Baldwin Const. Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Taxation

• Decision Date: 13 August 1952
• Docket Number: No. L--7594,L--7594
• Citation: 21 N.J.Super. 370,91 A.2d 224
• Parties: BALDWIN CONST. CO. et al. v. ESSEX COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION et al.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 370

21 N.J.Super. 370

91 A.2d 224

BALDWIN CONST. CO. et al. v. ESSEX COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION et al.

No. L--7594.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

Aug. 13, 1952.

Herbert J. Hannoch and Joseph L. Lippman, Newark, for plaintiffs other than B. Altman & Co.

Martin & Reiley, Newark (Blair Reiley and J. H. Thayer Martin, Newark, Appearing), for plaintiff B. Altman & Co.

Theodore D. Parsons, Atty. Gen. (Benjamin M. Taub, Deputy Atty. Gen., appearing), for Essex County Board of Taxation.

Donald Karrakis, East Orange, for City of East Orange.

JOSEPH L. SMITH, J.S.C.

The sole question before this court is on a motion on behalf of the defendant City of East Orange and the defendant Essex County Board of Taxation to dismiss the action on the ground that this court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as the plaintiffs have not exhausted their remedies before the administrative agency before instituting the present action, in that they did not appeal to the Essex County Board of Taxation from the assessments made against their real property.

The merits of the controversy, naturally, this court is not in any way now determining or expressing any opinion thereon. It seems to me that the sole question before the court is whether or not in the exercise of its discretion will the court retain jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction, and it will retain same.

In considering the briefs submitted, the oral arguments, the pleadings, and the record as submitted to the court, it is apparent that the gravamen of the action on behalf of these plaintiffs is one of discriminatory conduct on the part of the said taxing board.

From the record it would appear that all the plaintiffs own real estate in the City of East Orange, and the properties owned by them are set forth in Schedule A annexed to the complaint and Schedule A annexed to the petition, requesting that certain parties plaintiff be admitted to this action. Orders so directing have been entered. These properties were assessed by the defendant City of East Orange for 1952 by its assessors in the amounts set forth in the said Schedules A.

The assessors on January 10, 1952 filed their list with the county board, and on January 25, 1952, pursuant to the statute, the said board of assessors of all the taxing districts of Essex County met for the purpose of examining, revising, correcting and equalizing their respective tax lists.

On March 20, 1952 the tax board made an order directed to the assessors, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint, ordering that the tax lists relating to certain properties in the City of East Orange be corrected and revised in accordance with the amounts of the assessments contained in the list prepared and presented in the order of the said tax board. The assessors corrected their lists in accordance therewith. This order referred to 62 tracts of real estate, among which the plaintiffs' properties are included, and the tax lists made by the assessors for the 1952 valuations are set forth in the original statutory lists.

On March 24, 1952 the assessors complied with the aforesaid order and corrected the tax lists and duplicate.

These plaintiffs, of course, are not all of the taxpayers whose assessments for 1952 were revised.

The court, in determining the motion adversely to the defendants, is exercising its discretion and retaining jurisdiction because of the expression as pronounced by the Supreme Court in considering Rule 3:81--14, which provides as follows:

'Except where it is manifest that the interests of justice require otherwise, proceedings under Rule 3:81 shall not be maintainable, so long as there is available judicial review to a county court or inferior tribunal or administrative review to an administrative agency or tribunal, which has not been exhausted.'

The court in considering the first part of said rule, namely, 'Except where it is manifest that the interests of justice require otherwise,' is determining same in accordance with the findings in the opinion of Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. 477, at page 485, 89 A.2d 13, at page 16 (1952), wherein the Chief Justice said, speaking for that court, among other things:

'* * * we realized the inconvenience, expense and injustice that must necessarily flow from the arbitrary enforcement of the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in each and every case, regardless of the circumstances and the interests of justice.'

In that case the court also referred to Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 70 A.2d 77 (1949), wherein certain exceptions were stated and recognized. I think these exceptions are covered in the instant case. This court also refers to the opinion of Judge Jacobs in the case of Waldor v....