Baldwin v. Barnhart

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Flanagan
• Citation: Baldwin v. Barnhart, 444 F.Supp.2d 457 (E.D. N.C. 2005)
• Decision Date: 24 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 7:03-CV-171-FL(1).,7:03-CV-171-FL(1).
• Parties: Tia S. BALDWIN, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

444 F.Supp.2d 457

Tia S. BALDWIN, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 7:03-CV-171-FL(1).

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division.

March 24, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William L. Davis, III, Lumberton, NC, for Tia S. Baldwin, Plaintiff.

David J. Cortes, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of North Carolina, Raleigh, NC, for Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Defendant.

ORDER

FLANAGAN, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). [DE # `s 7 & 13]. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), United States Magistrate Judge Christina L. Demory entered a memorandum recommending that the court deny plaintiff's motion, grant defendant's motion, and uphold the Commissioner's decision denying benefits. Plaintiff timely filed an objection to the memorandum and recommendation ("M & R"), and defendant did not file a response. In this posture, the matter is ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, the court rejects plaintiff's objection to the M & R and upholds the Commissioner's decision denying benefits.

In addressing plaintiff's objection to the M & R, the district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Upon careful review of the record, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id.; see Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.1983).

In this case, plaintiff "objects to the Magistrates [sic] findings and recommendations that the Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] decision is supported by substantial evidence." (Pl's Obj., p. 1). In her argument, however, plaintiff does not distinguish between errors made by the ALJ and errors made by the Magistrate Judge in reaching specific findings. Indeed, in the discussion of her objections, plaintiff only restates without substantive alteration, and in many instances verbatim, arguments made in her initial memorandum. (See Pl's Obj., pp. 3-4, 6-17). Upon careful review of the record, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge already has addressed the arguments made by plaintiff in her objection.

Specifically, plaintiff argues in her objection that the ALJ failed to sufficiently consider plaintiff's impairments, in combination, when making its decision on plaintiff's disability. (Pl's Obj., pp. 12 & 14-15). Plaintiff stated this argument, nearly verbatim, in plaintiff's memorandum at pages 14-15 and 16-17. The Magistrate Judge thoroughly addressed this argument at pages 5-9 of the M & R, where she discusses the evidence of the multiple impairments alleged by plaintiff. Accordingly the court adopts as its own the discussion of the Magistrate Judge on this issue.

Next, plaintiff argues in her objection that the ALJ erred by failing to consider plaintiffs evidence of pain, as confirmed by the testimony of her mother. (Pl's Obj., p. 13). Plaintiff stated this argument, verbatim, in plaintiffs memorandum at page 15. The Magistrate Judge addressed this argument at pages 9-10 of the M & R, where she discusses contrary evidence concerning plaintiffs daily activities. Accordingly, the court adopts as its own the discussion of the Magistrate Judge on this issue.

Next, plaintiff argues in her objection that the ALJ erred by rejecting plaintiffs medical evidence and relying on findings of daily activities in reaching the residual functional capacity determination. (Pl's Obj., p. 13). Plaintiff stated this argument, verbatim, in plaintiffs memorandum at page 17. The Magistrate Judge addressed this argument at pages 8-10 of the M & R, where she discusses the ALJ's residual functional capacity determination and the supporting evidence of daily activities. Accordingly, the court adopts as its own the discussion of the Magistrate Judge on this issue.

Finally, plaintiff argues in her objection that the ALJ erred by rejecting medical evidence from plaintiffs treating physician. (Pl's Obj., pp. 13, 15-17). Plaintiff stated this argument, in nearly identical terms, in plaintiffs memorandum at pages 15-16 and 19-21. The Magistrate Judge addressed this argument at pages 10-12 of the M & R, where she discusses the ALJ's rejection of the treating physician opinion that plaintiff was disabled. Accordingly, the court adopts as its own the discussion of the Magistrate Judge on this issue.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court accepts in whole the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations, rejects plaintiffs objection, and upholds the Commissioner's decision. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE # 7] is DENIED, and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE # 13] is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to close the case file.

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

DEMORY, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on the cross-motions of the parties for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 402 and 405(g) seeking judicial review of the defendant's denial of her application for supplemental security income ("SSI"). The plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies and the Commissioner's denial of her application has become final. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record submitted by counsel, this court recommends denying the plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for SSI on January 8, 2002.¹ In her application, she alleged lumbar disc disease, migraine headaches, irritable bowel syndrome, asthma, acid reflux, and fibromyalgia. After unfavorable determinations initially and upon reconsideration, a timely request for hearing was made. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALP) on May 8, 2003. On June 7, 2003, the ALJ issued his finding that the plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied the plaintiffs request for review and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner for the purpose of judicial review. The plaintiff then timely commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 402 and 405(g).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the scope of judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner is limited to determining whether substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's final decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.1990). Thus, a court must uphold the Commissioner's decision so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. See, e.g., Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir.1972).

"Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.C. 1420 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir.1992) (per curiam).

II. Process of Evaluation for Disability

The claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled under the Social Security Act. English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir.1993). In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, a five-step evaluation is mandated by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 124 S.Ct. 376, 379, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003). This sequential process can be summarized as follows:

The five step analysis begins with the question of whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If not, the analysis continues to determine whether, based upon the medical evidence, the claimant has a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimed impairment is sufficiently severe, the third step considers whether the claimant has an impairment that equals or exceeds in severity one or more of the impairments listed in Appendix I of the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, App. I. If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, the next inquiry considers if the impairment prevents the claimant from returning to past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). If the answer is in the affirmative, the final consideration looks to whether the impairment precludes the claimant from performing other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir.2001) (discussing the comparable fivestep analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). "If an applicant fails at any step of the process, the ALJ need not advance to the subsequent steps." Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir.1995).

The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the plaintiff. Id. At the fifth step the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that other work is available in the national economy which the plaintiff could perform. Id. The Commissioner often attempts to carry her burden through the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") who testifies to jobs available in the economy based on the characteristics of the plaintiff. See, e.g., English, 10 F.3d at 1084-86.

Moreover, where a physical or mental impairment that reasonably could be expected to cause pain is shown by medically acceptable objective evidence,...