Baldwin v. City of Estherville

• Decision Date: 14 June 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-1856,18-1856
• Citation: 929 N.W.2d 691
• Parties: Gregory BALDWIN, Appellant, v. CITY OF ESTHERVILLE, Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

929 N.W.2d 691

Gregory BALDWIN, Appellant,

v.CITY OF ESTHERVILLE, Iowa, Appellee.

No. 18-1856

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed June 14, 2019

Jack Bjornstad, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Douglas L. Phillips and Zachary D. Clausen of Klass Law Firm, LLP, Sioux City, for appellee.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor General, and Julia S. Kim, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae State of Iowa.

Katie Ervin Carlson and Emily McCarty of Timmer & Judkins, P.L.L.C., West Des Moines, and Joel E. Fenton of Law Offices of Joel E. Fenton, PLC, Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Association for Justice.

Jason C. Palmer, Thomas M. Boes, Catherine M. Lucas, and Benjamin R. Erickson, Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Communities Assurance Pool.

WIGGINS, Justice.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa certifies six questions pursuant to Iowa Code section 684A.1 (2019). In our discretion, we answer five of the questions because they meet the criteria of section 684A.1. We do not answer one of the questions because it does not meet the criteria of section 684A.1.

I. Facts Provided to Answer Certified Questions.

"When we answer a certified question, we rely upon the facts provided with the certified question." Baldwin v. City of Estherville (Baldwin II ), 915 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Iowa 2018) ; accord Life Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am. v. Estate of Corrado , 838 N.W.2d 640, 644 (Iowa 2013) ("[W]e restrict our answer to the facts provided by the certifying court when answering a certified question."). The facts as set forth by the federal court are as follows:

The factual background to this case is set out in considerable detail in [the federal court's] prior ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, seeBaldwin v. Estherville, Iowa [ (Baldwin I ) ], 218 F. Supp. 3d 987, 989–93 (N.D. Iowa 2016), then by the Iowa Supreme Court in Baldwin [II ], 915 N.W.2d 259, 261–65 (Iowa 2018). For present purposes, suffice it to say that, on November 10, 2013, Officers Reineke and Hellickson, of the Estherville City Police, were shown a video by a resident in the Estherville area of a person the officers identified as plaintiff Gregory Baldwin riding a 4-wheeler ATV that proceeded along North 4th Street and turned into a ditch, using the north Joe Hoye Park entrance, after which it continued in the ditch until it reached West 14th Avenue North, where it returned to the roadway.

The officers then reviewed IOWA CODE CH. 321I [ (2014) ], which, inter alia , permitted operation of ATVs only on streets designated by cities, see IOWA CODE § 321I.10(3), because the officers believed that Chapter 321I had been incorporated by reference into the City's Code of Ordinances when Chapter 321 was incorporated. They also consulted The Handbook of Iowa All–Terrain Vehicle and Off–Highway Motorcycle Regulations (Handbook ), which the defendants contended is a handbook frequently relied upon by police officers when determining whether off-road vehicles are operating in compliance with applicable laws. Finally, they discussed the matter with the City's police chief and a police captain. They concluded that the activity shown in the video amounted to a violation of City Ordinance E-321I.10. However, that Ordinance was not valid or in effect at the time, because it did not exist.

Officer Reineke prepared a citation and attempted to serve it on Baldwin at his home, but he was not there. Officer Reineke then refiled the citation with the notation "Request Warrant." On November 12, 2013, a state magistrate entered an order directing that a warrant issue. On November 13, 2013, Officer Hellickson served the warrant on Baldwin and took him to jail. Baldwin's wife posted bond, and Baldwin later pleaded not guilty to the charge.

In the days that followed, the City Attorney discovered that the City had not included IOWA CODE CH. 321I when it incorporated IOWA CODE CH. 321 into the City's Code of Ordinances. The City Attorney was granted leave to amend the charge to allege a violation of a different ordinance, City Ordinance 219–2(2). City Ordinance 219–2 generally permits ATVs to be operated on City streets except where prohibited, but subsection (2) prohibits operation of ATVs "in city parks, playgrounds, or upon any publicly-owned property." On Baldwin's Motion For Adjudication Of Law Points And To Dismiss, the Iowa District Court found that the cited act was not a violation of the City's Code of Ordinances as written and dismissed the case. The state court did so only after making two key constructions of pertinent City Ordinances: (1) that the plain meaning of "street" in City Ordinances included the "ditch," and (2) that "publicly-owned property" in City Ordinance 219–2(2), to the extent that it conflicted with another ordinance defining "street," did not include the "ditch" of a City street. SeeBaldwin [I ], 218 F. Supp. 3d at 1000–1001.

