Baldwin v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 24 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 69-C-230.,69-C-230.
• Citation: 300 F. Supp. 1220
• Parties: Richard Lee BALDWIN, Petitioner, v. Andrew LEWIS, Acting Superintendent of Milwaukee County Detention Home, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

300 F. Supp. 1220

Richard Lee BALDWIN, Petitioner, v. Andrew LEWIS, Acting Superintendent of Milwaukee County Detention Home, Respondent.

No. 69-C-230.

United States District Court E. D. Wisconsin.

June 24, 1969.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

E. Michael McCann, Dist. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for respondent.

Robert H. Friebert, Milwaukee, Wis., for petitioner.

OPINION

REYNOLDS, District Judge.

On May 6, 1969, Richard Lee Baldwin, a juvenile, petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 et seq.¹ of Title 28, United States Code of Laws. Because the petition raised substantial constitutional questions, a response was ordered from the defendant, Andrew Lewis, on May 9, 1969. A hearing was set for May 13, 1969. The parties filed a stipulation of facts, and the hearing was held as scheduled on May 13, 1969.

On May 14, 1969, based on the entire record of the proceedings in the state courts and the matters presented to this court, I granted the writ of habeas corpus sought by the petitioner and ordered his release to the custody of his mother pending further disposition of the charges pending against him in the Children's Court of Milwaukee County. At that time, I indicated that an opinion setting forth the reasons for my decision would be filed at a later date.

The following opinion is issued to supplement and explain the basis for my order of May 14, 1969, granting the writ of habeas corpus and releasing the petitioner, Richard Lee Baldwin, to the custody of his mother.

The petitioner is a seventeen year old male Negro who, at the time this action was brought, was in the custody of Andrew Lewis, Acting Superintendent of the Milwaukee County Detention Center. The petitioner was being held at the Detention Center on suspicion of having committed arson. The petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus sought his discharge from such custody on the grounds that (1) his rights under the Fourth Amendment² to the United States Constitution had been denied to him in that he was being held in custody without benefit of a judicial determination of probable cause to believe that a crime had in fact been committed and, further, that he had in fact committed such crime; and (2) his rights under the Eighth Amendment³ to the United States Constitution had been violated in that he had been denied admission to bail.

In addition, the entire record indicates to me that the petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment⁴ to the United States Constitution may have been violated in that petitioner was incarcerated and kept incarcerated without benefit of due process of law. In fact, consideration of the facts which form the basis for the two grounds alleged by the petitioner has led me to the conclusion that the overriding issue may be whether the petitioner has in fact been accorded due process of law. Before reaching these constitutional issues, however, I feel that a detailed statement of the facts in this matter is necessary.

FACTS

On March 27, 1969, a fire occurred on the stage of the auditorium of the North Division High School in Milwaukee. Subsequent fire department investigation revealed that the likely cause of the fire was arson. As a result of the statements of two witnesses and an alleged accomplice who implicated the petitioner in the suspected arson, the petitioner was taken into custody by the Milwaukee Police Department on April 22, 1969.

Petitioner was taken to the Children's Court Detention Center where a "Detention Authorization" form was filled out.⁵ This form contains numerous printed reasons for detention, and in the normal course one of these is checked as the cause for holding the particular juvenile involved. In the petitioner's case, however, no reason for detention was indicated.

On April 23, 1969, at about 8:30 a. m., and prior to the time his mother arrived at the Detention Center, petitioner appeared before Lawrence J. James, Jr., a social worker who has been designated by the Children's Court to determine whether a particular juvenile will be detained at the Center. Mr. James ordered that the petitioner be held in detention without bail and proceeded to execute a "Detention Authorization" form⁶ identical to that executed the preceding day, except that Mr. James checked the printed reasons for detention as:

"It is reasonably believed that a child has committed an act which if committed by an adult would be a felony" and

"The child is almost certain to commit an offense dangerous to himself or the community before the court disposition or transfer to an institution or another jurisdiction."

