ¶ 41, 43).2 Plaintiff alleges some PCCF officials retaliated against his Hepatitis-C complaints by attempting to have "plaintiff raped and murdered[,]" stealing documents from his cell, sexually abusing him, placing him in solitary confinement, and verbally harassing him. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 61-64).
On January 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant twenty-three (23) count Complaint against the ICE Defendants, John Kelly,3 and the United States as well as Sgt. John Frawley, Sgt. Forshe, Sgt. Martin,4 Sgt. Martin, and Elise Wenzel, Correctional Administrator ("PCCF Defendants") alleging a number of civil rights violations andtortious conduct under both Pennsylvania law and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). (See Doc. 1 generally).
On August 29, 2018, the Federal Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims against them. (Doc. 43). Magistrate Judge Carlson issued the instant Report and Recommendation on December 27, 2018, recommending that the Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted. (Doc. 83). Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on January 9, 2019 and the Federal Defendants filed a response to the objections on March 1, 2019. (Doc. 85; Doc. 93). This matter has therefore been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
When objections to the magistrate judge's Report are filed, the court must conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of the Report. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). However, this only applies to the extent that a party's objections are both timely and specific; if objections are merely "general in nature," the court "need not conduct a de novo determination." Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Third Circuit has instructed that "providing a complete de novo determination where only a general objection to the report is offered would undermine the efficiency the magistrate system was meant to contribute to the judicial process." Id. at 7. In conducting a de novo review, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Owens v. Beard, 829 F. Supp. 736, 738 (M.D. Pa. 1993). Uncontested portions of the Report may be reviewed at a standard determined by the district court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7. At the very least, the court should review uncontested portions for clear error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Cruz v. Chater, 990 F. Supp. 375, 376-77 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
When ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, "the district court must accept as true the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint, except to the extent federal jurisdiction is dependent on certain facts." Fed. Realty Inv. Trust v. Juniper Props. Group, No. 99-3389, 2000 WL 45996, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 21, 2000) (citing Haydo v. Amerikohl Mining, Inc., 830 F.2d 494, 496 (3d Cir. 1987)). A court may treat a Rule 12(b)(1) motion either as a facial or a factual challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 189 (3d Cir. 2000). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the Court may only consider the allegations contained in the complaint and exhibits attached to the complaint; matters of public record such as court records, letter decisions of government agencies and published reports of administrative bodies; and "undisputably authentic" documents which the plaintiff has identified as a basis of his claim and which the defendant has attached as exhibits to his motion to dismiss. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1993); Dykes v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564, 1567 (3d Cir. 1995) (). If the defendant submits and the court considers evidence that controverts the plaintiff's allegations, the court must treat the motion as a factual challenge. Gould, 220 F.3d at 178. In such cases, "the trial court is free to weigh evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). The court is "not confined to the allegations in the complaint." Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011). No presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the court possesses jurisdiction. Id. The plaintiff must show thisby a preponderance of the evidence. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs., 220 F.3d at 178.
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127. S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). Detailed factual allegations are not required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. However, mere conclusory statements will not do; "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Instead, a complaint must "show" this entitlement by alleging sufficient facts. Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). As such, "[t]he touchstone of the pleading standard is plausability." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974, meaning enoughfactual allegations "'to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of'" each necessary element. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should...
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