Baldwin v. Spriggs

• Decision Date: 22 June 1886
• Citation: 5 A. 295,65 Md. 373
• Parties: BALDWIN AND OTHERS v. SPRIGGS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

5 A. 295

65 Md. 373

BALDWIN AND OTHERS v. SPRIGGS.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 22, 1886

Appeal from circuit court, Anne Arundel county.

Proceedings to probate a will claimed to have been revoked by the testator's subsequent marriage, and the birth of surviving issue. Decree for contestant, and proponent appeals.

Edward C. Gantt, for appellants.

James Revell and D. R. Magruder, for appellees.

STONE J.

There is no dispute about the material facts in this case. James Spriggs, of Anne Arundel county, on the twenty-fifth of July 1865, duly executed his will. By that will he disposed of all the property real and personal, which he then owned. James Spriggs, at the time of the execution of the said will, had a wife, Ruth Spriggs, then living, and several children by her also living. By his said will he devised all his property to said wife and children. His wife, Ruth, died in 1871, and said James, soon after the death of said Ruth, about 1874, intermarried with Maggie E. Vane, and also had by her several children. Said James Spriggs died in January, 1886, leaving a widow, the said Maggie E. Spriggs, and the children of both said Ruth and Maggie E. surviving him. After the execution of the will the said James Spriggs purchased certain other real estate which was unaffected by said will. His will, as to his real estate, contained no residuary clause, but disposed of all the real estate he owned at its date, by specific description. After the death of James Spriggs his will was offered for probate in the orphans' court of Anne Arundel county, and a caveat was filed thereto by his second wife, Maggie E. Spriggs, in behalf of herself and her children, and upon such caveat plenary proceedings were had, and the orphans' court ordered and decreed that said will was revoked by his subsequent marriage and the birth of issue, and refused to admit the paper to probate. From this decree the children of the first wife have appealed to this court.

These are all the facts necessary to elucidate the legal proposition which we are called upon to decide, and which is simply whether, upon this state of the facts, the will of James Spriggs has been revoked by operation of law. It would be a profitless task to review all the English cases on this subject. They may be found by the curious fully discussed by Chancellor KENT with his usual ability in the case of Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 506. It is enough for us to say that, after a good deal of doubt and hesitation, it was finally settled in England, before our Revolution, that marriage and issue taken together did amount to an implied revocation of a will previously made, and that such implied revocations were not within the statute of frauds, but that such implied revocations might be rebutted and controlled by circumstances. The final determination of the matter seems to have been reached by the cases of Christopher v. Christopher, (decided by the court of exchequer, C. B. PARKER, presiding, in 1771,) 2 Dickens, 445, and in the case of Spraage v. Stone, (decided in 1773,) Amb. 721. These cases appear to have definitely settled the law that a subsequent marriage and birth of a child, standing alone, and unaccompanied by other circumstances, amount to an implied revocation of a will.

The whole subject, says Chancellor KENT, has continued to receive great discussion in the English courts since the era of our Revolution, growing out of new cases constantly arising amidst the endless variety of human affairs. The most important of the English cases since the Revolution is the case of Marston v. Fox, (decided in 1838 by 14 out of the 15 English judges,) 8 Adol. & E. 14, where the general doctrine we have stated was reaffirmed. We will recur to this case again for another purpose. But we are not without decisive authority in our own state. The unreported case of Sedwick v. Sedwick, decided at June term, 1844, was a case similar to the one at bar. And the court of appeals decided that the subsequent marriage, and birth of a child, did revoke the will, and they affirmed the decree of the orphans' court refusing it probate. No opinion was filed in the case, although a large amount of property was involved, and the case was argued by some of the most eminent counsel in Maryland. But they did flatly decide the question by a decree declaring the will revoked by the subsequent marriage and birth of a child.

But while such is the general rule, like other general rules, it has been held in England subject to some exceptions. Among the exceptions is the one where the testator has made provision for his children born after the execution of the will. As the origin of the rule was the duty of the parent to provide for his offspring, this exception seems right and proper. Another matter upon which the English courts have exercised themselves is the determination of the ground upon which the doctrine of implied revocation ought to be rested. This is of practical importance in this case, and will require some examination. Lord MANSFIELD, in the case of Brady v. Cubitt, 1 Doug. 31 thought the rule should rest on the presumption that the testator intended to revoke his will, and that it therefore followed that such presumption might be rebutted by even parol evidence,--to use his own words, that such presumption might be rebutted by "every sort of evidence." But Lord MANSFIELD'S view seems to us irreconcilable with the statute of frauds. It would in effect allow the will to be revoked by the subsequent intention of the testator, without such intention being evidenced by the positive acts so expressly required by that statute. That view leads to another difficulty: that the testator may change his first intention, and adopt a contrary one; and, if so, which of the two intentions is to prevail? The conclusion, however,...