There is nothing in the record which indicates the facts upon which Mr. James based the above conclusions.

On April 25, 1969, there was a "rehearing" on the order for detention before the Honorable John F. Foley of the County Court, Children's Division (hereinafter "Children's Court"). On that occasion it was held that the petitioner should be held without bail.

It is not clear from the record of this Children's Court hearing whether Richard Baldwin was present. The record does indicate, however, that Attorney Robert Friebert appeared on behalf of Richard Baldwin and that Mrs. Celeste Baldwin, his mother, was also present. In addition, Mr. James and Mr. David Berman, an Assistant District Attorney, were present.

At the outset of the hearing, the petitioner's attorney objected to the manner in which the arrest had occurred. Mr. Friebert argued that since more than a month had elapsed between the time of the alleged arson and the petitioner's arrest, there should have been some sort of judicial determination of probable cause prior to the petitioner's arrest. At this point, the court inquired as to whether counsel was requesting a preliminary hearing. Counsel responded that he was not requesting a preliminary hearing but rather a discharge of the petitioner due to the failure of the Milwaukee Police Department to obtain any judicial determination of probable cause prior to petitioner's arrest. The court then requested that this issue be presented on written motion and reserved determination of the issue on its merits.

The court stated that the only matter to be considered at the April 25, 1969, hearing was whether the petitioner should be detained pending further proceedings. Petitioner's counsel proceeded to make a lengthy argument as to why the petitioner should be released pending further proceedings. He indicated that the petitioner had been attending school regularly, took additional classes in auto mechanics, and held a part-time job at the Veterans Administration. Counsel also informed the court that Mrs. Baldwin had just moved to her present home in the last four months, but that prior to that she had lived in the same place for three years and prior to that had lived nine years in one location. Counsel indicated that both Mrs. Baldwin and petitioner had lived in Milwaukee all their lives and, further, that the assistance of the petitioner was necessary to the preparation of a defense to the charges against him, especially in regard to the locating of witnesses. In conclusion, counsel requested that the petitioner be released to the custody of his mother without bail or, in the alternative, that the court set bail if the court felt there was some likelihood that the petitioner would not appear at further proceedings.

The Children's Court then asked Mr. James for the recommendation of the probation department. Mr. James stated that in view of the fact that the fire which the petitioner was charged with having set had occurred in a public school, "it would represent a clear and present danger to the community to release the boy." Mr. James also stated that the police report indicated that there were three eye witnesses to the petitioner's having started the fire. However, no report of any sort was introduced and, consequently, none appears in the formal record.⁷

Following Mr. James' recommendation, the Assistant District Attorney presented the position of the State. Because of the seriousness of the crime charged, the State concurred with the recommendation of the probation department. The State argued that the petitioner's denial of the charge was but a self-serving statement which should have no bearing whatsoever in a detention hearing. The State contended that release of the petitioner in order to aid in the preparation of his defense was not a basis for release under the Children's Code. The State also pointed out that under its interpretation of the Children's Code, there was no provision for bail and further urged that if this interpretation of the Children's Code were to be overturned, such action should be taken only by an appellate court. The State also argued that bail should not be allowed because the petitioner was not charged with a crime in the technical sense and, further, because the petitioner was under the legal age to enter a valid contract and therefore unable to contract for bail.

The court concluded the hearing by denying the motion for bail on the grounds that In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), was silent with respect to the issue of bail and, furthermore, because a provision for bail had been removed from the Wisconsin Children's Code in 1956. In addition, the Children's Court stated that "with respect to the detention of the juvenile, the Court does feel that it would be in the best interests of the juvenile and the community that the boy be detained. The Court will order that the boy be detained pending further proceedings in this matter."

The document ordering detention after this hearing was the same type of "Detention Authorization" form previously used.⁸ It was signed by both Mr. James and Judge John F. Foley. This form indicates, however, that "upon referral of rehearing" detention was ordered because "the child is almost certain to commit an offense dangerous to himself or the community before the...