Baldwin v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WOODS, J.
• Citation: Baldwin v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 78 S.C. 419, 59 S.E. 67 (S.C. 1907)
• Decision Date: 31 October 1907
• Parties: BALDWIN v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO.

59 S.E. 67

78 S.C. 419

BALDWIN v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 31, 1907

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Oconee County; R. C Watts, Judge.

Action by Stephen Baldwin against the Postal Telegraph Cable Company for trespass to real estate. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. P Carey and J. W. Shelor, for appellant.

J. R Earle and B. F. Martin, for respondent.

WOODS J.

The plaintiff recovered judgment for damages against defendant under this allegation: "That on the _____ days of _____ in the years 1902 and 1903, the defendant oppressively, without right or authority, with a high hand, and in reckless and wanton disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, went upon his said tract of land and did trespass thereon by digging holes, erecting poles, stringing wires across said premises, cutting down and destroying trees, making roads through his cultivated and uncultivated lands and growing crops, dragging and hauling poles and other material across and upon his cultivated and uncultivated land against plaintiff's will and over his protests and entreaties, to his damage in the sum of $600." The circuit court, being of the opinion that there was no evidence that the trespass alleged was committed oppressively with high hand or recklessly and wantonly, ordered a nonsuit as to punitive damages.

The defendant first contends the action is solely for punitive damages, and therefore the finding that there was no evidence to support punitive damages was necessarily a finding there was no case, and the circuit judge erred in not ordering a nonsuit generally. The law is well settled that in declaring in tort, when the plaintiff alleges the act which caused the injury to be negligent and willful, he in reality states two causes of action-in one cause of action alleging the act to be a tort because inflicting injury by negligence, and in the other alleging the act to be a tort because inflicting injury willfully. Under a complaint so drawn, upon failure to prove willfulness, the plaintiff may be nonsuited as to that cause of action and denied punitive damages, but may recover actual damages on proof supporting the charge of negligent injury. Machen v. Telegraph Co., 72 S.C. 261, 51 S.E. 697. But, if the act be one for which there can be no recovery, no matter how great the injury, unless it was done either negligently, or willfully, recklessly, or wantonly, and the plaintiff omitting to charge negligence, alleges it was done willfully, wantonly, or recklessly, he cannot recover either actual or punitive damages unless he proves willfulness, wantonness, or recklessness. Procter v. Railway Co., 61 S.C. 186, 39 S.E. 351; Id., 64 S.C. 491, 42 S.E. 427; Chiles v. Railway Co., 69 S.C. 327, 48 S.E. 252; Machen v. Telegraph Co., supra. But, under such allegations upon proof of willfulness, wantonness, or recklessness, he may recover both actual and punitive damages. Chiles v. Railway Co., supra; Duke v. Telegraph Co., 71 S.C. 104, 50 S.E. 675. In the application of these established rules, an important distinction is to be observed between cases where the act complained of is in itself a tort, as, for example, a trespass on real property, and those where the act only becomes a tort because done negligently, or willfully, wantonly, or recklessly. A complaint which merely alleges injury done in the prosecution of work on land carried on by permission of the owner states no cause of action. To make such injury a tort, it is necessary to allege it was inflicted negligently, or willfully, wantonly, or recklessly. Hence in such case, if the allegation be that the injury was inflicted willfully, and the proof be it was inflicted not willfully, but negligently, under the authorities above cited, a nonsuit is proper for failure to prove the cause of action alleged. There being no allegation of negligence, and the allegation of willfulness having fallen for lack of proof, there remains nothing to support the case. But neither willfulness nor negligence is necessary to make trespass on real estate a tort. Hence, this case, when by the nonsuit the circuit court struck from the case every charge of willfulness and oppression, there remained the charge of an unintentional trespass which when proved carried a right to...