Baldwin v. Reagan

Decision Date06 July 1999
Docket NumberNo. 32S00-9812-CV-767.,32S00-9812-CV-767.
Citation715 N.E.2d 332
PartiesPatricia BALDWIN, Prosecuting Attorney of Hendricks County, Roy Waddell, Sheriff of Hendricks County, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Rebecca REAGAN, James Lewis, Brent Steele, John M. Waterman, R. Michael Young, Gary Hofmeister, Indianapolis Urban League, Inc., Benjamin Saxon, Mason Grove, Daniel Gilmore, Leon G. Coward, William L. Tolbert, Carmel Motorists Association, James Phend, Mary C. Barton, Larry Vaughn and Vern Kasper, Appellees (Plaintiffs below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Jon Laramore, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Melina Maniatis Kennedy, Kelly M. Lamm, Johnson Smith Pence Wright & Heath, Indianapolis, for Amicus Curiae Indiana Safety Belt Coalition.

John Price, John R. Price and Associates, Indianapolis; Bruce A. Stuard, Indianapolis, for appellee. SULLIVAN, Justice.

The plaintiffs contend that the Indiana Seatbelt Enforcement Act authorizes the police to stop motorists in violation of their state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. We agree that the police may not enforce the seat belt law in violation of these constitutional rights. In this opinion, we hold that an Indiana police officer may not stop a motorist to enforce the seat belt law unless the officer observes circumstances that would cause an ordinary person to agree that the driver or passenger is not wearing a seat belt. However, because the Seatbelt Enforcement Act can be applied in conformity with this holding, we conclude that it is constitutional.

Background

It is important to understand that the plaintiffs in this lawsuit do not challenge or seek to overturn the Indiana law requiring seat belt use. Instead, this lawsuit is about another provision of Indiana law governing enforcement of the seat belt use requirement.

In 1985, the Indiana General Assembly added a new chapter to the Indiana Code mandating that drivers and passengers in motor vehicles wear seat belts in certain circumstances. P.L. 122-1985, § 1, now codified at Ind.Code § 9-19-10-2.1 When the legislature passed this law, it provided in section 3 of the new chapter: "A person may not be stopped, inspected, or detained solely to determine compliance with this chapter." P.L. 122-1985, § 1, now codified at Ind.Code § 9-19-10-3.2 The courts held that this provision prohibited a police officer from simply "[w]atching for and then pulling over" a passing driver who was not wearing a seat belt. State v. Eilers, 697 N.E.2d 969, 971 (Ind.Ct. App.1998).

In 1998, the legislature amended this provision twice. First, P.L. 57-1998 added a new section 2.5 to the seat belt chapter, requiring children between the ages of four and twelve properly to be fastened and restrained by a child passenger restraint system or safety belt.3 It then changed section 3 to provide that a "person may not be stopped, inspected, or detained solely to determine compliance with this chapter" except for "a stop, an inspection, or a detention of a person to determine compliance with" section 2.5. Later in the same session of the legislature, section 3 was rewritten in P.L. 116-1998 to provide: "A vehicle may be stopped to determine compliance with this chapter. However, a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of this chapter." We will refer to section 3 (Ind. Code § 9-19-10-3) as amended in P.L. 116-1998 as the "Seatbelt Enforcement Act."

Shortly after Governor O'Bannon signed P.L. 116-1998 into law, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Hendricks Circuit Court. They sought a declaratory judgment that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act violated the federal and state constitutions and a permanent injunction barring its enforcement. The Hendricks Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the law.

Utilizing the fact that the plaintiffs claimed that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act violated the federal constitution in several respects, the defendants transferred the lawsuit to federal court and sought to have the temporary restraining order dissolved. They were successful. In dissolving the restraining order, United States District Court Judge John D. Tinder issued a written decision addressing many of the issues in this case. We find ourselves largely in agreement with Judge Tinder's analysis.

After Judge Tinder ruled, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to eliminate all their contentions that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act violated the federal constitution and asked to have the case transferred back to our state court system. This request was granted and the case returned to Hendricks County. It was later transferred from the Circuit Court to a Superior Court.

Following arguments on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act violated art. I, § 11, of the Indiana Constitution and permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the statute. The defendants, represented by the Attorney General, appeal those rulings. Under Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(8), this court has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.4

Discussion

The Seatbelt Enforcement Act provides:

A vehicle may be stopped to determine compliance with this chapter. However, a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of this chapter.

Ind.Code § 9-19-10-3 (as amended by P.L. 116-1998, § 2). Article I, § 11, of the Indiana Constitution provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

The plaintiffs argue that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act violates art. I, § 11, because it:

authorizes and enables law enforcement officers to stop vehicles without probable cause. The language of the statute[ ] gives law enforcement officers unbridled discretion to stop motorists. An officer does not need probable cause under the new statute[ ] that a motorist is not wearing a seat belt in order to stop the motorist. The officer is empowered to make the stop for the purpose of determining that the motorist and passengers are wearing passenger restraints, even in cases where the officer has no reason to believe that the motorist or passenger are not wearing restraints.

(R. at 212; Second Am. Compl. for Decl. J. at 5.) The plaintiffs emphasize their contention by predicting that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act will result in lawlessness by Indiana police officers:5

The statutory authorization to law enforcement officials to make stops without probable cause, to "determine compliance" with the passenger restraint law, is not significantly different from prior violations of basic human rights imposed on motorists and pedestrians in this and other countries and in this and other times. The ability of a law enforcement official to stop a vehicle, pursuant to Indiana statute, in order to "determine compliance" with the requirement of wearing a seat belt, is an open and obvious invitation to officials to "inspect your papers," and other similar violations of basic privacy rights....
Enforcement of the new statute[ ] could create significant risks for high risk/at-risk groups for discriminatory targeting to accomplish the pretext of searching for weapons and drugs. Such groups include youths, minorities, and females who travel alone, who are also at high risk of sexual harassment/assault.

(R. at 212-13; Second Am. Compl. for Decl. J. at 5-6.)

I
A

The plaintiffs contend that art. I, § 11, prohibits an Indiana police officer from stopping a motorist to check whether the driver or passengers are wearing their seat belts unless the police officer has "probable cause" to believe that they are not. The Attorney General does not disagree, although he phrases his analysis slightly differently: "The Indiana Constitution mandates that a law enforcement officer have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a violation in order to legally stop a vehicle." (R. at 384; Mem. of Law in Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def. Baldwin's Cross-mot. for Summ. J. at 8.) Indeed, the Attorney General uses the expression "probable cause" interchangeably with "reasonable and articulable suspicion" at several points. Id.

We find it necessary to observe that even though the plaintiffs contend that the Seatbelt Enforcement Act violates art. I, § 11, of the Indiana Constitution, both they and the Attorney General largely use federal Fourth Amendment analysis and authority in pressing their arguments. But in Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind.1995), this Court enunciated a separate and distinct method of analysis for claims of search and seizure violations of the state constitution. Rather than employ federal concepts like the warrant requirement and probable cause requirement, we require instead that the State bear the burden of showing that, in the totality of the circumstances, the intrusion was reasonable. Id. at 79-80.

Since Brown, we have not had an occasion to define further the reasonableness requirement. However, shortly before we decided Brown, Judge Kirsch of the Court of Appeals, applying independent state constitutional analysis, examined the question of whether a brief police detention of an individual violated art. I, § 11. Taylor v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). As we were to do in Brown, Judge Kirsch found that the constitutional provision required the detention to be reasonable. He went on to conclude that a brief police detention of an...

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