Ball-Foster Glass v. Amer. Flint Glass Workers

• Decision Date: 03 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 1:01CV176.,Civ. 1:01CV176.
• Citation: 354 F.Supp.2d 839
• Parties: BALL-FOSTER GLASS CONTAINER CO., L.L.C. (n/k/a Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc.), Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FLINT GLASS WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO and American Flint Glass Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Local No. 150, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

354 F.Supp.2d 839

BALL-FOSTER GLASS CONTAINER CO., L.L.C. (n/k/a Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc.), Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FLINT GLASS WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO and American Flint Glass Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Local No. 150, Defendants.

No. Civ. 1:01CV176.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

January 3, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey M. Mallamad, Karl L. Mulvaney, Michael W. Padgett, Bingham McHale, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

Jules L. Smith, pro hac vice, Blitman & King, LLP, Rochester, NY, for defendant.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants, American Flint Glass Workers' Union, AFL-CIO ("AFGWU") and American Flint Glass Workers' Union, Local No. 150, AFL-CIO ("Local No. 150", and, together with the AFGWU, the "Union"), filed their motion for summary judgment on September 20, 2001. The plaintiff, Ball-Foster Container Co., LLC, (n/k/a Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc.)("Saint-Gobain"), filed its cross-motion for summary judgment on October 22, 2001. The parties completed briefing both motions on December 12, 2001.

For the following reasons, the Union's motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, and Saint-Gobain's cross-motion for summary judgment will be denied.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. In Re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High School District No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992)(quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits", if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind.1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983).

So that the district court may readily determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, under Local Rule 56.1, the moving party is obligated to file with the court a "Statement of Material Facts" supported by appropriate citation to the record to which the moving party contends no genuine issues exist. In addition, the non-movant is obligated to file with the court a "Statement of Genuine Issues" supported by appropriate citation to the record outlining all material facts to which the non-movant contends exist that must be litigated. See, Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp. et al., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir.1994). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Furthermore, in determining the motion for summary judgment, the court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are controverted in the "Statement of Genuine Issues" filed in opposition to the motion. L.R. 56.1

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Finally, the court notes that, "[i]t is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983).

Discussion

On April 27, 2001, Saint-Gobain commenced this action seeking vacatur of an arbitration award. On September 7, 2001, the Union filed a counterclaim seeking enforcement of the arbitration award. In the motions presently before the court, the Union requests summary judgment enforcing the arbitration award and ordering Saint-Gobain's compliance therewith, dismissing Saint-Gobain's complaint, and awarding the Union the attorneys fees and costs incurred in this litigation. Saint-Gobain's cross-motion for summary judgment requests that the arbitrator's decision be vacated in its entirety.

Saint-Gobain is a manufacturer of glass containers for the food and beverage industry. The company came into existence in September 1995 when it acquired plants and equipment formerly owned and operated by Ball Glass Container Corporation and Foster-Forbes Division of American National Can Co. Saint-Gobain currently operates 18 plants, all former Ball Glass Container Corporation or Foster-Forbes plants, located throughout the United States and employs approximately 6,000 employees. Among these 6,000 employees, there are approximately 200 bargaining-unit employees, including the grievant, represented by the defendant Union. The remainder of the bargaining-unit employees are represented by the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (GMP).

Employees represented by the defendant Union worked under the jurisdiction of a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the Union and the Glass Container Industrial Relations Council (GCIRC), of which Saint-Gobain is a member employer. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Union and the GCIRC, effective September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1999, was in effect at the time of the filing of the grievance underlying the present motions. The CBA contains provisions regarding pension benefits in Article 18 (Pensions) and Article 20 (Restoration of Service). In addition, Saint-Gobain (then Ball-Foster Glass Container Co., LLC) entered into a Letter of Understanding with the Union dated April 11, 1996 with respect to pension benefits. This Letter of Understanding was attached to and made a part of the CBA.

On December 30, 2000, Arbitrator Michael E. Zobrak issued an arbitration decision and award in which he determined that employee Homer Vogan was entitled to retirement benefits service for his employment at the Foster-Forbes Glass Company plant in Oil City, Pennsylvania between April 19, 1966 and April 13, 1984. Saint-Gobain has refused to comply with the Arbitrator's Decision, which directed that Mr. Vogan be credited with retirement benefits service for his prior employment at the Oil City plant.

The CBA, in Article 25, Presentation of Grievances, provided for final and binding arbitration of contract grievances in dispute between the parties:

Step 5. If the grievance is not settled in Step 4, it may be submitted to arbitration at the request of either the National President of the Union or the Manufacturer, and the decision of the arbitrator will be final and binding.

The Union filed a grievance on behalf of Mr. Vogan on April 11, 1997. The grievance asserted that Saint-Gobain was in violation of Article 18 of the CBA¹ and the April 11, 1996 Letter of Understanding.² The grievance demanded that...