Baldwin v. City of Waterloo
| Decision Date | 31 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1470,84-1470 |
| Parties | Debra K. BALDWIN f/k/a Debra K. Henry, Appellant, v. The CITY OF WATERLOO, John R. Rooff, Jr., and Raymond White, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Paul T. Shinkle of Gottschalk, Shinkle & Long, Cedar Falls, for appellant.
David J. Dutton, Waterloo, for appellee City of Waterloo.
John T. McCoy, Waterloo, for appellee John R. Rooff, Jr.
Frederick G. White, Waterloo, for appellee Raymond White.
Robert W. Thompson, Reinbeck, and James E. Walsh, Jr. of Clark, Butler, Walsh & McGivern, Waterloo, for amicus curiae Estate of James L. Plaehn.
Considered en banc.
These interlocutory appeals present three issues: (1) whether a cross-petition against this estate is a "claim" required by Iowa Code section 633.410 to be filed within six months and, if so, whether "peculiar circumstances" existed so as to excuse a late filing; (2) whether Iowa Code section 668.4, limiting joint and several liability in certain circumstances, applied in this case; and (3) whether the alleged negligence of unidentified tortfeasors, nonparties in this action, could be considered in assessing the percentage of fault to respective parties. We conclude that the cross-petition was a "claim" under section 633.410, but "peculiar circumstances" excused the late filing. We also conclude that Iowa Code section 668.4 applies, but the negligence of unidentified parties may not be considered in assessing liability under it.
On May 5, 1978, a motorcycle operated by James L. Plaehn, on which the plaintiff Baldwin was a passenger, collided with a thirty-foot pole, "similar to" a utility pole, lying crossways on a street in Waterloo, Iowa. Just prior to the accident, according to police reports, the pole had been lying on the "parking area" between the sidewalk and curb, adjacent to the property owned by defendant Rooff and leased by defendant White.
After the accident, Baldwin and Plaehn, the driver, filed a petition alleging that defendants city of Waterloo, Rooff and White were negligent in allowing the pole to be placed in the street. The defendants countered that they did not place the pole in the street and that they could not have foreseen that it would end up there. They also alleged that Baldwin and Plaehn had been drinking and that Plaehn had operated his vehicle in a negligent manner.
In July of 1980, defendant Rooff filed a motion to compel discovery, claiming that Plaehn had failed to respond to discovery requests. The trial court ordered him to respond. On January 4, 1981, Plaehn died in an unrelated automobile accident, and his estate was substituted as a plaintiff. The discovery request remained unanswered.
Defendant Rooff moved to dismiss the estate's suit because of its continued failure to respond to the discovery order. The trial court sustained the motion. In addition, claims of the estate of Plaehn against all of the other defendants were dismissed, on January 1, 1982, under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1.
On June 25, 1984, defendants Rooff and White attempted to bring the Plaehn estate back into the suit by filing a motion for leave of court to file a third-party petition against it. The defendants also sought to file a cross-petition against certain "unidentified vandals" who, they contended, actually placed the pole on the roadway. It is the defendants' attempts to bring in the estate, and the "unidentified vandals," which spawn the issues on appeal.
Defendant Rooff moved for an adjudication of law points, asserting that, even if the court would not allow formal joinder of the unidentified vandals, the liability of these parties should nonetheless be considered in assessing negligence. Baldwin resisted and requested a ruling that section 668.4 (), is inapplicable in the present case.
The district court ruled: (1) That leave of court would be granted to file a third-party petition against the estate of James Plaehn, but not against the unidentified persons; (2) that Iowa Code section 668.4, relating to joint and several liability, applied; and (3) that the negligence of unidentified persons may not be considered in assigning the percentages of liability under section 668.4.
Following these rulings, both parties were granted leave to file interlocutory appeals.
