Baldwin v. State
Decision Date | 17 August 1971 |
Docket Number | 5 Div. 7 |
Citation | 47 Ala.App. 136,251 So.2d 633 |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Parties | Willie BALDWIN v. STATE. |
Russell, Raymon & Russell, Tuskegee, for appellant.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Morrow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Macon County of Robbery and sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary.
At the trial the State's evidence tended to show that the appellant was living in Tuskegee with a man named Jeeter, whose home was next to Lillian Foy Ivey, a seventy year old woman. Around 8:00 or 8:30 P.M. on the night of October, 1967, the appellant knocked at this woman's back door and asked if she had a room to rent. She replied that she did not and then he asked for a drink of water. The woman gave him a glass of water and when she opened the screen door to retrieve the glass, the appellant stepped inside her house and told her he wanted her money. He struck her twice in the face and choked her until she gave him a five dollar gold piece and a ten dollar bill. The appellant testified in his own behalf and denied the robbery.
The only question presented on this appeal involves the pleading of double jeopardy.
The indictment was returned on April 18, 1968. At arraignment on April 24, 1968, counsel was appointed to represent appellant due to his indigency. After the attorney was appointed he had a brief conversation with the appellant and after the appellant assured the attorney of his innocence a plea of not guilty was entered. Later that same day, after appellant's counsel had a conversation with the 'clerk' he filed written pleas of autrefois convict and former jeopardy properly verified in accordance with Tit. 15, § 280, Code, 1940, alleging that appellant had formerly been convicted of assault and battery in the Inferior Court of Macon County, Alabama. It was further alleged that the instant indictment for robbery is based on the same act or transaction as his conviction for assault and battery. The trial court allowed these pleas to be entered and later, on April 29, 1968, the day the case was set for trial, struck them ex mero motu.
For a better understanding of what transpired, we quote from the record:
The question then is whether the trial court abused its discretion in striking these pleas after first having allowed them.
We first address ourselves to whether the pleas are meritorious if properly proven.
Art. 1, § 9, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 provides that 'no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb * * *.'
A single crime cannot be split up, or divided, into two or more offenses. Hurst v. State, 86 Ala. 604, 6 So. 120. Neither can a series of charges be based upon the same act. Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632; Clayborne v. State, 103 Ala. 53, 15 So. 842; Crosswhite v. State, 31 Ala.App. 181, 13 So.2d 693.
Tit. 15, § 287, Code, 1940, provides:
'Any act or omission declared criminal and punishable in different ways by different provisions of law, shall be punished only under one of such provisions, and a conviction or acquittal under any one shall bar a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other provision.'
In Moore v. State, 71 Ala. 307, where a former conviction of assault and battery was held to preclude a subsequent prosecution for assault with intent to murder, the court said:
'* * * The true rule seems to be, that, if the minor offense is embraced within the major one, as a constituent element, or component part of it, and on the trial of the one there can be a conviction of the other, then a former conviction or acquittal of the minor will bar the major.--Whart. Cr.Ev. § 584; 1 Bish. Cr.Law, §§ 1055--1058. This is certainly the general rule, subject, perhaps, to certain exceptions, either real or apparent.--1 Whart. Amer.Cr.Law, § 563, 566. If such were not the case, as suggested by Mr. Bishop, 'then the prosecutor may begin with the smallest, and obtain successive convictions, ending with the largest (offense); while, if he had begun with the largest, he must there stop--a conclusion repugnant to good sense.'--1 Bish. Cr.Law (6th Ed.) §§ 1057, 1055.
'A conclusive reason for the soundness of this view, to our mind, is, that if a defendant has been tried for the smaller offense--whether acquitted or convicted it is immaterial--and he is...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Smith v. State
...23, 20 So. 632; Clayborne v. State, 103 Ala. 53, 15 So. 842; Crosswhite v. State, 31 Ala.App. 181, 13 So.2d 693." Baldwin v. State, 47 Ala.App. 136, 251 So.2d 633 (1971); Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137 "The State is without authority to split up one crime and prosecute it in parts. Savage v. ......
-
Phillips v. State
...that a single crime may not be subdivided into multiple offenses, nor a series of charges based on the same act. Baldwin v. State, 47 Ala.App. 136, 251 So.2d 633 (1971); Crosswhite v. State, 31 Ala.App. 181, 13 So.2d 693 (1943). Although combined in one transaction, appellant clearly commit......
-
Phillips v. State, No. CR-06-1577 (Ala. Crim. App. 5/28/2010)
...that a single crime may not be subdivided into multiple offenses, nor a series of charges based on the same act. Baldwin v. State, 47 Ala. App. 136, 251 So. 2d 633 (1971); Crosswhite v. State, 31 Ala. App. 181, 13 So. 2d 693 (1943). Although combined in one transaction, appellant clearly co......
-
Connolly v. State
...at 315-16 (1970) (footnotes omitted). "A single crime cannot be split up, or divided, into two or more offenses." Baldwin v. State, 47 Ala.App. 136, 140, 251 So.2d 633 (1971) (conviction for assault and battery bars prosecution for robbery). Thomas v. State, 41 Ala.App 525, 526, 138 So.2d 2......