Baldessarre v. Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 29 June 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 10–CV–2594 (KMK).
• Citation: 277 Ed. Law Rep. 1043,820 F.Supp.2d 490
• Parties: Philip BALDESSARRE, and Valentina Baldessarre, on behalf of their minor son, Daniel Baldessarre, Plaintiffs, v. MONROE–WOODBURY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Althea Schepperly, and Claire Nalick, in Their Official Capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

277 Ed. Law Rep. 1043

820 F.Supp.2d 490

Philip BALDESSARRE, and Valentina Baldessarre, on behalf of their minor son, Daniel Baldessarre, Plaintiffs,

v.MONROE–WOODBURY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Althea Schepperly, and Claire Nalick, in Their Official Capacities, Defendants.

Case No. 10–CV–2594 (KMK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

June 29, 2011.

Mary Jo Whateley, Esq., Legal Services of the Hudson Valley, Newburgh, NY, Michael H. Sussman, Esq., Sussman & Watkins, Goshen, NY, for Plaintiffs.

James P. Drohan, Esq., Donoghue, Thomas, Auslander & Drohan, LLP, Hopewell Junction, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge.

Philip and Valentina Baldessarre (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are the parents of Daniel Baldessarre (“Daniel”), a child in the Monroe–Woodbury Central School District (“the District”) with a diagnosed disability. ¹ Plaintiffs have sued the District, Daniel's former teacher, Claire Nalick (“Nalick”), and the District's Director of Pupil Personnel Services, Althea Schepperly (“Schepperly”) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504” or “Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Nalick and Schepperly are sued only in their official capacities. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants discriminated against Daniel because of his disability when he was in kindergarten. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment, which the Court is treating as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), or in the alternative, as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Dkt. No. 14.) ² Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and that the claims against Nalick and Schepperly should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within an exception to the IDEA exhaustion doctrine and thus exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required. Plaintiffs also maintain that their claims against Schepperly are viable, but agree that Nalick should be dismissed from the case. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion is granted.

I. Background

The Court assumes the following facts, as alleged in the Amended Complaint, to be true for purposes of this motion.

A. Facts

Daniel has been diagnosed with a speech impairment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) When Daniel was two-years old, he was classified as a preschooler with a disability and “placed in a non-integrated 12:1:2 preschool class.” ( Id. ¶ 9.) ³ Plaintiffs allege that in April 2009, the District declassified Daniel at a Committee on Special Education (“CSE”) meeting, terminated special education and related services, and placed Daniel in a regular classroom for kindergarten beginning in September 2009. ( Id. ¶ 10.) According to Plaintiffs, the teaching style of Nalick, Daniel's kindergarten teacher, was “ineffective, inflexible, and ultimately exacerbated Daniel's difficulties” with socialization and academics. ( Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs claim that instead of convening a CSE to address Daniel's problems, the District “punished and suspended Daniel on a near daily basis.” ( Id. ¶ 12.)

The Amended Complaint does not mention whether an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) was ever created for Daniel.⁴ However, the Amended Complaint does indicate that throughout Daniel's kindergarten year, several CSE meetings were held, and that issues as to the proper classification and placement of Daniel were frequently addressed. Plaintiffs allege that when they requested a CSE meeting on October 7, 2009, a subordinate of Schepperly indicated that a meeting could not be held until November and recommended placing Daniel in an Intensive Day Treatment (“IDT”) program in the meantime. ( Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) Plaintiffs refused such a placement and allege that they instead contacted the Superintendent of Schools, which resulted in a CSE meeting on October 14, 2009. ( Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs allege that at this meeting, Schepperly “unilaterally recommended that Daniel be classified as ‘emotionally disturbed’ ” and insisted that Daniel should be removed from the school and placed in a segregated IDT or Board of Cooperative Educational Services (“BOCES”) program. ( Id. ¶¶ 13, 18.) Plaintiffs rejected both this classification and placement, maintaining that Daniel's problems were caused by Nalick's “refus[al] to accommodate Daniel's disability.” ( Id. ¶¶ 14, 18.)

