Bakhtiari v. Spaulding
| Decision Date | 27 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:17-CV-00016,1:17-CV-00016 |
| Parties | ALIREZA BAKHTIARI, Plaintiff v. STEVEN SPAULDING, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Kane)
This is a civil action initiated upon the filing of a complaint in this matter on January 4, 2017, by pro se prisoner Plaintiff Alireza Bakhtiari ("Bakhtiari"), seeking to recover monetary damages against a total of twenty-one (21) Defendants under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1977), 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). The Court has conducted a screening review of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in part and permit Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
On January 4, 2017, Bakhtiari, a federal inmate currently confined at the York County Prison located in York, Pennsylvania, filed a 19-count, 47-page complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, asserting federal and state law claims against 21 Defendants named in their individual and official capacities, including: 13 prison officials employed at the Federal Correctional Institution at Allenwood, Pennsylvania ("FCI-Allenwood"); 5 Middle District of Pennsylvania Assistant United States Attorneys ("AUSA's"); 2 Bureau of Prison ("BOP") administrators; and the United States of America.1
The events forming the basis of Plaintiff's complaint occurred while Plaintiff was interned at FCI-Allenwood. The crux of Plaintiff's complaint concerns his cellmate assignment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was "brutalized, battered and physically and psychologically tortured" by FCI-Allenwood employees ("Allenwood Defendants"),2 and by his assigned cellmate, Champaign (whom Plaintiff labels a white-supremacist), because of his Iranian nationality. (Doc. No. 1 at 12-13.) Bakhtiari claims that the Allenwood Defendants intentionally placed him in this cell in retaliation for comments he made about certain prison staff. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Allenwood Defendants instructed Champaign to torture him because of Plaintiff's nationality and as a result of having called the Allenwood Defendants "rejects." (Id.) Fearing for his life, Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly pleaded with theAllenwood Defendants to allow him to switch cells, but with no success. (Id. at 11-15.) The tension within the cell continued to escalate until January 9, 2016, when Plaintiff finally convinced Allenwood Defendants Martin and Felton to remove him from the cell and place him in a temporary holding cell. (Id. at 14.)
After examining him and finding no signs of physical marks or abuse, the Allenwood Defendants proceeded to introduce Plaintiff back into the cell with Champaign. However, Plaintiff, still hand-cuffed, began resisting their efforts to secure him in the cell out of fear that Champaign would assault him. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that the Allenwood Defendants responded to Plaintiff's resistance by throwing him to the concrete floor, breaking his glasses, and assaulting him. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff alleges he was then taken to the "dry-room to be chained and tortured." (Id. at 16.)
According to Plaintiff, after spending at least 18 hours in the "dry-room," the Allenwood Defendants took him back to the cell with Champaign. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that after the Allenwood Defendants placed him in the cell and walked away, Champaign punched Plaintiff in the face and continued to punch him in the head and face until Champaign "became tired." (Id. at 18.) That next morning, Allenwood Defendant Slokum came to Plaintiff's cell and informed him that he was being transferred to a different cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that when he was finished packing, Champaign stated "Well[,] [Defendant] Lozano asked me for this favor when I came here, I better deliver[]" and then began punching Plaintiff again. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that despite the visible signs of blood, bruises and wounds on him, the Allenwood Defendants refused to provide him with necessary medical attention. (Id. at 19.)
In addition to Plaintiff's allegations relating to his cell assignment, Plaintiff also alleges that Allenwood Defendant Bittenbender, the disciplinary hearing adjudication officer, failed to afford him with impartial hearings on two occasions, resulting in the loss of a total of 160 days of good time credit from the two decisions. (Id. at 12, 19.) Plaintiff further contests the Regional and Central Office of the BOP's failure to address his appeals of those adjudications of his misconduct. (Id.; Doc. No. 1-2, Declaration of Facts at 1-5.) Plaintiff alleges that because the Regional and Central Officer staff were "playing games and avoiding adjudication of [his] claims," he submitted his appeals to the Prison Litigation Unit, and specifically to the five AUSA's named as Defendants in the caption of the complaint, but did not receive any response from them. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 3.) Finally, Plaintiff complains that FCI-Allenwood employees refused his numerous requests for his prescriptions while housed in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). (Doc. No. 1 at 10-11.)
Plaintiff sets forth a total of 19 causes of action against the above-named Defendants. The matter is now before the Court pursuant to its statutory obligation under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and (e)(2) to screen the complaint and dismiss it if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.3
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 F. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court's inquiry is guided by the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under Twombly and Iqbal, pleading requirements have shifted to a "more heightened form of pleading." See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint hasalleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the following steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint "not entitled" to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any "well-pleaded factual allegations" contained in the complaint "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). A court may also consider "any 'matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.'" Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d Ed. 2004)).
In conducting its screening review of a complaint, the court must be mindful that a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
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