Baldwin v. Estherville (Baldwin III ), 333 F. Supp. 3d 817, 823–24 (N.D. Iowa 2018) ; see Baldwin v. Estherville (Baldwin IV ), 336 F. Supp. 3d 948, 950 (N.D. Iowa 2018) (order certifying questions) (incorporating by reference the factual statements made in Baldwin I , 218 F. Supp. 3d at 989–93, Baldwin II , 915 N.W.2d at 261–65, and Baldwin III , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 822–24 ). We will refer to the City of Estherville as the "City" in this opinion.

II. Questions Certified by the Federal Court.

In Baldwin II , we answered a certified question from the federal court involving qualified immunity. 915 N.W.2d at 260–61, 281. There we said,

Constitutional torts are torts, not generally strict liability cases. Accordingly, with respect to a damage claim under article I, sections 1 and 8 [of the Iowa Constitution], a government official whose conduct is being challenged will not be subject to damages liability if she or he pleads and proves as an affirmative defense that she or he exercised all due care to conform to the requirements of the law.

Id. at 281.

It is not clear whether Baldwin II addressed whether qualified immunity is available to government employers. See id. ; id. at 281–83 (Appel, J., dissenting); see also Baldwin III , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 831–32. Because the only defendant in this case is a municipality, the federal court has asked additional certified questions. On October 2, the federal court issued an order certifying the following six questions to this court:

1. Can the City assert qualified immunity to a claim for damages for violation of the Iowa Constitution based on its officers' exercise of "all due care"?

2. If the City can assert such a defense, on the facts presented in this case, does the City have "all due care" qualified immunity to liability for damages for the violation of Baldwin's right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure under article I of the Iowa Constitution? This question necessarily includes questions about the extent to which reliance on a warrant may satisfy the "all due care" standard and whether the "all due care" analysis considers alternative bases for probable cause or a warrant on which the officers did not rely.

3. If punitive damages are an available remedy against an individual defendant for a violation of a plaintiff's rights under the Iowa Constitution, can punitive damages be awarded against a municipality that employed the individual defendant and, if so, under what standard?

4. If punitive damages are available in answer to the previous question, would a reasonable jury be able to find that the applicable standard was met on the facts presented in this case?

5. If an award of attorney's fees would have been available against an individual defendant for a plaintiff who attains some degree of success on a claim of a violation of a plaintiff's rights under the Iowa Constitution, would they be available against a municipality that employed the individual defendant and, if so, under what standard?

6. If the answer to either Question No. 3 or Question No. 5 (or both) is in the affirmative, will retroactive application to the pending case be appropriate?

Baldwin IV , 336 F. Supp. 3d at 958–59.

III. Standard of Review and Criteria for Answering Certified Questions.

The statutory provision authorizing us to answer a certified question provides,

The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by ... a United States district court ..., when requested by the certifying court, if there are involved in a proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts of this state.

Iowa Code § 684A.1 (2019). Thus, the Code gives us the discretion to answer a certified question if four conditions are met:

(1) a proper court certified the question, (2) the question involves a matter of Iowa law, (3) the question "may be determinative of the cause ... pending in the certifying court," and (4) it appears to the certifying court that there is no controlling Iowa precedent.

Life Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am. , 838 N.W.2d at 643 (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 648A.1 (2013)).

IV. Certified Question Number 1: A Municipality's Ability to Assert Qualified Immunity Based on Its Officers' Exercise of "All Due Care."

The first certified question from the federal district court is "Can the City assert qualified immunity to a claim for damages for violation of the Iowa Constitution based on its officers' exercise of ‘all due care’?" Baldwin IV , 336 F. Supp. 3d at 958. This question essentially asks whether a municipality can be "vicariously immune" from liability for its employees' constitutional torts when the employees would be immune from personal liability. The question does not ask whether a municipality is immune for its own acts.

Baldwin bases his suit against the City on a constitutional tort and the doctrine of respondeat superior. We recognized that a...