Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1201.,12–1201.
• Citation: 711 F.3d 401
• Parties: Karen B. BALAS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES, INC., Successor to Northrop Grumman Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

711 F.3d 401

Karen B. BALAS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES, INC., Successor to Northrop Grumman Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–1201.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 31, 2013.

Decided: March 15, 2013.

Recognized as Unconstitutional

West's V.C.A. § 18.2–344ARGUED:Steven Scott Biss, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Scott William Kezman, Kaufman & Canoles, PC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Mark E. Warmbier, Kaufman & Canoles, PC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge DUNCAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge WYNN and Judge FLOYD joined.

OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Karen B. Balas appeals the district court's denial of relief on her claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”), as well as wrongful discharge, assault, and battery, brought under Virginia law, against Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (“Huntington Ingalls”), the successor to her former employer, Northrop Grumman Corporation. ¹ On appeal, Balas argues that the district court erred in construing the scope of her charge of discrimination, denying her leave to amend her complaint, and granting summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls on her claims of retaliatory discharge, assault, and battery. For the reasons ably articulated by the district court, we affirm.

I.

A.

According to Balas, Huntington Ingalls “subject[ed] her to an ongoing sexually hostile work environment that included unwanted requests from her supervisor for sex, numerous sexual comments, sexually explicit posters knowingly being allowed in [her] workplace, employees massaging one another, sexually offensive pictures, and unwanted touching....” J.A. 7. Her complaint centers on the actions of her supervisor, Brad Price, who, she alleges, “frequently and repeatedly commented to [her] about how much he liked her attire and physical appearance”; “referred to [her] as a ‘good woman’ ”; “frequently and repeatedly entered [her] small work space and her personal space”; and “frequently talked about his sex life to [her].” J.A. 7–8. According to Balas's complaint, “[i]n or around April 2009, Mr. Price solicited sex from [her].” J.A. 8.

In August 2009, Balas wore a pair of ripped jeans to work. Price, apparently in response to a complaint, sent her home to change into more appropriate work attire. Balas alleges that men dressed in similarly ripped jeans were not asked to change. She alleges that upon returning to work, she complained to Price that his request for her to change clothes was discriminatory.

In January 2010, Price hugged Balas. Balas alleges that Price “trapped [her] in her work space and willfully, wantonly and forcibly put his arms around [her,] hugging her against her will.” J.A. 11–12. It is undisputed, however, that this hug occurred after Balas had given Price a gift of Christmas cookies for his family, and that immediately prior to the hug, Price had thanked her for the cookies and told her, “You never cease to amaze me.” J.A. 145.

Balas alleges that she repeatedly complained of gender discrimination and a hostile work environment. She asserts that because of these complaints, she was repeatedly denied promotions.

On February 17, 2010, Balas was fired for falsifying her February 11, 2010 time records. Another female employee was fired the same day for the same infraction. It is undisputed that Balas did not properly account for taking off over an hour of time. Price alerted Cindi Wolfe, his human resources representative, and Roger Lowman, the department manager, of the time-keeping infraction. The three of them undertook an investigation of the incident. Lowman, who was never made aware of Balas's alleged complaint to Price about the jeans incident, was solely responsible for the decision to fire Balas.

B.

On July 19, 2010, Balas submitted an intake questionnaire to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). She attached to her questionnaire a letter laying out her complaints in greater detail, including being denied opportunities for promotions, a “personal vendetta” Wolfe held against her, and the circumstances of the jeans incident. J.A. 182–84. The EEOC prepared a charge on her behalf, alleging sex discrimination and retaliatory termination, which Balas signed on July 26, 2010. The only specific occurrences referenced in the charge were her termination and the jeans incident. The EEOC charge listed February 17, 2010—the date of her termination—as the “earliest” and “latest” date of discrimination. The “continuing action” box on the charge was left blank.

On October 2, 2010, Balas sent a second letter to the EEOC providing further details related to Price and the alleged sexual harassment. Later that month, the EEOC prepared an amended charge, which included the allegation that Price inappropriately hugged her in January 2010. The hug was the only additional fact alleged in the amended charge. The earliest date of discrimination section was left blank, but, again, the “continuing action” box was not checked.

The EEOC dismissed Balas's charge and issued her right to sue letter on February 25, 2011. She subsequently filed suit in the district court pro se. In her complaint, Balas alleged Title VII claims for failure to promote, retaliatory termination, and hostile work environment based on sexual harassment. She also alleged state law claims for wrongful discharge, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Huntington Ingalls filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted in part. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider allegations in Balas's Title VII claim that were not included in her EEOC charge. In determining the scope of that charge, the court declined to consider Balas's intake questionnaire or letters to the EEOC. The court concluded that Balas only properly alleged discriminatory or retaliatory termination and harassment by her supervisor. It went on, however, to dismiss her harassment claim.

In her complaint, Balas alleged that Huntington Ingalls wrongfully discharged her by terminating her in order to silence her opposition to discrimination and harassment in the workplace, in violation of what she asserted is the public policy articulated in the Virginia Human Rights Act (“VHRA”), Va.Code § 2.1–714 et seq. Balas sought to amend her complaint to include other sources of public policy in support of her claim. The district court determined that Balas's proposed amendments would be futile because the complaint, even if amended, would not sufficiently state a claim for wrongful discharge. The court thus denied Balas leave to amend her complaint and dismissed her wrongful discharge claim.

The court found that Balas had stated a claim of retaliatory termination under Title VII and denied Huntington Ingalls's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to that claim. In considering the merits of Balas's retaliatory termination claim on summary judgment, the court concluded that Balas sufficiently alleged that she had engaged in a protected activity in complaining to Price about discrimination and that Huntington Ingalls took an adverse employment action against her by firing her. It determined, however, that she failed to present more than merely colorable evidence of a causal link between the two events, and granted summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls.

The court also determined that Balas had stated claims for assault and battery. Upon considering the merits of those claims, however, it concluded that Price's hug could not amount to either a battery or an assault, and granted summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls.

Balas now appeals the district court's dismissal of the majority of her Title VII claims on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, its denial of leave to amend her complaint, and its grant of summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls on her retaliatory termination, assault, and battery claims.²

II.

Balas first argues that the district court erred by considering only her EEOC charge—and not the intake questionnaire and letters she sent to the EEOC—in evaluating her Title VII claims. She also argues that she should have been granted leave to amend her complaint to include additional sources of public policy upon which to base her wrongful discharge claim.

Balas further challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls. With respect to her Title VII retaliatory discharge claim, she argues that a reasonable person could find a connection between her alleged complaints to Price regarding sexual harassment and discrimination and Lowman's decision to fire her. She also argues that she presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Price committed the torts of assault and battery.

We address each of these arguments in turn.

A.

We first take up Balas's argument that the district court erred in considering only her amended EEOC charge, and not the contents of her intake questionnaire or the two letters she submitted to the EEOC. The import of her argument derives from the fact that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims for which a plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir.2009). We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc).

1.

An employee seeking redress for discrimination cannot file suit until she has exhausted the administrative process. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b). The requirement of filing a charge with the EEOC against the party sued serves two principal purposes: “ ‘First, it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation. Secondly, it brings the charged party...