Baldy v. Stratton

• Decision Date: 11 July 1849
• Citation: 11 Pa. 316
• Parties: PAUL R. BALDY <I>v.</I> FRANCES STRATTON.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

11 Pa. 316

PAUL R. BALDY v. FRANCES STRATTON.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 11, 1849.

July 11.

WRIT of error to the Common Pleas of Columbia.

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Bancroft, for the plaintiff in error.

Pleasants, Cooper, and Comly, for defendant in error.

The opinion of this court was delivered by ROGERS, J.

Although an action for breach of a promise of marriage is an action on a contract, yet the circumstances which attend its breach, before, at the time, and after, may be given in evidence in aggravation of damages. This I have never known to be disputed; and so far has this principle been extended, that Chief Justice Parsons, a jurist of acknowledged talents, in Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. Rep. 73, ruled, that where seduction has been practised under colour of a promise of marriage, the jury may consider it to aggravate the damages in an action on the contract. The plaintiff in error principally relies on Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Barr, 80 contending, on the authority of that case, that a contract of marriage is to be construed by the rules of the construction of contracts generally; but that case decides nothing more than that, in an action for promise of marriage, seduction cannot be given in evidence; first, because the plaintiff cannot claim compensation for her own guilt; and this, it seems, is principally on the ground, that if the daughter could give evidence of seduction in her action on the promise, the defendant would be doubly exposed to vindictive damages; inasmuch as the father could give such evidence in his action of the seduction. And for the same reason, in Foster v. Scofield, 1 Johns. Rep. 299, it is ruled, that in an action brought by the father for the seduction of the daughter, the daughter cannot be a witness to prove a previous promise of marriage in aggravation of damages, for she has her own right of action for the breach of the promise. The cases cited depend on the rational principle, that each is a substantive ground of action, pertaining to different persons, and it would be a wrong to the defendant, to permit him to be twice mulcted for the same offence. But in neither of these cases is it doubted, but, on the contrary, it is expressly admitted, that where these objections do not occur, his improper conduct, in which she does not participate, and is not at all to blame, may be given in evidence, to enhance the damages for such heartless, unprincipled, insulting, and outrageous behaviour to the person he has cruelly deceived. It would be a mockery of justice to confine the jury to give compensation merely for the value of a worthless husband; for that would, in every case, be equivalent to saying that the plaintiff should be entitled to nothing. So far, it is true, it is an action on a contract, but you may, notwithstanding, under peculiar circumstances, which it is impossible particularly to point out, recover exemplary or vindictive damages; in that respect, the action partakes of the nature of a tort. In the case in hand, we see nothing in the charge to which just exception can be taken. The court evince an anxious desire to induce the jury to discard from their minds all considerations arising out of the seduction of the plaintiff, whether effectually or not it is not our place to determine. "Much has been said (say the court) incidentally of the seduction of the plaintiff by the defendant, but the court have already refused to hear evidence on that point; and we lay down the law to you, that you cannot take into consideration the seduction, in order to increase or aggravate the damages. When a woman has criminal intercourse with a man, it is their mutual imprudence, their reciprocal offence: she cannot maintain an action against the man for their illicit connexion; she cannot make her seduction a ground of recovery directly, nor can she do so incidentally, in an action for breach of promise of marriage." The court say everything that can be reasonably expected, to guard the jury against any influence which does not legitimately belong to the case. There is nothing we can perceive in the charge calculated to "mislead the jury, to increase prejudices already greatly excited, or any evidence that the judge partook strongly of the...