Baldridge & Courtney Bridge Co. v. Cartrett

• Citation: 13 S.W. 8
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Decision Date: 21 January 1890
• Parties: BALDRIDGE & COURTNEY BRIDGE CO. <I>v.</I> CARTRETT.

Page 8

13 S.W. 8

BALDRIDGE & COURTNEY BRIDGE CO.

v. CARTRETT.

Supreme Court of Texas.

January 21, 1890.

Appeal from district court, Washington county; C. C. GARRETT, Judge.

Searcy & Garrett, for appellant. Bryan & Campbell, for appellee.

GAINES, J.

The appellant is a corporation maintaining a toll-bridge across the Brazos river. The appellee attempted to cross the bridge in a wagon drawn by a pair of mules, which he was driving; but, after he had got upon it, the mules, becoming frightened, backed the wagon against the railing, which gave way, and precipitated wagon, mules, and driver to the ground below. The wagon and mules were damaged, and appellee was injured in his person. He brought this suit to recover damages of the corporation owning the bridge, and obtained a verdict and judgment for $4,000.

A demurrer was interposed to the petition on the ground that "there was an intervening cause which caused the injury complained of, for which the defendant was not responsible." We understand the proposition to be that the accident was not the proximate result of the alleged defect in the bridge. The allegation which is pointed out as showing this is as follows: "That he [meaning plaintiff] stopped to pay his toll at the usual place at which defendant is accustomed to receive its tolls from passengers over said bridge, when his mules, for some reason unknown to plaintiff, became frightened, and commenced to push the wagon backward. That plaintiff used every possible exertion and means within his power to urge them forward; but, before he could get control of the animals, the wagon struck against the railing or siding of the bridge, which railing immediately gave way, and plaintiff, together with his wagon and mules, * * * was precipitated to the ground below, a distance of over seventeen feet." It was also alleged that the railing was defective, and that the injuries complained of resulted from the fall. If the facts so alleged be true, the damages were the immediate result of the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep the railing in a safe condition. The petition was sufficient.

Upon the trial the following answer of a witness, not shown to be an expert, was read to the jury, over the objection of defendant: "I do not know how long before said accident since said bridge had been repaired. Judging from its appearance and my inspection of said bridge, I should think it did need repairs. The same sidings and uprights were replaced after the accident; the nails put in the same old holes. Nothing else occurs to me as to the condition of said bridge." The objection was upon the ground that the answer gave the opinion of the witness, and was therefore incompetent; and we think the objection well taken to that part of the answer which reads: "Judging from the appearance and my inspection of said bridge, I should think it did need repairs." This was clearly a matter of opinion. The witness should have stated the facts. The same may be said of so much of the testimony of the witness Sullivan as was objected to by defendant. It is as follows: "I don't know anything about a bridge of that kind. It seemed to be good, except the sidings, which were shabby." To say that the sidings were "shabby" does not state a fact, but merely conveys the witness' opinion of their condition, and that, too, in a very indefinite manner.

The following question to plaintiff himself, while on the stand, was objected to by defendant on the ground that it was leading: "Are not ordinary animals, such as are ordinarily used on farms, apt to be frightened and nervous and skittish when driven on plank-roads and bridges, etc." The question was allowed to be asked; and the witness answered, "Yes." This was error. The question both suggested the desired response and admitted of the answer "Yes" or "No." It was clearly leading. It was not, however, irrelevant. The fact that the horses and mules that...