Baldwin v. State
| Decision Date | 15 November 1923 |
| Docket Number | 24,144 |
| Citation | 141 N.E. 343,194 Ind. 303 |
| Parties | Baldwin v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied February 20, 1924.
From Marion Criminal Court (52,666); James A. Collins, Judge.
Wesley Baldwin was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without displaying number plates, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. Fred Masters and U. Z. Wiley, for appellant.
U. S Lesh, Attorney-General, and Mrs. Edward Franklin White Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with operating a motor vehicle, to wit, a truck, upon public streets and highways in Marion county, Indiana, without displaying any number plates, in violation of Acts 1921 p. 579, § 10472 Burns' Supp. 1921.
Appellant filed below a motion to quash said affidavit, specifying in such motion two grounds: (1) "that the affidavit filed against him herein does not state sufficient facts to constitute a public offense; (2) that the affidavit filed herein against the defendants does not state an offense with sufficient certainty."
This motion was overruled, to which the appellant duly excepted, and upon a trial he was found guilty. He filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the judgment and finding were not sustained by sufficient evidence, and also were contrary to law, and for alleged error occurring upon the trial in the admission and rejection of evidence, which said motion was overruled, and appellant claims in this appeal that the court below erred both in overruling the motion to quash and in overruling the motion for a new trial.
The evidence showed that appellant was driving and operating a motor vehicle known as a truck, upon the public streets in said county, upon which motor vehicle no number plates were displayed.
It is first contended by the appellant that the title to the act upon which this prosecution was based is not broad enough to authorize or require the payment of a license fee. The act in question requires the payment of a license fee, or toll charge, to secure number plates, which are to be displayed upon the motor vehicle.
The above act amended the act of 1913, Acts 1913 p. 779, and it is the title to this original act which appellant questions. The title of said act reads as follows: "An Act defining motor vehicles and providing for the registration, numbering and regulation of same, defining chauffeurs and providing for the examination and licensing thereof, and providing for punishment for the violation," etc.
It is appellant's contention that nothing in this title would authorize the legislature to embody in the act a provision for the collection of a license fee, or registration fee.
It is only the subject of the act and not the matters properly connected therewith that need be expressed in the title. The authority to regulate includes the authority to license. Tomlinson v. City of Indianapolis (1896), 144 Ind. 142, 36 L.R.A. 413, 43 N.E. 9; St. Johnsburg v. Thompson (1887), 59 Vt. 300, 9 A. 571, 59 Am. Rep. 731; Vernor v. Secretary of State (1913), 179 Mich. 157, 146 N.W. 338, Ann. Cas. 1915D 128.
The title to the act in question, which covers the registration and regulation of motor vehicles, included the subject of licensing or collecting a toll therefor and was sufficient. Note to 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 949.
It is also contended that the act in question covers more than one subject and is therefore in violation of the constitutional provision restricting acts to one subject. The Constitution restricts an act to one subject and matters properly connected therewith. Art. 4, § 19 Constitution, § 115 Burns 1914.
The act here only embraces the subject of motor vehicles and matters properly connected therewith, to wit, the regulation and operation thereof. Isenhour v. State (1901), 157 Ind. 517, 87 Am. St. 228, 62 N.E. 40.
It is claimed by the appellant that the act in question violates both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and also the bill of rights of the Constitution of Indiana, in that it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens and denies them equal protection of the law, and that it grants to certain citizens, or classes of citizens, privileges or immunities which do not upon the same terms belong to all citizens.
The first section of the act of 1921, Acts 1921 p. 579, § 10465 Burns' Supp. 1921, provides that every owner of a motor vehicle shall make application to the secretary of state for registration.
Section two of said act, § 10467 Burns' Supp. 1921, provides that the secretary of state shall assign to such motor vehicle a distinctive number and deliver two number plates therefor to such owner.
Section three of said act, § 10472 Burns' Supp. 1921, provides that such number plates shall be conspicuously displayed on such motor vehicle when driving or used upon the public streets, etc.
Section four of said act, § 10469 Burns' Supp. 1921, then provides the fees to be paid the secretary of state for such registration, and it is this section which appellant claims is discriminatory and in violation of the above constitutional guaranties. Said section last above referred to first provides for the payment of a certain graduated fee, or toll charge, for all motor vehicles, the amount to be determined according to the horse power of the motor vehicle. It then provides for a higher charge for the class of motor vehicles known as trucks, and excepts hearses and funeral cars from the classification of trucks. It is claimed by appellant that this is unreasonable and unauthorized distinction, or classification, which violates his constitutional rights.
A reasonable classification for purposes of legislation is not prohibited by either the federal or state Constitution. All that is required is that the law operate alike upon all persons similarly situated. The classification cannot be arbitrary, but must be reasonable. However, the classification will be upheld unless it is so manifestly inequitable and unjust that it would cause an imposition of a burden on one class to the exclusion of another without reasonable distinction.
It is primarily for the legislature to determine the classification and is never a judicial question unless the classification under no circumstances can be viewed as reasonable. When the classification in a law is questioned, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts must be presumed. 6 R. C. L. pp. 373-385; City of...
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