During this time period, Plaintiffs allege that Daniel was evaluated by both his developmental pediatrician, Dr. Hugh Bases (“Dr. Bases”), and, at the request of the District, a psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Hahn (“Dr. Hahn”). ( Id. ¶ ¶ 19, 21.) According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Bases concluded that although Daniel still had a speech impairment or articulation disorder and had developed “impulsive and oppositional behaviors,” he “was not emotionally disturbed and should continue to receive services in a regular classroom with a 1:1 aide to assist him.” ( Id. ¶¶ 19–20 (emphasis in original).) ⁵ Dr. Hahn's report noted that Daniel had difficulties with attention, focus, impulsivity, and anxiety, but, according to Plaintiffs, also did not support the emotionally disturbed classification. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs again rejected the emotionally disturbed classification and IDT placement on November 25, 2009. ( Id. ¶ 23.)

Plaintiffs allege that at the next CSE meeting on December 7, 2009, the District continued to insist that Daniel was emotionally disturbed and should be placed in a segregated BOCES program. ( Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) According to Plaintiffs, the District maintained this position despite a “lack of any support for its recommendation” and evidence presented at the meeting that Daniel's negative behavior in the classroom was caused by being required to undertake occupational therapy (“OT”) tasks such as handwriting. ( Id.) ⁶ Plaintiffs allege that when the CSE next convened on December 14, 2009: (1) the principal of the proposed BOCES program stated that he had agreed to conduct an intake of Daniel but had not determined whether the program was appropriate for him; (2) Nalick stated that she had spoken with Daniel's preschool teacher who indicated that Daniel had experienced similar difficulties with transitioning and tantrums at the beginning of preschool; and (3) Dr. Bases reiterated that Daniel could continue in his current setting with the “provision of necessary related services in speech and OT” and a 1:1 aide to assist him with transition issues. ( Id. ¶¶ 27–31.) However, Plaintiffs claim that despite this evidence that Daniel simply “required more support to assist him in succeeding in a mainstream environment, [ ] Schepperly continued to press for Daniel's classification as ‘Emotionally Disturbed,’ his removal from his general education class and his placement in an out-of-district segregated class.” ( Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiffs were accompanied at this meeting by their attorney, Mary Jo Whateley, who indicated that she would “invoke due process.” (2010–2011 IEP at 2–3.) ⁷ However, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs did “invoke due process” at this, or any other, time and Plaintiffs have not alleged otherwise.⁸

On January 7, 2010, the school psychologist convened an informal meeting between Mrs. Baldessarre and several school staff members “in an attempt to resolve Daniel's in-school behaviors.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs allege that at this meeting, when Director of Special Education Eric Eulau (“Eulau”) suggested that Nalick “could modify her responses to Daniel's behavior and not remove him from the classroom,” Nalick purportedly “stated openly and unequivocally that she would not modify her teaching, ‘even for one child with a disability.’ ” ( Id. ¶¶ 34–35 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiffs further claim that the next day, Eulau contacted Mrs. Baldessarre to suggest that Plaintiffs consider changing Daniel's class “because of the staff's ‘apparent taint against Daniel’ ” and, that at a meeting the following week, the school principal allegedly acknowledged that “Nalick was not ‘the right match’ for Daniel.” ( Id. ¶¶ 36–37.) According to Plaintiffs, they then agreed to remove Daniel from Nalick's class and place him in a different kindergarten class in early February 2010 because the District—rather than addressing Nalick's alleged “refusal to accommodate Daniel's disability” through training, supervision, or reprimand—told Plaintiffs that removal from the class was their only option. ( Id. ¶¶ 38–39.)

Plaintiffs allege that on March 22, 2010, the District tried to “illegally” use IDEA procedures to remove Daniel from the school to an interim alternative education setting, despite evidence that he had improved in the new class and that his problematic behavior had decreased. ( Id. ¶ 40.) ⁹ The Amended Complaint is not entirely clear, but it appears that an impartial hearing was scheduled to address this potential removal. Defendants claim that the District “initiated an expedited impartial due process hearing under IDEA to seek [Daniel's] temporary removal” from the school. (Answer to Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that contradict Defendants' contention. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that at a resolution meeting on April 9, 2010,¹⁰ the District and Plaintiffs agreed to postpone the scheduled hearing in order to allow time to see if Daniel's behavior continued to improve in the new class. (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.) In fact, Daniel's behavior did improve, which led the District to withdraw its due process complaint. ( Id. ¶ 42.) Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs never requested an impartial hearing for...