These defendants attempted to bring in the estate of James Plaehn, as an additional defendant, in order to dilute their own percentage of negligence and thereby escape joint and several liability. See Iowa Code section 668.4 (1985) (). They argue that the court's order allowing a claim against Plaehn's estate was proper for three reasons: (1) Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 34 allows such a claim; (2) the applicable statute of limitations was not that of section 633.410 but the five-year statute of section 614.1(4), relating to "other actions"; and (3) even if the proper statute of limitations is section 633.410, "peculiar circumstances" existed, thus permitting a late filing. The estate of James Plaehn, as amicus curiae, and the plaintiff Baldwin, challenge the order granting the cross-petition against the estate.
A. It is true, as defendants claim, that a motion to implead a third party after the ten-day period provided by the rules lies within the sound discretion of the district court. See Atlas, Ltd. v. Kingman Warehouse Co., 357 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Iowa 1984).
No amount of trial court discretion, however, can reinstate a case once the limitation period of section 633.410 has expired, unless "peculiar circumstances" exist. Section 633.410, the probate claims statute (often referred to as our "nonclaim" statute) provides:
All claims against a decedent's estate, other than charges, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, shall be forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the distributees of the estate, unless filed with the clerk within six months after the date of the second publication of the notice to creditors; provided, however, that the personal representative may waive such limitation on filing; and this provision shall not bar claimants entitled to equitable relief due to peculiar circumstances.
(Emphasis added.)
It is obvious that this language is very broad, covering "[a]ll claims ... whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated...." It has been suggested, based on a reading of Nichols v. Harsh, 202 Iowa 117, 209 N.W. 297 (1926), that the test for determining whether a contingent claim will be barred if not filed under section 633.410 is the practicality of requiring a timely filing. For example, if the decedent had been a grantor in a warranty deed, it would not be practical to require the filing of a contingent claim by every subsequent grantee on the basis that some day there might be liability. On the other hand, these practical problems do not exist to the same extent in a case where the decedent had guaranteed a note. There, the basis of liability, and the circumstances on which it is based, are readily foreseeable. See S. Kurtz & R. Reimer, Iowa Estates: Taxation and Administration § 13.13, at 441 (1975). We agree with this analysis of Nichols and apply that test here.
In this case, the cross-petitioners had been sued by Plaehn and Baldwin while Plaehn was still alive. They were therefore aware of Plaehn's involvement even before his estate was opened. If they had desired to spread the liability around, Plaehn (and later his estate) were obvious candidates. Under these circumstances, the need for filing a contingent claim was reasonably foreseeable. Based on these circumstances, and the broad language of section 633.410, we believe that this claim was one subject to the filing provisions of section 633.410, and the claim of cross-petitioners is barred by section 633.410 unless peculiar circumstances are established.
B. The district court ruled that "peculiar circumstances" existed so as to excuse the claimant's late filing. We first note the scope of our review. While section 633.410 says that "equitable" relief may be granted under peculiar circumstances, a proceeding in probate court to establish peculiar circumstances is at law, not equity. Therefore, our review is not de novo, and the district court's fact-finding will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. See In re Estate of Northrup, 230 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Iowa 1975); In re Claim of Gwynne v. Vance, 258 Iowa 875, 877, 140 N.W.2d 917, 918-19 (1966); Rindfleisch v. Mundt Estate, 247 Iowa 1124, 1128, 77 N.W.2d 643, 646 (1956).
In this case, however, there is no dispute about the facts. The parties agree that the reason for delayed filing of the cross-petition was the defendants' desire to take advantage of the newly-enacted statute modifying the rule of joint and several liability. See Iowa Code § 668.4. The issue is therefore not one of fact, but of law, and we are not bound by the district court's application of the law. Wolder v. Rahm, 249 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1977); Northrup, 230 N.W.2d at 921; Farmers Insurance Group v. Merryweather, 214 N.W.2d 184, 186-87 (Iowa 1974).
We have held that a strong showing of peculiar circumstances is not necessary, especially when the estate is open and unsettled. In addition, the peculiar-circumstances exception should be liberally construed to effectuate justice. The burden of pleading and proving the exception is on the person seeking equitable relief. Northrup, 230 N.W.2d at 921-22.
Our cases indicate that "peculiar circumstances" include fraud or...
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